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Abstract 
A long-standing dichotomy in neuroscience pits automatic or reflexive drivers of 
behaviour against deliberate or reflective processes. In this thesis I explore how 
this  concept  applies  to  two  stages  of  action  control:  decision-making  and 
response inhibition. 
The first part of this thesis examines the decision-making process itself during 
which  actions  need  to  be  selected  that  maximise  rewards.  Decisions  arise 
through influences from model-free stimulus-response associations as well as 
model-based, goal-directed thought. Using a task that quantifies their respective 
contributions, I describe three studies that manipulate the balance of control 
between  these  two  systems.  I  find  that  a  pharmacological  manipulation  with 
levodopa increases model-based control without affecting model-free function; 
disruption  of  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  via  magnetic  stimulation  disrupts 
model-based  control;  and  direct  current  stimulation  to  the  same  prefrontal 
region  has  no  effect  on  decision-making.  I  then  examine  how  the  intricate 
anatomy  of  frontostriatal  circuits  subserves  reinforcement  learning  using 
functional, structural and diffusion magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). 
A  second  stage  of  action  control  discussed  in  this  thesis  is  post-decision 
monitoring  and  adjustment  of  action.  Specifically,  I  develop  a  response 
inhibition  task  that  dissociates  reactive,  bottom-up  inhibitory  control  from 
proactive, top-down forms of inhibition. Using functional MRI I show that, unlike 
the strong neural segregation in decision-making systems, neural mechanisms 
of reactive and proactive response inhibition overlap to a great extent in their 
frontostriatal  circuitry.  This  leads  to  the  hypothesis  that  neural  decline,  for  
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example in the context of ageing, might affect reactive and proactive control 
similarly.  I  test  this  in  a  large  population  study  administered  through  a 
smartphone  app.  This  shows  that,  against  my  prediction,  reactive  control 
reliably  declines  with  age  but  proactive  control  shows  no  such  decline. 
Furthermore,  in  line  with  data  on  gender  differences  in  age-related  neural 
degradation,  reactive  control  in  men  declines  faster  with  age  than  that  of 
women. 
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1.1  Conceptual overview  
This thesis addresses how the human brain supports reward learning, decision-
making  and  action  control.  It  builds  on  a  large  body  of  work  describing 
behavioural  models  of  action  control  and  the  functional  neuroanatomy  of 
decision-making when rewards and punishments are at stake. In this chapter I 
will  provide  an  outline  of  the  work,  define  the  key  terms  that  will  be  used 
throughout this thesis and present an overview of the chapters.  
Human decisions are shaped by countless factors. We often deliberate on our 
choices, agonizing over the possible consequences of our actions by weighing 
the risks against the gains. This process plays out over seconds, minutes or 
many days. Thankfully we do not need to invest such mental effort for each 
action we take, as the limited capacity of our brain suggests we would grind to a 
halt just making breakfast in the morning. Instead we automate many of our 
decisions, making it unnecessary or even impossible for deliberate thought to 
intervene. A prominent example is addiction, whereby a once deliberate choice 
to  take  drugs,  try  gambling  or  go  shopping  becomes  so  engrained  in  our 
decision-making machinery that no amount of consideration of likely negative 
consequences  prevent  these  maladaptive  behaviours  from  expressing 
themselves.  
The first aim of the work in this thesis is to better understand what neural factors 
determine the extent to which humans use more complex or simple strategies in 
our  decisions.  I  will  explore  how  to  directly  manipulate  the  use  of  these 
strategies through dopamine and brain stimulation. Using neuroimaging I will 
ask how these value-based decisions are implemented in subcortical structures 
such  as  the  basal  ganglia.  The  second  aim  is  to  understand  how,  after  a Introduction 
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decision has been made, we exert rapid self-control to alter these decisions in 
response to changing circumstances. Most of this work focuses on the role of 
preparation in the execution of rapid self-control. 
1.2  Definitions 
1.2.1  Rewards, values, models and decisions 
Many  terms  in  the  field  of  learning  and  decision-making  have  intuitive 
meanings; nevertheless we should define them more precisely. A fundamental 
concept is that of reward, which is operationalised as the ‘intrinsic desirability of 
a state’ (Sutton and Barto, 1998). More broadly it is whatever an organism tries 
to  maximise  over  the  long  run,  and  can  be  further  classified:  unconditioned 
reinforcers are desirable in and of themselves possible by virtue of the engine of 
evolution,  manifest  in  the  desirability  of  water,  food  and  sex;  conditioned 
reinforcers  are  desirable  only  by  virtue  of  their  association  with  other 
reinforcers, as in the case of money which can buy all three rewards mentioned 
above. The maximization of reward is achieved by calculating values at each 
decision point. The value function describes, for each available action or state, 
how  much  reward  it  will  yield  in  the  long  run.  For  example,  the  immediate 
reward of being in an airport might be considered low, but the value of that 
same  state  is  high  if  airports  predict  holidays  and  conferences  in  the  near 
future.  Typically,  we  try  to  understand  an  organism’s  value  function  by 
examining how it is expressed in choice.  
The field of reinforcement learning is, to a large extent, concerned with efficient 
ways of calculating values. Two such ways, model-based and model-free, play 
a prominent role throughout this thesis, and are discussed in-depth in section 
2.2.  It  is  worth  briefly  discussing  the  notion  of  a  model:  it  refers  to  any Introduction 
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representation that mimics the behaviour of the environment, for example a set 
of rooms in a building and the way they are connected. These models can be 
used for planning and calculating the value function on-line. This differs critically 
from what has been defined as model-free algorithms, which lack such a model 
of the environment and use more primitive methods of approximating value.  
At  this  point  we  have  discussed  rewards,  values  and  models.  What  are 
‘decisions’  in  this  framework?  Decisions  are  often  taken  to  involve  some 
conscious,  deliberative  effort  by  the  organism.  But  decades  of  psychological 
research has  shown that many actions are reflexive, model-free or habitual, i.e. 
driven without any deliberation. Here I consider any action derived from a value 
function to be a decision, therefore including both model-free and model-based 
actions. Although the definition of the terms as presented here comes from the 
field  of  reinforcement  learning,  these  notions  pervade  psychology,  cognitive 
neuroscience and economics.  
1.2.2  Self-control 
We can think of decision-making as a fallible process that needs both time and, 
now  and then, post-decision  adjustment. A failure to do  so  leads  to  what  is 
varyingly  called  impulsivity  or  a  lack  of  self-control.  These  are  multifactorial 
concepts (Evenden, 1999), though always defined in the context of poor actions 
leading  to  undesirable  outcomes.  In  chapters  9  and  10  I  will  specifically 
consider  post-decision  inhibitory  self-control,  or  more  plainly,  the  ability  to 
prevent an action as it is about to be executed. Although this type of self-control 
should  be  considered  distinct  from  self-control  at  the  time  of  choice,  its 
impairment can be observed just the same in, for example, addiction (Ersche et 
al., 2012). One promising avenue in the study of self-control is how we prepare Introduction 
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for situations that will challenge our ability to inhibit our actions. For example, a 
recovering drug addict might resolve not to approach a dealer on the street, 
rather  than  rely  on  their  immediate  ability  to  stop  themselves  in  case  the 
situation  arises.  Such  proactive  control,  then,  is  intimately  linked  with  goal-
directed  choice,  and  is  similarly  thought  to  rely  on  working  memory, 
maintenance of future goals and top-down control originating in frontal cortex 
(Aron, 2011; Braver, 2012; Schall and Godlove, 2012). 
1.3  Outline of thesis 
I will start by reviewing the literature on reinforcement learning and the central 
role  it  occupies  in  the  psychology  and  neuroscience  of  reward  learning  and 
decision-making. In particular, I will discuss recent advances in understanding 
how multiple reinforcement learning systems in the brain trade off and compete 
with  one  another.  This  will  be  followed  by  an  overview  of  the  literature  on 
inhibitory self-control, focusing on notions of proactive and selective inhibition 
and  their  neural  correlates.  Chapter  3  provides  a  background  on  the 
methodology used in the subsequent chapters.  
The empirical work in this thesis is divided into two parts. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
present work on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. In chapter 
5  I  employed a  systemic manipulation  of dopamine  levels.  This is  known  to 
affect both model-free and model-based control separately, but I provide novel 
insights into its effects when both types of control are allowed to compete. In an 
effort  to  pin  down  the  anatomy  of  this  trade-off,  chapters  6  and  7  examine 
prefrontal  roles  in  reinforcement  learning  by  applying  a  transient  functional 
lesion  or  supposed  gain-of-function  through  neurostimulation,  respectively. 
Together, these three chapters provide novel insights into direct alterations of Introduction 
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decision-making  strategies.  I  then  ask  how  action  values  and  rewards  from 
reinforcement  learning  models  are  represented  in  the  anatomy  of  the  basal 
ganglia and its recurrent loops with the cortex, using a combination of structural, 
diffusion-weighted and functional imaging.  
The second half of the empirical work centres on a paradigm for investigating 
the  role  of  preparation  in  selective  inhibitory  control  of  action.  Chapter  9 
presents a novel characterization of behaviour on this task, before examining 
how preparation is implemented in neural structures known to be involved in 
outright inhibition. In brief, the task allows simultaneous measurement of the 
speed and selectivity of inhibition, and I ask how this trade-off is reflected in 
neural structures. Chapter 10 then applies this same paradigm on a much larger 
scale  by  means  of  a  smartphone  experiment.  This  allowed  us  to  map  the 
demographics of proactive self-control. 
Finally, the discussion (chapter 11) I will discuss the implications of this work, 
drawing  together  insights  from  the  chapters  to  examine  the  link  between 
decision-making and self-control. 
   Literature review 
Chapter 2 
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2.1  Overview 
The work described in this thesis encompasses learning, decision-making and 
action control. In this chapter I start with an overview of reinforcement learning, 
describing its history in animal learning as well as in artificial intelligence, the 
underlying algorithms and its neural implementations. A distinction will be made 
between different solutions to the problem of reward maximization, and how an 
organism might arbitrate between distinct strategies.  
In a continually changing environment adaptive behaviour does not end with a 
value-based  decision.  Examining  adjustments  to  ongoing  actions  provides  a 
window  into  prefrontal  and  subcortical  control  mechanisms  that  are, 
fundamentally, rapid decision-making systems. I will review the concepts and 
models underlying the field of inhibitory self-control in section 2.3, and more 
recent work in the field examining how preparation and expectation shape self-
control. I end each section by explaining how outstanding questions in the field 
are addressed by the work that makes up the core of this thesis.  
2.2  Reinforcement learning 
2.2.1  Multiple solutions to the same problem 
If the long-term goal is survival and reproduction, the apparently trivial decisions 
we make throughout the day are what determine success. Understanding the 
building  blocks  of  such  adaptive  behaviour  in  a  complex  and  uncertain 
environment  can  be  guided  by  models  from  artificial  intelligence,  decision 
frameworks  in  economics,  and  heuristics,  biases  and  cognitive  strategies  in 
psychology. As we shall see in this review of the literature, the class of models I 
focus  on  reside  in  reinforcement  learning.  Its  algorithms  not  only  accurately Literature review 
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describe  value-based  learning  and  choice  in  humans;  but  also  provide 
suggestions for their efficient implementation in neural systems.  
Dual process theories, based on the notion that a problem can be solved in 
multiple  ways,  are  ubiquitous  in  psychology  and  artificial  intelligence. Within 
decision-making,  the  first  of  two  such  processes  has  been  called  System  1 
(Kahneman, 2011), unconscious, habitual (Dickinson, 1985), direct (Sutton and 
Barto, 1998), or model-free (Daw et al., 2005); the second process referred to 
as System 2 is conscious, goal-directed, indirect, or model-based, respectively. 
Here I adopt the nomenclature of model-free and model-based control, as the 
algorithms I implement are borrowed from reinforcement learning theory rather 
than psychology or economics. In Figure 2.1 I present characteristics of these 
two  modes  of  control.  A  major  trade-off  concerns  statistical  efficiency  and 
computational  power.  A  model-based  system  can  use  sparse  data  to  make 
predictions about never-seen-before situations, but at a cost of computationally 
expensive forward planning and calculation. In contrast, a model-free system 
can only rely on previous experience without extrapolation to novel situations, 
and in doing so is computationally lean and fast. Critically, this suggests that an 
organism needs to determine what controller to employ for any given problem, 
and this in turn depends on the statistics of the environment (Simon and Daw, 
2011). After discussing model-free and model-based reinforcement learning in 
sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, I will turn to the question of trade-off between these 
control strategies in section 2.2.4.  Literature review 
Chapter 2 
 
18 
 
 
Figure  2.1:  Model-free  and  model-based  decision  strategies  and  their 
characteristics. A similar set of contrasting properties can be used for many 
other dual-process theories of decision-making. 
2.2.2  Model-free RL 
2.2.2.1  Model-free control in animal and human psychology 
Attempts to understand animal behaviour started in earnest with Thorndike in 
the late 19
th century (Thorndike, 1898). He introduced the intuitive Law of Effect, 
noting that actions that are followed by pleasant consequences are likely to be 
repeated, whereas behaviour followed by unpleasant feedback is likely to be 
avoided  (Thorndike,  1911).  He  thus  placed  concepts  of  action,  reward  and 
learning within the same context. This behaviourist perspective involving error-
driven  learning  was  further  pursued  by  Skinner  using  operant  conditioning 
paradigms (Skinner, 1938). It is important to establish at this stage that this 
thesis is concerned with instrumental learning—that is, learning what actions to 
perform and what actions to avoid. This is distinct from classical conditioning 
illustrated  by  Ivan  Pavlov’s  work  (Pavlov,  1906),  whereby  associations  are 
learned  between  unconditioned  reinforcers  (e.g.  a  bell)  and  conditioned Literature review 
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reinforcers  (e.g.  food),  with  no  action  by  the  animal  itself.  Models  of 
conditioning, such as the Rescorla-Wagner update rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 
1972;  Wagner  and  Rescorla,  1972),  partially  share  the  mechanics  of  error-
driven updating with some instrumental learning models discussed in this thesis 
(though Rescorla has updated his view and considered Pavlovian learning to be 
equivalent  to  learning  a  model  of  the  environment;  Rescorla,  1988). 
Nonetheless,  I  will  restrict  my  discussion  to  action  learning  and  refer  to 
published works for more background on conditioning (Pavlov and Anrep, 1960; 
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pavlov, 2003; Gazzaniga, 2004). 
More directly relevant to a current understanding of model-free reinforcement 
learning is the work by Anthony Dickinson and colleagues. They developed the 
gold standard for assessing model-free (‘habitual’) behaviour in the form of the 
devaluation  paradigm  (Dickinson  et  al.,  1983;  Dickinson,  1985;  Balleine  and 
Dickinson, 1998). In this paradigm an animal is trained to press a lever to obtain 
food, and the food is subsequently devalued by lacing it with lithium or satiating 
the animal on that specific food. When placed back into the operant chamber, 
the  rat  will  continue  or  stop  pressing  the  lever  depending  on  whether  the 
learning phase was long or short, respectively. Given that the test phase is in 
extinction,  i.e.  without  feedback,  in  order  to  refrain  from  obtaining  the  now 
devalued food the rat must have a representation of the consequences of its 
action. This is termed goal-directed or model-based control. In contrast, once 
the  lever  pressing  has  been  engrained  as  a  model-free  habit  the  mere 
presentation of the lever stimulus triggers a response without consideration of 
its consequences. This stimulus-response behaviour is also called habitual or, 
as described throughout this thesis, model-free control. As we will see in section Literature review 
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2.2.2.4.3 this paradigm has been widely used to map the neural substrates of 
model-free control. 
Although  the  devaluation  paradigm  has  been  applied  to  humans  to  test  for 
model-free control (Valentin et al., 2007; Tricomi et al., 2009), in chapters 5, 6 
and  7  I  used  a  different  assay  that  captures  any  expression  of  model-free 
control  rather  than  habitual actions  that  have  been  ‘stamped  in’  during  over 
extended training sessions (Wise, 2004). 
2.2.2.2  Model-free control in artificial intelligence 
Most would agree that a robot pre-programmed to execute a set of tasks or 
movements,  such  as  those  found  in  19
th-century  factories,  is  not  intelligent. 
Slightly more complex are those machines whose actions depend, through pre-
set rules, on measurement of the environment—a thermostat or a movement-
activated lamp, for example. Yet more interesting are entities that can adapt 
and  learn  from  their  environment,  where  behaviour  is  not  fixed  but  is  now 
programmed  to  adapt.  The  field  of  artificial  intelligence,  and  in  particular 
reinforcement learning, has endeavoured to build such algorithms for the past 
sixty years. The goal is to find efficient ways of choosing actions that maximise 
reward. In the introduction to this thesis I introduced concepts like reward and 
value functions, and here I will briefly elaborate on specific examples of such 
algorithms.  It  has  proven  useful  to  think  of  (artificial)  behaviour  in  terms  of 
Markov  Decision  Processes  (MDPs;  Bellman,  1956;  Howard,  1960;  Markov, 
1971).  In  this  framework  the  agent  transitions  through  discrete  states,  and 
probabilistic transitions are governed by the choices of the agent. Rewards are 
available in some states, and the goal of the agent is to choose actions so as to 
maximise rewards in the long run. This framework can encompass both model-Literature review 
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free agents, as described shortly, as well as model-based agents (Figure 2.2A). 
Although  MDPs  are  widely  used,  there  is  a  mismatch  between  its  discrete 
states and the continuous nature of the world. An alternative way of evaluating 
these problems is through an estimation of some value quantity at each time 
step, whereby changes in this quantity represent good or bad actions (Minsky, 
1954).  This  is  captured  in  temporal  difference  learning  algorithms,  a  firmly 
established method for modelling reinforcement learning agents (Witten, 1977; 
Sutton and Barto, 1981; Barto and Sutton, 1982). Expectations are built into this 
framework  by  value  transferring  from  the  inherently  rewarding  stimuli  to 
predictors of those stimuli, as the predictors themselves come to increase the 
current estimate of long-run reward.  
One framework I describe here is that of Q-learning (Watkins, 1989; Watkins 
and  Dayan,  1992),  which  brings  together  various  aspects  of  MDPs  and 
temporal difference models to estimate state-action values (Q-values). Critically, 
Q-learning does not require a model of the environment unlike methods such as 
dynamic programming (section 2.2.3.2); it can update estimates incrementally 
without having to wait for a sequence to be finished, as is the case for Monte 
Carlo methods; it is often referred to as an off-policy method, meaning that it is 
guaranteed  to  acquire  the  optimal policy  even  when  allowed  to  explore  and 
choose  suboptimal  actions  (Watkins  and  Dayan,  1992).  This  distinguished  it 
from u Sarsa methods which are on-policy (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994). Put 
simply, an optimal policy can be learned faster under Q-learning despite the 
presence of exploration  (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Nonetheless, in chapter  4 
onwards  I  also  used  Sarsa,  a  slight  modification  on  Q-learning  that  is  only 
relevant to multi-step problems. It has been suggested that learning signals in Literature review 
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animals  resemble  Sarsa  rather  than  Q-learning  approaches  (Morris  et  al., 
2006). 
 
Figure 2.2: Schematics of two reinforcement learning strategies. (A) A model-
free agent takes the experience or feedback from actions and directly updates 
the  policy  without  an  intervening  model.  Model-based  control  has  an  added 
complexity whereby a policy arises from an evaluation of a model, which itself 
has been learned through experience. (B) Examining model-free learning more 
closely, action values are updated through a reward prediction error. Figure A is 
based on figure 9.2 in Sutton and Barto (1981). 
Having discussed developments in animal learning theory as well as in artificial 
intelligence, these two strands of research converged with work in the 1990s 
showing dopamine signals can be described in terms of reinforcement learning 
signals (Houk et al., 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). Finally, 
Daw  et  al.  (2005)  explicitly  framed  animal  and  human  temporal  difference 
learning  as  model-free  control.  In  the  next  two  sections  I  will  describe  the 
algorithm of Q-learning as used throughout this thesis, followed by an overview 
of the neural correlates of a model-free system in the rodent and primate brain.  
2.2.2.3  Algorithms Literature review 
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I will briefly describe the basics of Q-learning, an algorithm that describes how 
an agent without an explicit model of its environment might learn what actions to 
take and what actions to avoid (i.e. learn an optimal policy). The equations are 
adapted from Sutton and Barto (1998) and described in their one-step form, that 
is, without an eligibility trace that allows for action values more than a single 
action  back  in  the  past  to  be  updated.  The  implementation  of  a  two-step 
eligibility trace is described in section 4.4. 
Q-learning  attempts  to  learn  the  value  of  state-action  pairs  in  an  MDP 
environment.  The  MDP  consists  of  states  ? ∈ ?  where  actions  ? ∈ ?(?)  are 
available.  The  agent  tries  to  obtain  ?∗,  which  is  the  optimal  action-value 
function.  This  function  is  approximated  by,  at  each  time  ?,  computing  the 
following (Equation 6.6 in Sutton and Barto, 1998): 
?(??,??) ← ?(??,??) + ? [??+1 + ?max
?
?(??+1,?) − ?(??,??)] 
Where ?? is the immediate reward at time ?, ? is a fixed discount factor for future 
value, and max? ?(??+1,?) represents the action value of the best action in the 
state the agent ends up in after action ?? from ??. Critically, it does not depend 
on what action is actually chosen in ?(?+1). This is the only difference between 
Q-learning and Sarsa, which rather than the argmax uses the actual chosen 
option on the next state (in boldface, and as used in chapter 4; Rummery and 
Niranjan, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998):  
?(??,??) ← ?(??,??) + ?[??+1 + ?𝑸(??+𝛏,???+𝛏) − ?(??,??)]  
Central to the function of this agent is the learning rate ?, which describes the 
weighting function of past experiences, and the notion of reward prediction error Literature review 
Chapter 2 
 
24 
 
(RPE), which is the term multiplied by ?. A low ? means that the Q-values are 
updated slowly, such that even events far in the past still influence the current 
estimate. A learning rate of 1 means only the current event is used to estimate 
the Q-value through the RPE. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, in 
static or variably volatile environments a fixed learning rate is suboptimal (Yu 
and  Dayan,  2005;  Courville  et  al.,  2006;  Simon  and  Daw,  2011).  Variable 
learning  rates  have  been  implemented  in  Bayesian  frameworks  and  here 
correlates were also observed in the brain (Behrens et al., 2007a; Behrens et 
al., 2008). As I did not manipulate volatility in the learning experiments I used a 
more conventional fixed learning rate approach (Daw, 2011). 
Once the state-action values are known, an action is selected through some 
policy, for example by selecting the best action except on a random set of trials 
where an agent chooses randomly with probability 𝜀 (hence the policy’s name—
ε-greedy; e.g. Daw et al., 2006). Throughout this thesis I used a softmax rule, 
which assigns a probability to each of 𝑛 actions in a state: 
𝑝(??) =
𝑒
?∗𝑄??
∑ 𝑒
?∗𝑄?? ?
?=1
 
where ? is the inverse temperature. A low inverse temperature means all choice 
options  are  almost  equiprobable,  irrespective  of  their  Q-value.  High  inverse 
temperatures  pushes  choices  towards  the  option  with  the  highest  Q-value, 
irrespective of how small the difference might be. As such, this parameter is 
linked to the exploration/exploitation trade-off (Daw et al., 2006), though equally 
it captures the unpredictability (noise) in the agent’s choices. I added various 
parameters to these models in chapters 4-8 though these merely add a bias, Literature review 
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extra  learning  rate  or  eligibility  trace,  without  affecting  the  fundamental 
characteristics of a temporal difference model. I will now turn to the remarkable 
similarities  between  physiological  signals  and  components  of  the  algorithms 
described above, which is the real reason reinforcement learning has played 
such a central role in the neuroscience of learning and decision-making for the 
past 20 years.  
2.2.2.4  Neural correlates of model-free learning 
2.2.2.4.1 Dopamine signalling a prediction error 
No  paper  more  clearly  signalled  the  fusion  of  empirical  neuroscience  and 
computational neuroscience than  Schultz et al. (1997), who showed that the 
firing of cells in the dopaminergic midbrain resembles an update signal from 
temporal difference models. Previous work had already shown that dopamine 
neurons  fire  in  response  not  only  to  rewards  but  also  to  stimuli  predicting 
rewards  (Romo  and  Schultz,  1990;  Schultz  et  al.,  1993)  as  well  as  to 
unexpected  rewards  (Mirenowicz  and  Schultz,  1994).  In  parallel,  work  from 
Dayan, Houk et al. (1995) and Montague et al. (1996) developed theoretical 
frameworks  which  led  to  the  critical  insight  that  DA  neuron  firing  is  most 
parsimoniously  explained  in  terms  of  TD  learning  (Schultz  et  al.,  1997). 
Corroborating results have been found using various techniques, including fMRI 
of the midbrain (D'Ardenne et al., 2008; Duzel et al., 2009), human single-unit 
recordings (Zaghloul et al., 2009) and, perhaps most critically, in a rodent model 
whereby individual neurons in the midbrain were identified as dopaminergic or 
GABAergic  (Cohen  et  al.,  2012).  In  this  pivotal  study  it  was  shown  that 
dopamine  cells  indeed  signal a  reward  prediction  error,  whereas  GABAergic 
interneurons provide the expected value signal (Figure 2.3; Cohen et al., 2012). Literature review 
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Further evidence from optogenetic stimulation showed this pattern had causal 
properties in that phasic firing of DA neurons led to behavioural conditioning 
(Tsai et al., 2009). Lastly, it seems the RPE signalled by dopamine is derived 
from a Sarsa model rather than Q-learning (Morris et al., 2006). Over the past 
20 years, then, the dopamine system has been firmly embedded in model-free 
error-driven learning. However, we will see in chapter 11 that this signal might 
also reflect updates from more complex value systems such as model-based 
control (Daw et al., 2011).  
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Figure 2.3: Firing rates for identified dopaminergic and GABAergic cells in the 
ventral tegmental area. Dopaminergic cells increase their firing rate in response 
to an odour cue that has been learned to signal a big reward, in line with a 
theory for dopamine signalling a  temporal difference  reward prediction  error. 
GABAergic cells had a markedly different response profile—a sustained rather 
than transient pattern of firing that scaled with expected value. This suggests 
these  units  provide  the  subtractive  component  to  reward  prediction  error. 
Figures reproduced from Cohen et al. (2012). 
2.2.2.4.2 The anatomy of the basal ganglia 
If we accept that dopaminergic cells in the midbrain signal a reward prediction 
error to update action values, where might these values themselves be updated 
and  stored?  Ascending  dopaminergic  projections  arise  along  roughly  eight 
different pathways, of which the mesolimbic and nigrostriatal projections are the 
strongest  (Steiner  and  Tseng,  2010).  Both  these  pathways  project  to  the 
striatum:  the mesolimbic projections  enter the  nucleus accumbens,  the most 
rostroventral part of the striatum; the nigrostriatal pathway terminates all across 
the putamen and caudate nucleus (Fallon and Moore, 1978; Beckstead et al., 
1993; Haber et al., 2000).  
The  anatomy  and  structural  connectivity  of  the  striatum  continue  to  provide 
inspiration for empiricists and theorists. In chapter 8 I explore the relationship 
between this anatomy and how it relates to function, and in chapter 9 I study its 
function in proactive inhibitory control, so I will take some time here to make 
clear some of the anatomical features of the basal ganglia.  
Starting  at  the  macro-anatomical  level,  almost  all  of  cortex  projects  to  the 
striatum, which is the primary input region of the basal ganglia (Alexander et al., 
1986; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; DeLong, 1990; Haber et al., 2000; Haber, Literature review 
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2003).  These  pathways  then  continue  through  the  pallidum,  subthalamic 
nucleus, substantia nigra and thalamus before reaching cortex again, giving rise 
to the term cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical ‘loop’ (Alexander et al., 1986). 
This  was  initially  speculated  to  subserve  motor  control  by  funnelling  diverse 
inputs  directly  into  motor cortex  via  the  thalamus  (Kemp  and  Powell,  1971). 
Further  work  revealed  that  despite  a  strong  convergence  of  inputs,  cortical 
topography  is  maintained  throughout,  such  that  thalamo-cortical  projections 
reach most parts of cortex that provided the initial inputs. These pathways have 
been divided in many different ways, each with its own naming convention and 
grouping criteria (Alexander et al., 1986; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Haber, 
2003), a testament to the inherently continuous nature of any topographically 
organised  network  (Figure  2.4A;  Haber  and  Behrens,  2014).  Crudely,  these 
pathways encompass limbic, associative and motor loops, covering the entire 
frontal cortex as well as motor regions (Haber, 2010).  
A  microscopic level analysis of  the  striatum  shows  glutamatergic projections 
from  cortex  arriving  on  dendrites  of  GABAergic  medium  spiny  projection 
neurons (MSNs; Somogyi et al., 1981), which make up about 95% of cells in the 
striatum  (Kemp  and  Powell,  1971).  They  are  distributed  homogeneously 
throughout  the  striatum  and  come  in  two  equally  numerous  types:  so-called 
‘direct pathway’ MSNs project to the internal segment of the globus pallidus 
(GPi) or substantia nigra (SN), whereas ‘indirect pathway’ MSNs project to the 
external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe; Loopuijt and Van der Kooy, 1985; 
Kawaguchi  et  al.,  1990).  Alternative  naming  for  these  two  pathways  are 
striatonigral  and  striatopallidal  or  Go  and  Nogo,  respectively  (Figure  2.4B). 
Although there are reports that the two pathways do not receive identical inputs Literature review 
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from  cortex  (Lei  et  al.,  2004;  Reiner  et  al.,  2010;  Wall  et  al.,  2013),  their 
dominant feature reflects each loop consisting a direct and indirect component 
that receives similar input from cortex. Activation of the direct pathway leads to 
GABAergic inhibition of  the  GPi,  which  in  turns  disinhibits  the  thalamus  and 
cortex. Conversely, activation of the indirect pathway leads to a triple negative 
by  adding  inhibitory  projections from  the  GPe,  leading  to  inhibition  of  cortex 
(Figure 2.4B). This architecture in principle allows for interesting computations 
and  functions,  such  as  selection  of  cortical  representations  and  a  gating  of 
actions, as I discuss in the next section.  
 
Figure 2.4: Levels of organization in the basal ganglia. (A) The entire frontal 
cortex  has  topographically  organised  projections  to  the  striatum.  In  this 
schematic it is emphasised that projections are partially overlapping. (B) The 
input from cortex is processed through a direct and indirect pathway. Activity in 
these pathways has an excitatory and inhibitory effect on cortex, respectively. 
Note  that  dopaminergic  input  has  opposite  effects  on  these  two  pathways. 
Figure A is reproduced from Haber and Behrens (2014), Figure B from Purves 
et al. (2001). Literature review 
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As  introduced  at  the  start  of  this  section,  nigrostriatal  projections  can  alter 
synaptic  transmission  throughout  the  striatum.  Dopamine  acts  as  a 
neuromodulator and is primarily released around the neck of dendritic spines 
(Freund et al., 1984). This dopamine diffuses to affect D1 receptors up to 2 μm 
and D2 receptors up to 7 μm from the synapse before being removed from the 
extracellular  space  via  dopamine  reuptake  (Cragg  and  Rice,  2004).  The 
difference in effective radius is due to the higher affinity of D2 compared to D1 
receptors (Richfield et al., 1989). Critically, these two receptors have opposing 
effects on MSN excitability (Hartman and Civelli, 1997) and (although initially 
contested, Surmeier et al., 1993; Aizman et al., 2000; Gerfen and Bolam, 2010) 
are  now  known  to  neatly  differentiate  direct  from  indirect  pathway  MSNs 
(Gerfen et al., 1990). That is, direct pathway MSNs express depolarizing D1 
receptors,  and  indirect  pathway  MSNs  express  hyperpolarizing  D2  receptors 
(Figure  2.4B).  Dopamine  can  thus  modulate  the  balance  of  activity  between 
these  pathways  by  activating  the  direct  and  inhibiting  the  indirect  pathway 
(Gerfen and Surmeier, 2011).  
To  summarise,  the  basal  ganglia  receives  strongly  converging  inputs  from 
cortex and is structured along parallel, possibly interacting, loops. It has direct 
and  indirect  pathways  passing  through  pallidum,  subthalamic  nucleus  and 
thalamus to modulate limbic, associative and motor representations in cortex.  
I now discuss studies in animal models and humans examining the function of 
the basal ganglia system in model-free reinforcement learning.  
2.2.2.4.3 Function of the basal ganglia in model-free reinforcement learning Literature review 
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Although  the  anatomy  and  microcircuitry  of  the  basal  ganglia  have  been 
carefully mapped, it has proven more difficult to study the function of each of its 
components. This is partly due to extensive overlap of the direct and indirect 
pathway, and their indiscriminability in classical electrophysiological recordings. 
In this section I will briefly discuss foundational lesion work before highlighting 
electrophysiological  recordings  and  recent  optogenetics  studies  of  the  basal 
ganglia  circuitry  in  the  context  of  choice  and  learning.  Human  work  on  the 
characteristics of the striatum during reinforcement learning is plentiful, but it is 
often as crude as lesion studies in terms of understanding fine microcircuitry. 
Nonetheless key insights from animal studies have helped inform the role of the 
basal  ganglia  in  higher  cognitive  function.  Lastly  I  will  highlight  some  of  the 
more  influential  computational  models  that  place  reinforcement  learning  in 
frontostriatal  circuits  as  they  usefully  highlight  the  relationships  between  key 
components of the network. 
2.2.2.4.3.1 Animal work on habits in the basal ganglia 
In  section  2.2.2.1  I  briefly  discussed  the  work  of  Anthony  Dickinson  and 
colleagues on habitual behaviour. Habits are also known as stimulus-response 
(S-R)  associations  that  have  been  ‘stamped  in’  through  reinforcement 
(Thorndike, 1898; Landauer, 1969). Early work suggested a critical role for the 
basal ganglia in habit formation (e.g. Mishkin et al., 1984; Salmon and Butters, 
1995), and a strong body of work in rodents now shows that such stamping in 
occurs in  the  dorsolateral  striatum,  also  known  as  the  putamen in  primates. 
Using a devaluation test (Dickinson et al., 1983), it was shown that muscimol-
induced deactivation or destructive lesions of the dorsolateral striatum made the 
animal perpetually sensitive to devaluation, suggesting its effect was to impair Literature review 
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an ability to form habits (Featherstone and McDonald, 2004; Yin et al., 2004; 
Yin  et  al.,  2005;  Yin  and  Knowlton,  2006).  Other  work  suggested  that  the 
formation  of  these  model-free  S-R  associations  relies  heavily  on  dopamine 
(Wise and Bozarth, 1987; Faure et al., 2005; Wickens et al., 2007), which is 
known  to  modulate  the  plasticity  in  corticostriatal  synapses  (Kötter,  1994; 
Calabresi et al., 2007). Together, this work provides some clues regarding the 
role  of  dopamine  and  corticostriatal  loops  in  habits,  a  quintessential form  of 
model-free control.  
2.2.2.4.3.2 Animal work on model-free RL in striatum 
I now return to the question posed at the start of this section, namely how does 
the striatal system encode cached, model-free, action values that are updated 
by  dopaminergic  reward  prediction  errors  as  described  in  section  2.2.2.4.1. 
Electrophysiological recordings showed that in the period before a value-based 
choice, up to a third of striatal neurons code an action-specific value derived 
from a reinforcement model (Samejima et al., 2005; Samejima and Doya, 2007; 
Lau  and  Glimcher,  2008;  Kim  et  al.,  2009;  Nakamura  et  al.,  2012).  Reward 
prediction  errors,  despite  their  being  signalled  through  diffuse  dopaminergic 
projections (Fallon and Moore, 1978), also show action-specificity in the dorsal 
striatum (Stalnaker et al., 2012). In an oculomotor task neurons in the caudate 
could be segregated into two groups that separately code action and outcome 
(Lau and Glimcher, 2007). In a delay discounting task neurons in the caudate 
coded temporally discounted action values (Cai et al., 2011b). Taken together, 
these data suggest the dorsal striatum exhibits both action coding and action 
value  coding,  providing  a  necessary  neural  substrate  for  dopaminergic 
prediction errors to update action values after feedback (Samejima and Doya, Literature review 
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2007; O’Doherty, 2014). However, none of these studies were able to determine 
whether the neurons were part of the direct or indirect pathway, leaving critical 
questions about the mechanics of this microcircuitry unanswered.  
Novel techniques such as optogenetic perturbation of MSNs have provided long 
sought-after evidence for theories on direct and indirect pathway function. First, 
stimulation  of  direct  and  indirect  MSNs  led  to  behavioural  activation  and 
inhibition,  respectively  (Kravitz  et  al.,  2010;  Kravitz  et  al.,  2012),  and 
coordinated co-activation of both pathways is necessary for basic movements 
(Cui et al., 2013; Jin et al., 2014). Critical to model-free reinforcement learning 
is the evidence that optogenetic stimulation of direct pathway MSNs acts as 
persistent, long-lasting reinforcement, whereas stimulation of indirect pathway 
MSNs acts as transient punishment (Kravitz et al., 2012). These manipulations 
worked even in the presence of D1 and D2 receptor antagonists, suggesting 
dopamine-independent activation of these pathways is sufficient to generate, in 
this specific instance, place preference learning (Kravitz et al., 2012; Paton and 
Louie, 2012). 
In summary, this work supports the view that reinforcement learning in rodents 
is subserved by dopaminergic prediction errors modulating action values stored 
in  corticostriatal  pathways.  When  faced  with  a  stimulus,  the  direct  pathway 
action channel of the basal ganglia most strongly associated with the stimulus 
(through  previous  reinforcement)  will  be  the  strongest  candidates  for 
expression. Next I will consider what evidence we have in humans for such a 
mechanism of model-free RL.  
2.2.2.4.3.3 Human striatum in model-free RL Literature review 
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Only  with  the  advent  of  optogenetics  and  viral  Ca
2+  indicators  could 
neuroscience begin to directly measure the direct and indirect pathway (Kravitz 
and  Kreitzer,  2011;  Cui  et  al.,  2013).  In  humans,  then,  it  is  unclear  how  to 
understand striatal function given that we currently lack the tools to study these 
same pathways in great detail. An outstanding challenge is to functionally and 
structurally delineate the presence of a direct and indirect pathway in humans. 
Functional MRI has been the dominant approach to studying striatal function, 
mostly driven by necessity as non-invasive electrophysiological methods cannot 
(yet) measure signals deep in the brain. FMRI studies have shown model-free 
reinforcement  learning  signals across  the  striatum.  An early  influential paper 
suggested  the  caudate  is  the  ‘actor’,  representing  action  values  during 
instrumental choice and RPEs during instrumental (but not Pavlovian) learning 
(O'Doherty et al., 2004). The dorsal striatum seems to only care for value when 
actions are involved (Tricomi et al., 2004; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Guitart-
Masip et al., 2014). Many studies since have described model-free action and 
learning signals in human fMRI (for reviews see Balleine and O'Doherty, 2010; 
Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Haber and Behrens, 2014). A recurring theme in this 
thesis is the dichotomy between model-based and model-free values. However, 
the studies cited above did not employ tasks that can dissociate value signals 
from  these  two  controllers.  Recent  work  has  shown  that  when  these  two 
controllers are contrasted, model-free values are observed specifically in the 
putamen  and  not  caudate  (Wunderlich  et  al.,  2012b;  Lee  et  al.,  2014), 
corroborating animal work that finds dorsolateral, but not dorsomedial, striatum 
to  be  critical  for  model-free  (habit)  learning  (see  section  2.2.2.1).  Together, 
these  studies  show  the  dorsal  striatum  is  a  prime  candidate  for  both  the Literature review 
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selection of actions as well as learning about these actions based on feedback 
(Jessup and O'Doherty, 2011). 
2.2.2.4.3.4 Basal ganglia models of model-free RL 
The exquisite architecture of the basal ganglia as described above has led to 
many models of its function relating to (value-based) action selection and action 
learning (Houk and Wise, 1995; Mink, 1996; Doya, 1999; Gurney et al., 2001; 
Frank, 2005; Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Hong and Hikosaka, 2011), working 
memory (Frank and O'Reilly, 2006; Hazy et al., 2006) and incentive salience 
(Berridge, 2007), as well as many other functions such as speech (e.g. Civier et 
al., 2013). The computational function most commonly ascribed to the basal 
ganglia can be summarised as ‘selection’—be it items in working memory or 
actions being represented in cortex. As such, the striatum can be thought of as 
being in a loop necessary for selection, where learning, feedback and selection 
all co-occur in the same brain region (Jessup and O'Doherty, 2011). 
As an exemplar model of instrumental learning I use that of Frank et al. (2004) 
(Figure 2.5). At the heart of this model are a number of action channels (e.g. for 
right-  vs  left-handed  response)  that  are  duplicated  for  a  direct  and  indirect 
pathway.  Their relative activity determines which action reaches threshold in 
premotor cortex for execution. The direct and indirect pathways are activated 
through inputs from cortex, serving as the ‘stimulus’ that triggers a response in 
S-R learning. On the first trial an action is randomly selected (through noise) 
and the resulting positive or negative feedback leads to an increase or decrease 
in  dopamine  release  from  the  midbrain.  This  critical  step  induces  long-term 
potentiation (LTP) in the direct pathway for positive feedback, and in the indirect 
pathway for negative feedback. As such, the direct pathway action channel for Literature review 
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an action that led to reward will undergo LTP, leading to stronger activation with 
the  next  occurrence  of  the  same  stimulus  (‘stamping  in’;  Thorndike,  1898). 
Conversely, an action that leads to low rewards will have its indirect pathway 
channel strengthened and is less likely to be selected on the next occurrence of 
the stimulus. Over multiple trials, then, the network learns S-R associations that 
are most likely to lead to reward. This simple but elegant coalescence of stimuli, 
actions, selection and learning reflects much of our thinking about basal ganglia 
function in health as well as disease (Tekin and Cummings, 2002; Maia and 
Frank, 2011; Dichter et al., 2012). Nonetheless, novel techniques for measuring 
and manipulating direct and indirect pathways are continuously inspiring altered 
models (Calabresi et al., 2014). As we will see in chapter 5 another potentially 
fruitful  pursuit  could  be  to  understand  the  role  of  striatal  pathways  and 
dopamine in model-based control (Daw et al., 2011). 
Having discussed the algorithms, anatomy and functional correlates of model-
free reinforcement learning, I now turn to a (shorter) treatise of model-based 
control before addressing the relationship between both controllers. Literature review 
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Figure 2.5: An exemplar computational model of cortico-basal ganglia function. 
Action channels are represented as columns in each region. Once activity in 
preSMA  reaches  a  certain  threshold  an  action  is  triggered.  To  reach  this 
threshold,  activity  propagates  from  other  cortical  areas  (‘Input’)  through  the 
direct and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia. These pathways are termed 
Go  and  NoGo  here,  respectively.  Dopaminergic  modulatory signals from  the 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) govern the relative activity and learning in 
the two pathways. The figure is reproduced from Maia and Frank (2011). 
2.2.3  Model-based RL   
2.2.3.1  Brief history of model-based RL—animal learning and psychology 
Whereas model-free S-R learning started in the final years of the 19
th century 
with Thorndike’s work, it took three decades to mount an offensive against a Literature review 
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purely  S-R  account  of  animal  behaviour.  Tolman’s  work  suggested  a 
fundamentally  different  view  of  behavioural  control—one  in  which  cognitive 
maps of the environment are learned as S-S associations and guide decisions 
through a mental search of these maps (Tolman, 1932; Tolman, 1948). Such 
cognitive  maps  have  since  been  shown  to  exist  in  cell  assemblies  in  the 
hippocampus  (Keefe  and  Nadel,  1978).  This  idea  of  prospection  and 
representations  of  future  decisions  and  outcomes  was  operationalised  by 
Dickinson  and  colleagues  as  goal-directed  control—the  antipode  of  habitual 
control  (Adams  and  Dickinson,  1981;  Dickinson  et  al.,  1983;  Balleine  and 
Dickinson,  1998).  As  explained  in  section  2.2.2.1,  an  animal  that  does  not 
pursue actions known to lead to a devalued outcome must have a response-
outcome (R-O) association whose desirability is assessed at the time of choice. 
Conceptually identical devaluation paradigms were used in humans to measure 
goal-directed control successfully (Valentin et al., 2007).  
However, outcome devaluation leaves the human neuroscientist with precious 
few trials to study behaviour and its neural correlates, as humans are able to 
rapidly adjust to novel situations. Spurred along by the fact that the definition 
and  operationalization  of  goal-directed  control  had  become  thoroughly 
entrenched in the devaluation paradigm, a new terminology was introduced to 
capture more broadly decision strategies that rely on prospection, models of the 
environment and mental simulation: model-based control (Doya, 1999; Doya et 
al., 2002; Daw et al., 2005). This shift in nomenclature has turned the spotlight 
onto the computations underlying this type of control, such as the complexity of 
performing mental searches in environments more complex than Skinner boxes 
(Huys et al., 2012). In-depth reviews on the history of goal-directed and model-Literature review 
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based control can be found elsewhere (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Rangel et 
al., 2008; Doll et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). Before describing some of 
the  recent  work  on  the  behavioural  and  neural  correlates  of  model-based 
control in section 2.2.3.4, I will first touch upon the origin of model-based control 
in  artificial  intelligence  and  the  basic  algorithms  that  can  describe  such  an 
agent.  
2.2.3.2  Brief history of model-based RL—artificial intelligence 
Whereas model-free control need only keep track of cached state-action values, 
model-based control requires on-the-fly calculation of optimal decisions based, 
in the most extreme case, on an evaluation of all possible future states. As in 
model-free  RL  (section  2.2.2),  this  challenge  was  approached  as  a  Markov 
Decision  Process  (MDP)  with  discrete  states,  actions  and  probabilistic 
transitions between states. Nonetheless, planning even a few steps ahead in a 
relatively  contained  situation,  such  as  chess  for  example,  leads  to  a 
combinatorial  explosion  of  possible  states  and  actions  that  would  require 
evaluation—the  ‘curse  of  dimensionality’  (Bellman,  1956).  A  computational 
framework  to  formally  address  this  forward  search  was  first  described  by 
Bellman (1956) in what is now called the Bellman equation (section 2.2.3.3). It 
generally  requires  complete  knowledge  of  the  system  such  that  it  can  be 
evaluated all the way through to an end state. In the following decades much 
work went into finding shortcuts and efficient ways of approximating the optimal 
solution, an endeavour particularly interesting given that the brain’s model of the 
world is inherently incomplete and neural resources are a valuable commodity. 
For  an  in-depth  review  of  this  work  I  refer  the  reader  to  established  works 
(Bryson Jr, 1996; Sutton and Barto, 1998) . Literature review 
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2.2.3.3  Algorithms 
The Bellman optimality equation for the optimal policy  ?∗ is as follows (after 
equation 4.2 in Sutton and Barto, 1998) 
?∗(?,?) = ∑???′
? [???′
? + ?max
?′ ?∗(?′,?′)
?′
]  
where ???′
?  denotes the transition probability going from ? to ?′ given action ?, 
???′
?  the immediate reward available if that transition indeed happens, and  ? 
denotes a discount factor for future value. Its formulation is remarkably simple: 
the  value  of  an  action  equals  the  sum  over  the  value  of  each  possible 
consequent  state  multiplied  by  their  probability  of  occurring,  with  each 
consequent state evaluated by searching all its consequent states. In this sense 
it is equal to the expected or Pascalian value as used in behavioural economics, 
for ? = 1. Note also that the algorithm assumes that in each future state the 
agent will choose the best available action, and therefore does not account for 
possible lapses or exploratory choices. Lastly, this type of model is a distribution 
model, in that it assesses the entire distribution of possible outcomes. We now 
turn to the brain and discuss some of the neural instantiations of model-based 
control.  Literature review 
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Figure 2.6: Example model-based tree search for deterministic transitions. The 
decision-maker is currently at the top (or root) of the tree and is prospecting to 
calculate  the  value  of  8  possible  outcomes.  Model-based  planning  assumes 
perfect  knowledge  regarding  the  values  and  transitions  at  each  state.  This 
figure is reproduced from Huys et al. (2012), who observed that planners prefer 
routes that do not involve a large loss given equal final outcomes. This suggests 
that humans have developed methods of pruning the decision problem to save 
computational expense. 
2.2.3.4  Neural mechanisms of MB RL, ubiquity of substrates 
The  complexity  of  computation  in  a  model-based  system  is  reflected  in  its 
neural underpinnings. Unlike the relatively straightforward neural instantiation of 
model-free  RL  in  the  striatum,  model-based  control  is  much  more  loosely 
defined and components of its computations have been found across cortex, 
striatum  and  hippocampus.  Indeed,  one  might  couch  many  things,  including 
planning, processing of fictive feedback, learning a model, and revaluation as 
model-based control of some sort simply because it cannot be done model-free. 
In this short review I focus primarily on studies related to value-based choice in 
a learning environment. Others have dealt with related topics such as decisions Literature review 
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in the framework of neuroeconomics (Rangel et al., 2008; Glimcher and Fehr, 
2013), working memory (Curtis and Lee, 2010; Baddeley, 2012) and planning 
(Owen, 2005; Tanji et al., 2007). 
Along with studies showing a critical role for dorsolateral striatum in model-free 
control  (section  2.2.2.4.3.1)  it  was  shown  in  animal  experiments  that 
dorsomedial striatum and prelimbic cortex are critical for goal-directed control 
(Balleine  and  Dickinson,  1998;  Corbit  and  Balleine,  2003;  Killcross  and 
Coutureau,  2003),  in  particular  its  acquisition  (Ostlund  and  Balleine,  2005). 
Prefrontal and striatal correlates have also been found in humans on numerous 
occasions. For example, activity in the ventral orbitofrontal cortex is reduced for 
devalued compared to non-devalued stimuli, suggesting this region represents 
prospective rather than cached values (Valentin et al., 2007). In a planning task 
without learning it was found that the caudate nucleus represents both end-
state  and  intermediate  values,  as  would  be  expected  from  a  model-based 
system (Figure 2.7A; Wunderlich et al., 2012b). Others have focused on how 
we might build models of our environment to use in planning: Gläscher et al. 
(2010) translated the latent learning experiment by Tolman and Honzik (1930) 
to an fMRI study whereby the participant is exposed to an environment in the 
absence of reward, triggering latent learning of the transition probabilities ???′
?  
from section 2.2.3.3. Upon the introduction of reward the participant then uses 
this model to obtain rewards in an efficient manner. Critically, during the latent 
learning period participants showed ‘state prediction errors’ that could facilitate 
model learning in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 2.7B; Gläscher et al., 
2010).  Other  prefrontal  regions  are  also  implicated  in  learning  model-based 
associations,  including  orbitofrontal  cortex  for  cognitive  maps  (Wilson  et  al., Literature review 
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2014) and stimulus-outcome associations (Klein-Flugge et al., 2013). Indeed, 
much of cortex and sub-cortical structures are involved in model-based control 
one way or another, a phenomenon described as ‘the ubiquity of model-based 
RL’ (Doll et al., 2012). The latter authors noted that even regions traditionally 
presumed to be purely involved in model-free control appear to show model-
based influences, hinting at interactions between these two systems. This is the 
topic of the next section, where we begin to understand how two seemingly 
disparate  controllers  might  successfully  cohabitate  in  the  brain  to  generate 
adaptive behaviour.  
 
Figure  2.7:  Neural  correlates  of  model-based  components.  (A)  In  a  decision 
task  that  involved  both  planned  and  extensively  trained  values,  the  caudate 
represents  the  planned  values, whereas  the  putamen  represents  extensively 
trained values. This is independent of what values was eventually chosen, as 
would  be  expected  from  two  systems  that  compete  with  one  another.  The 
functional anatomy is in line with rodent work showing goal-directed function in 
dorsomedial striatum and habitual function in dorsolateral striatum. (B) Learning 
a  model  of  the  world  can  conceivably  occur  through  state  prediction  errors, Literature review 
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which signal unexpected state-state transitions. This figure shows BOLD activity 
scaling with state prediction errors in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In chapter 6 
I  transiently  disrupt  this  region  of  the  brain  using  transcranial  magnetic 
stimulation to determine its necessary role in model-based control. Figure A is 
reproduced  from  Wunderlich  et  al.  (2012b),  Figure  B  is  reproduced  from 
Gläscher et al. (2010). 
2.2.4  Balance between MF and MB 
2.2.4.1  Rationale of two systems 
Why  invest  in  both  a  model-based  and  model-free  controller  if  they  are 
designed to achieve the same goal—that is, to maximise rewards? The current 
line  of  thinking  is  that  both  systems  come  with  their  own  strengths  and 
weaknesses, such that together they can deal with the statistics and dynamics 
of our environment. The model-free system, although very efficient in terms of 
only  having  to  store  individual  cached  values,  requires  many  repetitions  (or 
repeated experience) to approach the true value function. This in itself can be 
expensive or even life-threatening if the action to be learned is, say, whether to 
run towards or away from a lion. However, model-free learning can be highly 
efficient for predictable, repetitive tasks or for motor skill learning—for example, 
when  forming  habits.  Conversely,  the  model-based  system  requires  a  huge 
amount of resources in terms of attention, working memory and time but it is 
statistically efficient and generates decisions from a limited number of samples. 
Together, this is the computational efficiency versus statistical efficiency trade-
off  (Sutton  and  Barto,  1998;  Daw  et  al.,  2005;  Dolan  and  Dayan,  2013).  In 
simulation  and  human  behaviour  Simon  and  Daw  (2011)  showed  that  the 
statistics of the environment—the rate of change of the probability (‘volatility’) 
and  noisiness  of  reward—differentially  favour  model-based  or  model-free Literature review 
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control.  For  example,  in  a  noisy,  low-volatility  environment  a  model-free 
controller performs well as its incremental learning leads to a smoothing out of 
the noise. Conversely, a low noise, high-volatility environment favours a model-
based system as it can more efficiently track rapid changes in the environment 
without fear of over-fitting the noise (Simon and Daw, 2011). Taken together, 
organisms  with  only  a  single  controller  might  fare  well  in  a  restricted  set  of 
environments, but will not thrive in the real world, in which the environmental 
statistics vary widely.  
2.2.4.2  Deciding how to decide 
If we accept that there are multiple control structures, then what ‘controls the 
controller’? I should note at this point that the shorthand of ‘two systems’ I have 
been  using  so  far  is  merely  a  convenient  way  of  talking  about  the  different 
forces that act on behaviour. In fact the reality is that these two systems are 
embedded in the same brain, and can be seen to describe the extremes of 
behavioural control that in reality is more likely to be on a continuum (Dolan and 
Dayan, 2013). In the general discussion I will outline some recent ideas about 
how these types of control might be intertwined, but for convenience assume 
two  distinct  systems  and  ask  how  their  relative  levels  of  control  might  be 
governed. 
he prevailing hypothesis is that, in true Bayesian fashion, each system exerts 
control over behaviour dependent on its precision or uncertainty (Daw et al., 
2005). Uncertainty in the model-free system arises from the inaccurate, lagged 
cached values, whereas uncertainty in the model-based system is a product of 
the  computational  complexity.  A  study  examining  the  neural  correlates  of 
planned versus cached values found that during choice, the medial prefrontal Literature review 
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cortex is functionally coupled with the caudate nucleus—representing planned 
values—and the putamen—representing model-free values (Wunderlich et al., 
2012b). The medial PFC, then, represented the chosen value irrespective of 
what  controller  was  used  to  drive  that  decision.  These  results  suggest  two 
systems that are engaged in parallel. A more detailed study on the competition 
itself tested directly the notion that uncertainty determines the relative influence 
of these values (Lee et al., 2014). The latter authors manipulated uncertainty in 
a  model-based  system  by  making  the  transition  probabilities  more  or  less 
deterministic. In their model, parallel model-based and model-free controllers 
reported  on  their  reliability  through  state-  and  reward  prediction  errors, 
respectively (cf. Gläscher et al., 2010). The relative reliabilities then governed 
the weighting of values contributing to a single integrated Q value. Both these 
reliability signals, and their maximum, were observed in inferior lateral prefrontal 
cortex and frontopolar cortex, in line with a role for this region as an arbitrator. 
Furthermore,  they  observed  that  when  the  arbitrator  favoured  model-based 
control,  the  frontal  regions  were  more  negatively  coupled  to  striatal  regions 
known to be involved in model-free control (Lee et al., 2014). This should not be 
mistaken as evidence for an inhibition of the model-free system by a frontal 
arbitrator—nor is this argued by Lee et al. (2014)—as their connectivity analysis 
is ambiguous with respect to directionality and sign. Nonetheless, it provides the 
first thorough test of arbitration through uncertainty, and future work could help 
understand the origin of the reliability signals themselves.  
An  alternative  account  for  the  competition  between  systems  has  been  put 
forward by Keramati et al. (2011). They suggest that the additional time required 
for a model-based calculation presents an opportunity cost, that is, time that Literature review 
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could have been spent on gathering more rewards. A decision to engage in this 
calculation  then  depends  on  the  added  value  it  provides  over  a  model-free 
prediction. For example, if the model-free system is already confident about the 
best option, then there is no need to engage in an expensive forward search. 
This  provides  an  intuitive  yet  quantitative  approach  to  understanding  what 
factors might drive an investment of mental effort into a problem. Future studies 
that test the effects of reward rate (and thus opportunity cost) on the trade-off 
between  model-based  and  model-free  choice  could  provide  a  test  for  this 
model.  
2.2.4.3  Shifting the balance of control 
It has been suggested that an imbalance in control between a model-based and 
model-free  controller  might  be  implicated  in  various  disorders  such  as 
Parkinson’s  disease  (Redgrave  et  al.,  2010;  de Wit  et  al.,  2011);  addictions 
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005) including alcohol dependence (Sebold et al., 2014), 
food  and  methamphetamine  (Voon  et  al.,  2014);  and  obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Voon et al., 2014). Finding ways of manipulating this balance provides 
both insights into healthy function and potential avenues for treatment. Figure 
2.8 summarises some of the work that has manipulated the extent of control by 
each  system,  including  through  lesions,  drugs,  disease  or  cognitive 
manipulations. Critically, this work shows that disabling one system can reveal 
behavioural influences of the other system that would otherwise be hidden. As 
noted  before  it  suggests  these  systems  work  in  parallel,  with  model-free 
learning occurring in the background even if a model-based system is currently 
in control (Wassum et al., 2009). Conversely, even when a model-free system 
has the reins a model-based system can swoop in if the situation calls for it Literature review 
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(Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007, 2011). The work in chapters 5-7 further explores 
how  the  balance  in  control  can  be  manipulated  using  non-invasive  methods 
applicable in healthy humans.  
 
Figure 2.8: A non-exhaustive list of work that tilted the balance between model-
based and model-free control one way or another. 
1 Tran-Tu-Yen et al. (2009), 
2 
Killcross  and  Coutureau  (2003), 
3  Yin  et  al.  (2005), 
4  Otto  et  al.  (2013), 
5 
Schwabe and Wolf (2009), 
6 Schwabe and Wolf (2011), 
7 de Wit et al. (2012b), 
8 
de Wit et al. (2011), 
9 Yin et al. (2004), 
10 Balleine and O'Doherty (2010), 
11 
Hitchcott et al. (2007) 
2.2.5  Thesis work addressing reinforcement learning 
The first part of this thesis focuses on reinforcement learning behaviour and its 
neural correlates. This section has highlighted the importance of multiple driving 
forces of behaviour, and in a series of experiments I will describe how we can 
and  cannot  shift  their  balance  through  neurostimulation  and  pharmacology Literature review 
Chapter 2 
 
49 
 
(chapters 5  to 7).  I  then  ask how  the  value  representations  in  corticostriatal 
loops,  as  described  in  section  2.2.2.4.3.3,  can  be  derived  from  anatomical 
measurement  of  corticostriatal  white  matter  connectivity  in  healthy  humans 
(chapter 8).  
   Literature review 
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2.3  Response inhibition 
2.3.1  General overview 
In  the  previous  section  I  touched  on  various  decision-making  strategies  an 
animal  might  take  to  maximise  its  rewards.  This  approach  assumes  a  fixed 
decision  point  after  which  consequences  unfold  irrevocably.  In  reality,  an 
abstract  decision  is  followed  by  motor  preparation,  action  initiation  and 
continuous  monitoring  and  adjustment.  Given  an  uncertain  environment,  this 
allows for radical changes to behaviour when conditions suddenly change. For 
example, the onset of a green light at a crossing might evoke a decision to start 
walking. But the sound of police sirens fast approaching can just at the last 
moment trigger a complete reprogramming of the action, even if it was already 
initiated.  
In the second part of this thesis I explore how the brain rapidly inhibits actions 
when required by changes in the environment. I will specifically address the role 
of uncertainty and prior expectation on the behavioural and neural expression of 
inhibition. Deficiencies in inhibitory control have been implicated in neurological 
and psychiatric disorders (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Aron, 2011), perhaps 
most  famously  in  attention-deficit/hyperactivity  disorder  (Barkley,  1997)  and 
addiction (Ersche et al., 2012).  
Inhibitory control is part of a broader field of self-control and impulsivity, which 
has been studied across many disciplines. Indeed, impulsivity is a catch-all for a 
wide  range  of  behavioural  phenomena  in  economics,  psychology  and 
psychiatry, each with its own tasks and models. For authoritative reviews I refer 
the  reader  elsewhere  (Logan  et  al.,  1997;  Evenden,  1999;  Whiteside  and 
Lynam, 2001; Madden and Bickel, 2010; Bari and Robbins, 2013; Moeller et al., Literature review 
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2014).  In  this  section  I  go  into  some  background  regarding  one  facet  of 
impulsivity,  namely  the  ability  to  withhold  one’s action after an  intention  has 
been  formed,  and  how  proactive  control  for  this  type  of  inhibition  alters  its 
execution. 
2.3.2  Reactive response inhibition 
2.3.2.1  The stop-signal task 
Response inhibition tasks are among the most common in cognitive science, 
stretching back as far as the go/no-go task developed by Donders (1868). In 
this task, most trials consisted of a go cue requiring a button press; the other 
trials  contain  a  no-go  cue  indicating  nothing  should  be  done.  The  simple 
expectation that a response is required will lead to errors of commission on no-
go  trials,  indicating  a  failure  of  inhibition  (Bari  and  Robbins,  2013).  A  more 
challenging  version  of  this  task  is  the  stop-signal  task  (Lappin  and  Eriksen, 
1966). As popularised by Logan et al. (1984), every trial contains a go cue, but 
on  a  subset  of  trials  this  cue  is  quickly  followed  by  a  stop  cue—the 
psychologist’s  equivalent  of  a  police  siren  just  before  stepping  out  onto  the 
road.  By  adjusting  the  delay  between  go  and  stop  signal (stop-signal delay, 
SSD) to approximate successful inhibition on 50% of trials, a simple calculation 
yields the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT, Figure 2.9; Logan, 1994; Band et al., 
2003;  Verbruggen  and  Logan,  2009b).  This  measure  is  used  to  reflect  the 
number of milliseconds it takes to stop an action after onset of the stop signal; 
much  like  a  reaction  time  indicates  the  number  of  milliseconds  it  takes  to 
respond to the onset of a cue. Its intuitive interpretation, ease of administration 
and calculation has made it a staple in inhibition research. In chapters 9 and 10 Literature review 
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I go into more detail regarding some basic predictions made by this model, and 
show that data from the modified stop-signal tasks satisfies these predictions. 
An aim in this thesis is to understand how an inhibitory ability changes with 
uncertainty about the environment. I manipulated this by adding components of 
selectivity  and  preparation  to  the  task,  which  are  attributes  of  response 
inhibition that have come to the fore only in the past decade (Vink et al., 2005; 
Coxon et al., 2007; Chikazoe et al., 2009). I will review recent behavioural work 
on proactive, selective inhibition and discuss its potential neural correlates. 
 
Figure  2.9:  Rationale  behind  the  stop-signal  reaction  time.  The  independent 
horse race model assumes the inhibitory process is of fixed duration; if it is 
initiated early enough (short SSD) and the go response happens to be slow on 
that trial (long RT), the inhibition can catch up with the go process and prevent 
the action from occurring. I will call this a ‘stopSuccess’ trial. In contrast, if the 
inhibitory process is started late or the go response happens to be fast, the 
action will be executed before it can be inhibited, resulting in a ‘stopFail’ trial. 
The duration of the SSRT is estimated by subtracting the mean SSD from the 
RT at the intersection of stopSuccess and stopFail trials, set such that the area-
under-curve  for  stopSuccess  is  equivalent  to  the  actual  proportion  of 
stopSuccess trials. 
2.3.3  Extending the framework: proactive and selective inhibition 
2.3.3.1  Selectivity of inhibition Literature review 
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The classic stop-signal task involves only a single button press. This leaves little 
room to study whether inhibition is an action-specific process or a ‘global’ stop 
signal  that  temporarily  shuts  down  all  motor  action—or  in  the  example  of 
stepping  out  onto  the  road,  does  sudden  inhibition  of  walking  also  inhibit 
unrelated  actions  such  as  speaking  or  typing  on  a  phone?  Strictly  selective 
action inhibition is an ability to stop a single action without interfering with other 
ongoing actions  (Aron, 2011). Unfortunately selectivity comes at a cost: it is 
slower compared to stopping all responses (Coxon et al., 2007) and creates 
interference with ongoing actions (Coxon et al., 2007, 2009; Greenhouse et al., 
2012). One explanation for the interference effect is that upon inhibition, the 
subthalamic  nucleus  (STN)  drives  the  entire  motor  loop  of  the  GPi,  in  turn 
driving widespread inhibition across motor cortex (Schall and Godlove, 2012; 
Schmidt et al., 2013). Some of the most convincing evidence for this notion of 
global inhibition comes from studies showing that inhibition of a single finger 
response reduces the excitability of leg areas of motor cortex (as measured by 
motor-evoked  potentials;  Badry  et  al.,  2009;  Greenhouse  et  al.,  2012). 
Intriguingly,  another  study  showed  reduced  leg  suppression  when  the 
participant  is  warned  about  which  specific  response  might  require  inhibition, 
suggesting that preparation might play a critical role in selective targeting of 
actions in motor cortex (Majid et al., 2012). I therefore now turn to the topic of 
proactive inhibition, or the role of expectation and preparation in action control.  
2.3.3.2  Proactive inhibition 
Prediction and expectation play a central role in neuroscience  (e.g. Rao and 
Ballard, 1999; Friston et al., 2006), and certainly so in inhibitory action control. 
Many  studies  have  manipulated  expectations  by  changing  the  stop-signal Literature review 
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probability, most commonly by cueing people about the relative probability a 
stop-signal might occur on a given trial (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Verbruggen and 
Logan, 2009a; Jahfari et al., 2010; Swann et al., 2011; Zandbelt et al., 2012). 
This  manipulation  reliably  leads  to  a  slowing  of  go  RT  for  higher  stop 
probabilities, suggesting a strategic adjustment to increase chances of stopping 
successfully. The evidence for effects of stop-signal probability on the actual 
speed of the inhibitory process after correcting for this slowing—the SSRT—is 
more  ambiguous:  although  one  study  observed  faster  SSRT  in  the  high-
probability  condition  (Chikazoe  et  al.,  2009),  this  has  not  held  up  in  further 
studies (Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2012). A component of the slowing 
of  responses  seems  to  be  suppression  of  the  corresponding  motor 
representation  in  motor  cortex,  measured  as  a  reduction  in  motor-evoked 
potential  magnitude  after  cueing  and  before  action  execution  (Claffey  et  al., 
2010;  Cai  et  al.,  2011a).  This  in  itself  seems  to  be  driven  by  proactive 
recruitment of the entire fronto-basal ganglia network as well as parietal cortex, 
a set of regions also involved in outright response inhibition (Chikazoe et al., 
2009;  Zandbelt  and  Vink,  2010;  Jahfari  et  al.,  2011;  Jahfari  et  al.,  2012; 
Zandbelt et al., 2012). 
2.3.3.3  Preparing for selective inhibition 
From the previous sections it should be clear that the response inhibition field 
has slowly but surely inched towards more ecologically interesting forms of self-
control. It is not often that a drastic, unprepared inhibition of all motor action is 
required, and it could be argued that more subtle forms of self-control are more 
closely related to disorders of inhibition (Aron, 2011; Schall and Godlove, 2012). 
For  example,  withholding  oneself  from  reaching  out  to  the  cookie  jar  upon Literature review 
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passing by surely does not involve widespread and global inhibition—if it did we 
would freeze in place on every occasion. More likely this falls in a scenario 
whereby, even before seeing the cookie jar, there is selective suppression of 
the specific action of reaching out for the jar. When considered this way, the 
process of proactive control is not dissimilar to decision making, as both involve 
the  control  over  actions  so  as  to  optimise  the  long-run  benefit.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly,  the  first  forays  into  this  topic  have  suggested  that  proactive 
inhibitory control engages many structures we know from decision making: a 
frontostriatal circuit that involves both the associative and motor loops  (Aron, 
2011; Majid et al., 2013). In particular the action channels in the basal ganglia 
described  in  section  2.2.2.4.2  are  hypothesised  to  serve  as  an  efficient 
substrate for selective inhibition, compared to global inhibition via the cortico-
subthalamic nucleus hyperdirect pathway (Aron, 2011).  
2.3.4  Thesis work addressing open questions in inhibitory action control 
In  chapters  9  and  10  I  use  a  selective  stop-signal  task  and  manipulate  the 
amount  of  information  that  is  available  for  proactive  control.  This  allows  the 
examination at the behavioural level how preparation affects both the speed 
and selectivity of inhibition; at the neural level, I can ask what prefrontal and 
sub-cortical  brain  regions  mediate  the  improvements  in  behaviour  seen  with 
preparation. In a second study I modify the same task to work on a smartphone, 
allowing the collection of data from tens of thousands of participants. The key 
question here is to understand how ageing, which has a particularly pronounced 
detrimental effect in the frontal cortex, affects the ability to exert reactive and 
proactive control.  
   Methods 
Chapter 3 
 
56 
 
3  Methods 
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3.1  Physics of MRI 
3.1.1  Protons in a magnetic field 
The single proton present in a hydrogen atom has a quantum property called 
spin (Figure 3.1). Moving any such proton into a magnetic field, such as the 
Earth’s  field  or  the  field  of  a  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (MRI)  scanner, 
causes a proportion of the spins to align to the field in one of two states with 
splitting energy ∆?: a low energy spin-up state (parallel to the field), or a high 
energy spin-down state (anti-parallel to the field). Depending on the strength of 
the field ?0 and the magnetic moment of the atom, a slight majority of spins will 
be in the spin-up state. In addition to the net magnetization parallel to the field 
the hydrogen protons ‘wobble’ or precess around the field direction at a speed 
termed the Larmor frequency ?. These concepts relate to each other following 
according to the following equations: 
∆? = ħ
?
2𝜋
 
? =
?
2𝜋
?0 
Where ħ is the reduced Planck constant (in J s) and 
?
2𝜋 the gyromagnetic ratio 
(in  Hz  T
-1)  determined  by  the  composition  of  the  nucleus.  Fortunately,  the 
abundant 
1H protons have a relatively large gyromagnetic ratio of 42.576 MHz 
T
-1, leading to a slight majority of 50.000013% of protons aligning parallel to the 
field at 3 T and 37 °C (Huettel et al., 2004).  
?????????
?????−????????
= 𝑒
∆?
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It is this majority that allows us to perform MRI, as I will describe shortly. It is 
also  this  principle  that  has  driven  people  to  use  stronger  B0  fields  so  as  to 
increase the ratio of spin-up to spin-down protons. All studies reported in this 
thesis used 3 T.  
 
Figure 3.1: Magnetization of H
+ in H2O as a function of magnetic fields. (A) In 
the absence of a strong magnetic field the spin of protons is randomly oriented. 
(B) The application of an external field B0, as applied in MRI to protons in the 
brain, causes spins to align spin-up or spin-down. (C) As a slight majority of 
protons aligns itself spin-up, but none of the precessions are in phase, the net 
magnetization of protons is aligned straight along the B0 field. (D) The additional 
energy delivered through a B1 pulse at the Larmor frequency flips some spin-up 
protons  in  spin-down  state,  removing  or  even  inverting  the  longitudinal 
magnetization. At the same time, this pulse brings the precession into phase, 
yielding transverse magnetization. This can be picked up by sensors around the 
head.  (E)  The  transverse  magnetization  is  quickly  lost  due  to  field Methods 
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inhomogeneities  and  spin-spin  interactions,  whereas  the  longitudinal 
magnetization decays only slowly due to spin-lattice interactions. 
3.1.2  Manipulating net magnetization 
This  ????????? > ?????−????????  state  can  be  described  by  a  net  magnetization 
vector along the z-axis in three-dimensional Cartesian space, where the z-axis 
is aligned with the main magnetic field ?0 of the system (Figure 3.1). The net 
magnetization  vector  can  be  manipulated  though  radio-frequency  (RF,  also 
called B1 field) pulses that match the Larmor frequency and applied orthogonal 
to  the  B0  field.  The  pulse  firstly  brings  the  spins  into  phase,  leading  to 
transverse  magnetization  in  the  x-y  plane,  and  secondly  reduces  the 
longitudinal  magnetization  along  the  z-axis  by  exciting  spins  into  the  anti-
parallel state. The duration of the RF pulse determines the flip angle of this 
vector away from the Z-axis, which in all experiments reported here was 90 
degrees. The signal that is measured by magnetic resonance imaging is either 
the  transverse  magnetization,  which  decays  in  a  matter of tens milliseconds 
following the RF pulse with a time constant termed T2*, or the longitudinal (z-
axis) magnetization which recovers in a matter of hundreds of milliseconds with 
a time constant termed T1. Crucially, the T2* signal depends on the speed of 
dephasing of the spins. In fMRI for example it is possible to observe slower 
dephasing (i.e. an increase in T2* signal) due to a decrease in concentration of 
paramagnetic  deoxyhaemoglobin  (further  discussed  in  section  3.2.1).  In 
contrast, the T1 signal is determined by the spin-lattice interactions and can for 
example be used to distinguish tissue types such as grey and white matter. By 
adjusting the echo time (TE; readout time following the RF pulse) and repetition Methods 
Chapter 3 
 
60 
 
time (TR; time between two RF pulses on the same voxel) the signal becomes 
dominated by T1 and T2* contributions.  
3.1.3  Building a 3-dimensional image 
How can these physical concepts be exploited to obtain an image of the human 
brain? Whereas nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) has been used since late 
1940 to measure non-spatial properties of molecules in a solution, it  was in 
1976 that Paul Lauterbur and Sir Peter Mansfield independently realised that a 
sample, such as the brain, could be spatially dissected into slices and ultimately 
voxels (3-dimensional volumes arranged in a grid) using magnetic gradients on 
top of the static B0 field (Figure 3.2A; Lauterbur, 1973; Mansfield, 1977). When 
the gradients are applied along the direction of the B0 field, for example, the 
Larmor frequency of protons in superior parts of the brain (e.g. motor cortex) will 
be  different  from  those  in  inferior  parts  of  the  brain  (e.g.  temporal  lobe).  A 
narrow-band RF pulse will then only excite the slice of the brain that matches 
the frequency of the RF pulse (Figure  3.2B). After excitation of the slice, an 
additional ‘frequency-encoding’ gradient can shift the Larmor frequency along 
one dimension of the slice, such that a Fourier decomposition of the signal is 
equivalent to a spatial decomposition. A further phase-encoding gradient allows 
for the second dimension of the slice to be isolated (Figure 3.2C). As such, a 3D 
volume is usually constructed from sequentially acquired 2D slices. In chapters 
8 and 9 I used a more recent form of imaging for my functional acquisitions, 
acquiring  data  across  3  dimensions  simultaneously  (Pykett  et  al.,  1982; 
Papanikolaou and Karampekios, 2008). The benefit of this approach is faster 
acquisition of high-resolution data and a higher signal-to-noise ratio per unit of Methods 
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time  (Lutti  et  al.,  2013).  These  sequences  were  implemented  on  Siemens 
Magnetom TIM Trio hardware (Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany) 
 
 
Figure  3.2:  Using  MRI  to  build  a  3D  volume  of  tissue.  (A)  An  MRI  scanner 
contains a permanent B0 field. As tissue is moved into the scanner, the protons 
align  into  spin-up  and  spin-down  states.  (B)  The  Larmor  frequency  is 
approximately  homogenous  across  the  scanner,  such  that  a  B1  pulse  would 
excite all the protons. A slice-selecting gradient is applied at the time of the B1 
pulse to briefly differentiate the Larmor frequencies across the gradient. Only 
protons within the slab of tissue with the precession frequency of B1 are excited. 
(C) Signal from within the selected slab of tissue is further divided into voxels 
using frequency and phase encoding. Note that in 3D imaging this process is 
slightly  different,  as  slices  are  not  measures  sequentially  but  rather 
simultaneously. Methods 
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3.2  Functional MRI 
3.2.1  Basis of the BOLD signal 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides a measure of neural 
activity  in  the  brain.  The  three  main  currencies  of  neural  activity  are  action 
potentials  passed  down  axons  of  neurons,  post-synaptic  potentials  across 
dendrites of neurons, and molecular signals that bind the former two across 
synapses.  The  fMRI  signal  is  most  closely  associated  with  activity  at  the 
synapse and in particular the resulting post-synaptic potentials, which generate 
changes in blood flow measurable in fMRI. I will discuss first the effect of neural 
activity on blood flow, and secondly how such a change in flow is measured in 
fMRI.  
The brain is permeated by capillaries and arterioles that supply blood strictly 
based on demand: neurons and supporting astrocytes regulate local blood flow 
according  to  the  energetic  demands  of  the  cells  (Attwell  et  al.,  2010). 
Specifically,  over  80%  of  change  in  blood  flow  originates  from  pericytes 
contracting and relaxing around capillaries in response to chemical signals from 
nearby neural tissue (Hall et al., 2014). These signals are mediated by ions and 
small molecules such as nitric oxide, K
+, adenosine, CO2
 and arachidonic acid 
metabolites, all by-products of metabolism around the synapse, as well as glial-
mediated feedforward signals that increase blood flow before metabolites reach 
the  vascular  system  (Attwell  and  Iadecola,  2002;  Haydon  and  Carmignoto, 
2006;  Iadecola  and  Nedergaard,  2007),  and  can  result  from  glutamatergic 
signalling in both cortex and sub-cortex (Sloan et al., 2010). Taken together, 
neural activity leads to an ‘opening of the gates’ which floods the local tissue 
with  oxygenated  blood,  washing  away  deoxyhaemoglobin  (Hb-dO2). Methods 
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Simultaneous recordings have shown that the dominant driver of such changes 
in  blood  flow  is  post-synaptic  activity  (i.e.  incoming  information)  rather  than 
action potentials (i.e. outgoing information) (Mathiesen et al., 1998; Logothetis 
et al., 2001). 
Why are changes in blood flow in response to neural activity  important? An 
increase in blood flow results in a decrease in Hb-dO2 and an increase in Hb-
O2. It is the former that has an effect on the T2* signal observable in fMRI. The 
unbound Fe
2+ in Hb-dO2 is paramagnetic, causing strong local distortions in the 
B0 field, and serves as a natural contrast agent (Ogawa et al., 1990; Ogawa et 
al.,  1992).  Any  H
+  protons  in  H2O  near  the  Hb-dO2  will  thus  precess  at  a 
different frequency than other protons, causing them to rapidly go out of phase. 
This  speeds  up  the  loss  of  transverse  magnetization,  i.e.  T2*  is  shortened. 
Together, this suggests that neural activity, through an increase in blood flow 
and  decrease  in  Hb-dO2,  will  remove  these  local  field  distortions  and  thus 
increase  the T2*-weighted  signal.  Hence  the  signal is named  Blood  Oxygen 
Level-Dependent (BOLD). It is worth noting that in response to neural activity 
there are two additional processes that both push Hb-dO2 concentrations up: a 
relaxation  of  pericytes  causes  an  increase  in  blood  volume  (increasing  the 
quantity  of  Hb-dO2),  and  an  increase  in  oxygen  use  leads  to  more  rapid 
dissociation of O2 from Hb-dO2. However, both these components are weaker 
than the effect of blood flow changes, leading to a net increase in T2* signal in 
response to neural activity. 
3.2.2  Haemodynamic response function 
I  thus  measure  neural  activity  indirectly  through  the  BOLD  signal,  so  it  is 
pertinent  to  understand  how  the  two  are  linked  in  time  and  amplitude Methods 
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(Logothetis, 2008). If I were to flash a bright light in the eyes of a participant 
being  scanned  in  fMRI,  causing  strong  glutamatergic  firing  in  primary  visual 
cortex 25 to 30 ms after (Schroeder et al., 1998), the idealised BOLD signal in 
V1 would evolve as described in Figure 3.3A (for empirical BOLD response see 
Logothetis  et  al.,  2001).  This  is called  the haemodynamic response function 
(HRF, Figure 3.3A). Three points are worth noting: firstly, it takes approximately 
5 s for the BOLD signal to achieve its maximum intensity, and 12 to 20 s to 
return to baseline; secondly, if there are multiple instances of neuronal activity 
before BOLD has returned to baseline, they can be assumed to add linearly 
(Figure 3.3B; Boynton et al., 1996); thirdly, one can go back and forth between 
neural  activity  and  BOLD  signal  by  (de)convolving  with  the  HRF,  and  this 
principle  underpins  statistical  analysis  of  the  BOLD  signal  (Boynton  et  al., 
1996).  
To summarise, fMRI exploits the fact that neural activity is tightly coupled to an 
increase in blood flow. This reduces the concentration of Hb-dO2 which in turn 
increases T2* signal. This fortunate situation allows the indirect measurement of 
neural  activity  simultaneously  across  the  whole  brain  with  high  (0.5  mm  or 
higher) spatial resolution, albeit at the cost of poor temporal resolution. For the 
fMRI  work  presented  in  this  thesis  it  was  particularly  important  that  fMRI 
provides access to subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia, an ability 
not  afforded  by  techniques  such  as  electroencephalography  (EEG)  or 
stimulation techniques (see section 3.6). 
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Figure 3.3: Neurovascular coupling leads to canonical blood flow response. (A) 
Canonical  response  in  blood  oxygenation  level-dependent  (BOLD)  signal  in 
response to a burst of neural input into a region at t = 0 s, as used in this thesis 
to  predict  fMRI  signal.  The  signal  peaks  after  approximately  5  seconds  and 
returns  to  baseline  over  the  course  of  12  to  20  s.  (B)  Multiple  events  that 
happen before the signal has returned to baseline are assumed to simply add 
together. 
3.2.3  fMRI preprocessing 
The primary goal of preprocessing in fMRI is to transform individual volumes of 
BOLD signal such that a voxel at coordinates  (?,?,?) in a single participant 
refers to the same piece of tissue across all volumes, and to the homologous 
part of the brain across participants. The only step that does not directly relate 
to the issue of localization is bias correction, which corrects for receiver coil 
properties affecting the intensity of the signal. For all fMRI preprocessing in this 
thesis I used the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software developed at 
the  Wellcome  Trust  Centre  for  Neuroimaging,  UCL,  implemented  in  MatLab 
R2012a (The MathWorks, Inc.). All analyses were performed in SPM version 8 
unless noted otherwise.  Methods 
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There are a number of potential issues with BOLD images as they come from 
the scanner which are alleviated in preprocessing: voxels closer to the receiver 
coil have a stronger signal than those further away from the receiver coils (bias 
correction);  participants  inevitably  move  their  heads  during  e.g.  40  min  of 
scanning (motion correction); the B0 field is not perfectly homogenous due to 
the  mechanics  of  the  scanner  and  susceptibility  gradients  inside  the  head, 
leading  to  spatial  misattribution  of  the  signal  during  Fourier  decomposition 
(unwarping);  there  are  individual  differences  in  the  shape  of  the  brain  and 
location  of  the  head  in  the  field  of  view  (coregistration,  normalization  and 
smoothing).  
I note here that I did not perform slice time correction, a common step whereby 
the sequential acquisition of slices across the duration of the TR is corrected 
for. The fMRI data presented in chapters 8 and 9 were acquired through 3D 
imaging, which involves acquiring slices in K-space (spatial frequency space) 
rather than real space. As such, high spatial frequencies were acquired at the 
start and end of the TR, whereas low spatial frequencies were acquired around 
the  centre  of  the  TR.  In  other  words,  at  any  point  in  the  TR  information 
pertaining to the entire volume was being collected, and slice time correction 
cannot meaningfully be applied under these conditions. 
3.2.3.1  Bias correction 
BOLD-weighted images acquired on a 32-channel head coil from a 3 T scanner 
might  look  like  Figure  3.4A,  which  shows  an  axial  slice  at  1.5  mm  isotropic 
resolution with a restricted field of view. An artefact is readily observed whereby 
the edge of the brain has a stronger signal than the internal parts of the brain 
due to signal drop-off proportional to the distance from the sensors in the head Methods 
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coil (Figure 3.4A). This bias need not be corrected for statistical purposes as the 
mean of the signal is modelled independently for each voxel. Instead it aids 
subsequent  preprocessing  steps  that  rely  on  alignment  and  coregistration  of 
volumes (e.g. normalization). The field is assumed to be smooth (60 mm full-
width  at  half-maximum,  FWHM),  estimated  for  the  first  image  in  the  series 
(Figure 3.4B), and subtracted from all images (Ashburner and Friston, 2005).  
3.2.3.2  Motion correction 
To correct for participant movement during the course of scanning I used the 
first image as reference scan, and for each subsequent image I estimated a 6 
degrees-of-freedom  (df)  rigid-body  transformation  that  minimises  the 
discrepancy between images (Figure 3.4C; Andersson et al., 2001). The images 
were  then  resliced  to  obtain  the  aligned  images  and  the  transformation 
parameters recorded to enter into the statistical analysis as nuisance variables 
(Figure 3.4C, bottom; see section 3.2.4).  
3.2.3.3  B0 inhomogeneity correction 
There exists a spatial inhomogeneity in the B0 field due to imperfections in the 
magnets  generating  the  field  and  due  to  air-tissue  boundaries  that  generate 
local  magnetic  susceptibility  artefacts.  The  latter  primarily  affects  the  inferior 
frontal lobe (due to air in the paranasal sinuses) and in the inferior temporal 
areas (due to air in the ear canal). This inhomogeneity can be measured using 
a ‘fieldmap’ estimated from the phase difference between the signal at a short 
and long TE (Andersson et al., 2001). All motion-corrected functional images 
are spatially ‘unwarped’ using the fieldmap (Figure 3.4D). 
3.2.3.4  Coregistration of functional volumes to structural volume Methods 
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The images corrected for B0 inhomogeneities can be entered into a statistical 
model. However, it is often useful to first coregister the functional images to the 
structural image of the participant allowing for two analysis pathways both used 
in this thesis: firstly, the functional images can be brought into some standard 
space  shared  across  participants  to  examine  group-level  effects  (e.g.  as  in 
chapters 8 and 9), secondly the signal can be analysed in the space of the 
participant based on participant-specific regions of interest (ROIs) or diffusion 
data without the additional error introduced by normalization and smoothing. I 
performed coregistration by estimating a 6 df (rigid body) affine transformation 
matrix from the first functional scan to the magnetization transfer-weighted (MT) 
image  of  the  same  participant  (Figure  3.4E).  The  affine  transformation  only 
involves translations and rotations as there is no need for scaling or shearing 
within-participant. I used the MT image here as well as during normalization 
because it has a higher contrast between white and grey matter, especially in 
subcortical  structures.  The  transformation  involved  the  maximization  of 
normalised  mutual  information,  measured  as  the  sharpness  of  the  2D  joint 
histogram of the transformed functional and structural image  (Ashburner and 
Friston, 2005). A sharp histogram indicates that components of the signal in one 
image (e.g. the white matter component) can be predicted from the other, be it 
through a positive or negative relationship of any magnitude (see Figure 3.4E, 
bottom, for example of joint histogram before and after coregistration of two 
volumes;  note  that  sharper  edges  after  coregistration).  The  obtained 
transformation matrix is then applied to all B0-corrected images. 
3.2.3.5  Normalization of functional images Methods 
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Every brain has its own characteristic folding of sulci and gyri, thickness of grey 
matter,  size  of  subcortical  nuclei,  and  any  other  number  of  morphological 
idiosyncrasies.  Furthermore,  every  participant  is placed  in  a  slightly  different 
location in the scanner and in the field of view of the image. In order to make 
inferences about the population from which the participants were drawn it is 
necessary  to  average functional signals from anatomically  homologous  brain 
regions across participants. One way to do this is by moving, rotating, scaling, 
shearing and warping the brain of a single participant to optimally fit a standard 
template.  Using  a  standard  rather  than  a  group  template  has  the  additional 
advantage that a signal at coordinate (?,?,?) can be compared to coordinates 
from any other study that used the same standard space. This is particularly 
relevant  for  meta-analyses  and  the  use  of  anatomical  atlases  such  as  the 
Anatomical  Automatic  Labeling  (AAL)  atlas  used  in  chapter  9.  The  work 
presented in chapters 8 and 9 used Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space 
based  on  their  ICBM152  maps  (Mazziotta  et  al.,  2001).  The  details  of  the 
normalization  procedure  are  described  in  section  3.3.2  on  preprocessing  of 
structural  images.  The  transformation  parameters  obtained  through 
normalization of the MT image were then applied to all the functional images 
(Figure 3.4F). 
3.2.3.6  Smoothing 
At first thought smoothing functional images seems a waste of spatial resolution 
that physicists worked so hard to achieve. However, it is a necessary evil mainly 
for  three  reasons:  firstly,  part  of  the  noise  is  independent  across  voxels, 
whereas  the  signal  is  mostly  spread  out  over  contiguous  voxels,  such  that 
smoothing improves the signal-to-noise ratio by averaging out noise; secondly, Methods 
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the same information processing function might be located in a slightly different 
anatomical location in one participant compared to the other, such that even if 
normalization were perfect the signal would not overlap across participants; and 
thirdly,  correcting  for  the  multiple  comparisons  problem  by  Random  Field 
Theory  (RFT;  see  3.2.4.2)  requires  a  smoothness  greater  than  that  of 
unsmoothed fMRI data, such that not smoothing would lead to an excessively 
strict threshold for significance and a corresponding high false negative rate. 
Smoothing  is  applied  using  a  3D  smoothing  kernel  with  a  full  width  at  half 
maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm (chapter 9) or 6 mm (chapter 8; see Figure 3.4G). 
Ideally the size of the smoothing kernel is matched to the spatial extent of the 
hypothesised  activation;  in  practice  it  is  a  function  of  the  trade-off  between 
spatial  specificity  and  statistical  power  needed  to  overcome  the  stringent 
multiple comparisons correction associated with small smoothing kernels. That 
is, a well-powered study will be able to detect more focal signals albeit within 
the constraints of functio-anatomical heterogeneity across participants.  Methods 
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Figure 3.4: Preprocessing steps for fMRI data to prepare for statistical analysis. 
(A) Raw data shows a marked bias whereby the outer parts of the brain have 
greater signal amplitude compared to inner parts of the brain. This particular 
slice was from a single participant in chapter  8, which acquired data over a 
restricted  volume.  (B)  Bias  correction  estimated  a  smooth  bias  field  and 
generates  a  more  homogenous  signal  intensity.  (C)  Realignment  adjusts  for 
participant movement, and the estimated movement parameters (bottom) are 
used  in  the  statistics  as  described  in  section  3.2.4.  (D)  Fieldmaps,  which 
estimate the imperfections in the static B0 field, can correct distortions. (E) The 
functional data is coregistered to the participant’s structural data by maximizing 
the  normalised  mutual  information  (bottom).  (F)  The  structural  volume  is Methods 
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normalised  to  the  ICBM152  template  using  both  linear  and  non-linear 
transformations. (G) The normalised functional images are smoothed to account 
for small errors during preprocessing as well as inter-individual differences in 
the precise location of functional anatomy. This image was smoothed at 6 mm 
full width at half maximum (FWHM). 
3.2.4  Statistical analysis of fMRI images 
3.2.4.1  General linear model 
The  goal of fMRI  as used  in  chapters  8  and 9  was  to  associate  aspects of 
cognition or action—such as action values or proactive inhibition—to changes in 
the BOLD signal. This is most commonly achieved through a mass univariate 
approach  where  each  of  the  100,000+  voxels  is  treated  (at  first)  as  an 
independent measurement. I use the general linear model (GLM) described as 
? =  ?? + 𝜀 
where  ? is a vector containing the BOLD signal in a single  voxel across all 
acquired volumes and ? is the design matrix describing hypothesised causes of 
changes  in  ?  (Friston  et  al.,  1994).  A  set  of  regression  coefficients  ?  is 
estimated using restricted maximum likelihood (ReML) to account for structure 
in the residual error 𝜀 (Glaser and Friston, 2004). This violation of independent 
and  identically  distributed  errors  arises  from  the  sluggishness  of  the  BOLD 
signal (Figure 3.3) and of cognition, such that the signal in volume 𝑛 and 𝑛 + 1 
are  not  independent.  After  estimating  a  single  whitening  matrix  across  all 
voxels,  the  set  of  coefficients  ?  is  estimated  for  each  voxel  separately, 
generating a statistical parametric map (SPM) for each regressor in ?. Although 
in many studies there will only be a small number of regressors of interest, the 
design matrix contains many more regressors to account for as much variance Methods 
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in  the  signal  as  possible.  Firstly,  the  design  matrix  contains  regressors 
describing on-off events such as button presses, the appearance of a Go cue 
on  the  screen,  or  the  onset  of  feedback.  Secondly,  optional  parametric 
modulators on these events describe graded effects, such as reaction times on 
the button press, visual intensity of the Go cue, or the expected value at time of 
feedback. Thirdly, nuisance variables capture unwanted variance in the BOLD 
signal as well as possible confounds of the regressors of interest, such as head 
movements,  breathing  and  heartrate.  Lastly,  dummy  regressors  account  for 
baseline  signal differences  across  volumes  acquired  over  multiple  runs.  The 
scope here is limited to fast event-related designs as opposed to block designs 
(Friston et al., 1998), as I only used the former in the studies presented here. 
The  main  regressors  and  parametric  modulators  are  convolved  by  the 
haemodynamic response function (HRF), which links the hypothesised neural 
events  in  ?  to  the  BOLD  signal  in  ?  (see  Figure  3.3).  Note  that  ?  remains 
identical across all voxels, which leads to the implicit assumption that the HRF 
is identical across all regions of the brain (but see e.g. Handwerker et al., 2004). 
The  ?  at  each  voxel  can  be  transformed  into  a  ?  (or  𝑝)  value  to  examine 
whether there is a significant relationship between the regressor and the BOLD 
signal at a particular voxel: 
? =
??
????
 
where ? is a contrast vector selecting specific regressors of interest from ?. In 
addition  to  estimating  SPMs  for  individual  regressors  across  the  brain  (e.g. 
? = [1 0] or ? = [0 1]), contrast vectors can also be used to look for differences 
between regressors by adding and subtracting them (e.g. ? = [1 − 1]).  Methods 
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3.2.4.2  Multiple comparisons problem 
Most often we are not interested in SPMs of individuals, but rather in combining 
SPMs  across  individuals  to  describe  the  population  at  large  where  the 
participants were drawn from. In chapters 8 and 9 I created SPMs for contrasts 
of interest for each participant and performed one-sample ?-tests over the ?-
maps from all participants. But how do we then decide what voxels show a 
significant  response  to  the  manipulation?  This question  continues  to  provide 
fertile  grounds  for  debate  across  the  neuroimaging  community.  The  multiple 
comparisons problem arises from performing one ?-test at every voxel, leading 
to  many  false  positives  if  the  false  positive  rate  ?  is  set  to  0.05.  We  must 
therefore use a stricter ?. However, as the SPMs arise from smoothed data, the 
?-tests  are  not  independent  and  we  should  guard  ourselves  against  an 
excessive  false  negative  rate  due  to  an  insurmountable  (e.g.  Bonferroni-
corrected) ?. The solution used here and as implemented in SPM8 is Random 
Field  Theory  (RFT;  Worsley  and  Friston,  1995).  It  uses  an  estimate  of  the 
smoothness of the data to calculate the expected Euler Characteristic (EC) for 
different thresholds. The EC is directly related to the number of clusters that 
would exceed threshold under the null hypothesis. If we want at most 5% of the 
SPMs to contain one or more false positive clusters we can set the threshold 
such that the EC is equal to 0.05. This properly controls for false positives while 
minimising  false  negatives  within  a  single  SPM.  It  should  be  clear  that  this 
approach  does  not  correct  for  examining  multiple  SPMs  originating  from 
different  contrasts,  subsets  of  participants,  pre-processing  pipelines,  design 
matrices,  and  other  explorations  of  the  data.  Such  practices  would,  and 
probably have (Button et al., 2013), lead to an abundance of false positives in Methods 
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the literature. It should thus be noted that multiple comparisons correction in 
fMRI  is  only  useful  insofar  it  is  combined  with  sensible  hypotheses  and 
responsible analysis pipelines.  
3.2.4.3  Regions of interest 
A different way of alleviating the multiple comparisons problem is to use a priori 
regions of interest (ROIs). Rather than examining the entire brain, analysis is 
restricted to specific anatomically or functionally defined regions. In chapter 9 I 
averaged  β-values  from  anatomical  regions  defined  in  Montreal Neurological 
Institute  (MNI)  space  by  the  Automatic  Anatomical  Labeling  (AAL)  atlas 
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and from probabilistic atlases available in the 
community (e.g. Keuken et al., 2014). I also used functional ROIs defined by 
clusters from contrasts. In chapter 8 I used anatomical ROIs that were defined 
in the native space of the participant rather than in standard space by means of 
automatic segmentation with FIRST as implemented in FSL 5.05 (Smith et al., 
2004; Patenaude et al., 2011) and manual segmentation using ITK-SNAP 3.0 
(Yushkevich et al., 2006). Participant-specific ROIs improve spatial specificity 
by accounting for inter-participant anatomical variability and obviating the need 
for normalization, which is inherently imperfect.  
3.3  Multi-parameter mapping 
3.3.1  Quantitative structural images 
For each participant in chapters 8 and 9 I acquired structural multi-parameter 
maps  (MPMs).  In  addition  to  the  commonly  used  T1-weighted  scans,  the 
acquired volumes also include T2*-, proton density- and magnetization transfer-
weighted  volumes  (Weiskopf  and  Helms,  2008).  The  MPM  sequence  and 
processing pipeline aspires to provide quantitative maps, meaning the signal Methods 
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describes some property of the tissue in the voxel independent of scanner type, 
head  coil,  and  other  extraneous  factors  (Weiskopf  et  al.,  2013).  This  would 
allow meaningful aggregation of data across studies and research centres, be it 
through meta-analyses of the literature or more direct data-sharing. The work 
reported in this thesis does not leverage the quantitative property of the maps, 
so I refer the interested reader to other studies that examined this topic more 
closely (Draganski et al., 2011; Weiskopf et al., 2013; Callaghan et al., 2014). 
The  goal  in  collecting  the  MPMs  was  to  have  magnetization  transfer  (MT) 
images with exceptional grey/white-matter contrast for normalization and sub-
cortical segmentation, as well as T2* images for visualization of the internal and 
external parts of the globus pallidus, substantia nigra, and subthalamic nucleus 
during manual segmentation.  
Acquisition of the MPMs involves B1 mapping (i.e. mapping the RF field, Lutti et 
al., 2012), B0 mapping identical to field maps used with functional scans (see 
section  3.2.3.3),  and  the  acquisition  of  multiple  echoes  for  each  of  a  T1-
weighted volume, a MT volume and a proton density (PD)  weighted volume 
(Helms  et  al.,  2008a;  Helms  and  Dechent,  2009).  All  volumes  were 
simultaneously  processed  in  the  voxel-based  quantification  (VBQ)  toolbox 
implemented  in  SPM8,  which  models  the  tissue  properties  and  outputs  the 
quantitative maps (Callaghan et al., 2014). 
3.3.2  Normalization 
In  order  to  make  inferences  at  the  population  level  it  is  often  necessary  to 
normalise functional images to some standard space. Although the functional 
images could be directly normalised to a standard template, it is more accurate 
to do so via a high-resolution structural image of the participant (Ashburner and Methods 
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Friston, 2005). In chapters 8 and 9 I use Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space  to  normalise  the  MT  images.  The  normalization  procedure,  as 
implemented in SPM8 (Ashburner and Friston, 2005), segments the MT image 
into grey matter, white matter and cerebrospinal fluid based on a set of tissue 
probability maps (TPMs) in MNI space. During this process a set of non-linear 
distortions as well as a full affine (12 df) transformation matrix is estimated that 
optimally fits the TPMs to the MT image. This mapping is then applied to the 
functional images to bring them into a common space. 
3.4  Semi-automated segmentation of subcortical structures 
An alternative to performing normalization to allow population-level inference is 
to  produce  summary  statistics  for  each  participant  in  their  own  space.  For 
example, in chapter 9 I use regions of interest (ROIs) defined in the structural 
space of the participant to summarise functional activation in a particular region, 
and  ?-tests  over  these  average  activations  are  used  to  test  for  significant 
effects.  The  critical  difference  between  working  in  standard  space  versus 
structural  space  is the  automated  versus  manual identification  of  anatomical 
structures,  respectively.  That  is,  during  normalization  we  relinquish 
responsibility for matching the idiosyncrasies of an individual brain to a template 
to an algorithm that warps each brain into standard space (see section 3.3.2); 
when using ROIs in the participant’s structural space we define the ROIs by 
hand,  or  semi-automatically  by  having  an  algorithm  make  a  first  best  guess 
which  can  then  be  checked  and  manually  refined.  Therefore,  if  algorithms 
existed  that  almost  perfectly  normalised  images  into  structural  space  there 
would  be  no  need  for  manual  segmentation  of  regions,  but  such  reliable 
automated identification is as of yet impossible for structures like the substantia Methods 
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nigra,  subthalamic  nucleus  and  internal  and  external  parts  of  the  globus 
pallidus. As these regions were of interest in chapter 8, I used a combination of 
automated and manual segmentation to obtain ROIs for each participant in their 
structural space.  
The definition of the ROIs followed three steps. First, I used the toolbox FIRST 
as implemented in FMRIB Software Library (FSL) 5.0.5 to generate ROIs of the 
putamen, caudate, pallidum and nucleus accumbens for each participant in their 
structural  space  (Patenaude  et  al.,  2011).  Second,  I  loaded  these 
segmentations into ITK-SNAP 3.0 (www.itksnap.org, Yushkevich et al., 2006) 
visualised  onto  the  participant’s  MT  and  R2*  image  (Figure  3.5).  I  adjusted 
inaccuracies in the FIRST-based segmentations by hand. The combination of 
MT and R2* images allowed us to manually delineate the internal and external 
parts of the globus pallidus based on the medial medullary lamina visible on 
both  the  MT  and  R2*  image  (Figure  3.5A);  the  substantia nigra  based  on a 
strong contrast in the MT image with the surrounding tissue in the brain stem 
(Figure 3.5B); and the subthalamic nucleus based on a strong R2* contrast and 
a  MT  signal  that  differs  from  the  adjacent  substantia  nigra  (Figure  3.5B; 
Forstmann  et  al.,  2012;  Lambert  et  al.,  2012).  I  further  delineated  the  red 
nucleus to aid identification of the substantia nigra and subthalamic nucleus. In 
a  last  step  I  calculated  the  volume  of  each  ROI  and  plotted  a  range  of 
histograms (including volumes of single regions, right/left ratios, and between-
ROI volume ratios, all across participants) to detect outliers. These were re-
examined in ITK-SNAP and adjusted if necessary. The observed values were 
further compared to the literature, which showed that the volumes were within 
the expected range. Lastly, to visualise the segmented structures at the group Methods 
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level, I normalised the structures to MNI space and generated group probability 
maps  by  taking  the  mean  at  each  voxel  across  participants  for  each  mask. 
These were thresholded at 0.26 such that only voxels positive for 7 or more 
participants were retained in the mask. These normalised masks were not used 
for analysis, but rather for visualization.  
 
Figure 3.5: A single participant example of the use of magnetization transfer 
(MT) and R2* maps for automated and manual segmentation. (A) FSL FIRST 
segmented putamen, thalamus, hippocampus, caudate and pallidum from the 
T1w image. I then overlaid these segmentations onto the MT and R2* image in 
ITK-SNAP to, as a first step, split the pallidum into the internal and external part. 
The demarcation is the medial medullary lamina, indicated at the tip of the red 
arrows. On this slice the lamina is particularly well visible on the R2*, whereas 
on other slices the MT image showed a clear contrast. (B) On the sagittal view 
the substantia nigra can easily be visualised based on its dark colour in the MT 
image. The subthalamic nucleus is more challenging, and can be identified by 
its identical R2* intensity as the substantia nigra, but increased signal in the MT 
image. This border is indicated by the red arrow. 1: right putamen. 2: right GPe. 
3: right GPi. 4: right thalamus. 5: right amygdala. 6: left thalamus. 7: left GPi. 8: 
left GPe. 9: left putamen. 10: left amygdala. 11: left subthalamic nucleus. 12: left Methods 
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caudate  nucleus.  13:  right  caudate  nucleus.  14:  left  red  nucleus.  15:  left 
substantia nigra. 16: left nucleus accumbens.  
   Methods 
Chapter 3 
 
81 
 
3.5  Diffusion MRI 
3.5.1  Basis of the diffusion signal 
Axons, the part of a neuron that carries spike trains towards synapses, bundle 
together  to  transfer  information  between  parts  of  the  central  and  peripheral 
nervous system. Where enough axons bundle together, the otherwise Brownian 
motion of water molecules is restricted orthogonal to the direction of the bundle, 
such  that  displacement  along  the  principal  direction  of  the  bundle  is,  on 
average, larger than displacement orthogonal to it. In 1985 it was discovered 
such restrictions of random motion of water molecules are sufficiently large to 
pick up the direction of fibre bundles in vivo (Le Bihan and Breton, 1985; Le 
Bihan et al., 1986).  
Diffusion-weighted  imaging  (DWI) fundamentally  measures  the  loss  of  signal 
due to the movement of water molecules along a magnetic field gradient. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by an example: imagine a narrow tube filled with water, 
much like an axon bundle in the brain, in an MRI scanner. We can use an RF 
pulse combined with a slice-selecting gradient to excite a particular slice of the 
tube.  Between  the  time  of  the  RF  pulse  and  readout  of  the  transverse 
magnetization we could apply one of two magnetic gradients: one along the 
length of the tube, or one at a 90-degree angle to the tube. In the former case, 
water molecules  will freely  drift  along  the  length  of  the  tube, experiencing  a 
varying magnetic field and thus de-phasing rapidly. This would result in a weak 
transverse magnetization signal at the time of readout. In the alternative case, 
with  the  gradient  applied  orthogonal  to  the  direction  of  the  tube,  the  water 
molecules are unable to diffuse along the direction of the gradient and will thus 
all experience the same magnetic field, leading to little de-phasing and a strong Methods 
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signal at readout time. If all we measure, then, is a weak signal for one gradient 
direction and a strong signal for another, we know that there is non-isotropy (i.e. 
non-uniformity  across  diffusion  directions)  in  the  sample.  If  we  now  tested 
another, say, 100 directions, we could more accurately estimate the orientation 
of the tube based on when the signal is strong and weak (Jones et al., 2013). In 
addition to the number of directions we can also vary the duration and strength 
of the gradient, together summarised by a ‘b’-value, which further helps model 
the diffusion characteristics of the sample. We can then estimate the diffusion 
along a particular direction as described in the following equation: 
??
?0
= 𝑒−?? 
where ?? is the signal measured with the diffusion gradient turned on; ?0 the 
signal without the diffusion gradient (i.e. ?0 > ??); ? is the combined strength 
and duration of the diffusion gradient in s mm
-2; and D is the variable of interest 
defined as the diffusion coefficient, representing the strength of diffusion. As ?? 
decreases with no changes in ?0 and ?, ? must therefore increase. That is, the 
loss of signal in the diffusion scan relative to the non-diffusion (‘b0’) scan is 
inversely proportional to the log of the diffusion strength.  
In chapter 8 I used a sequence modelled after the Human Connectome Project 
(HCP;  Van  Essen  et  al.,  2013).  I  sampled  across  100  gradient  directions 
distributed over a sphere across three b-values (also called ‘shells’; 900, 1800 
and  2700  s  mm
-2),  along  both  right-left  and  left-right  phase-encoding  (PE) 
directions. The acquisition of both PE directions, also called ‘blips’, is necessary 
to correct for the strong distortions commonly observed in DWI. In chapter 8 I 
further acquired  b0  images  along  the  posterior-anterior and  anterior-posterior Methods 
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PE directions to inform the reconstruction of the original signal from the PE-
distorted images. 
3.5.2  Preprocessing of diffusion images 
I analysed the raw diffusion data (Figure 3.6A) using FSL’s diffusion toolbox to 
1) estimate the distortion along the phase-encoding dimension from b0 images 
(Figure 3.6B), 2) apply the corrections for these distortions and simultaneously 
correct for eddy currents and movement (Figure 3.6C), 3) estimate the diffusion 
tensors for each voxel to acquire fractional anisotropy maps (Figure 3.6D), and 
4) estimate the distribution of diffusion parameters (Figure 3.6E) at each voxel 
to allow for probabilistic tractography (Figure 3.6F).  
3.5.2.1  Correcting for phase-encoding distortions 
The  spin-echo  sequence  used  in  DWI  is  highly  sensitive  to  off-resonance 
effects, such as magnetic susceptibility gradients caused by air in the ear canal 
or sinuses. Especially at higher echo times (TEs), as used in chapter  8, the 
signal  around  the  inferior  parts  of  the  brain  gets  stretched  and  compressed 
along  the  PE  direction  due  to  these  off-resonance  effects  (Figure  3.6A). 
Fortunately, flipping the PE direction also inverts the distortions, such that signal 
that was stretched along one PE direction is compressed along the opposing 
PE direction and vice versa (see Figure 3.6). FSL’s TOPUP function maximises 
the  similarity  between  unwarped  images  by  estimating  the  distortion  field 
(Figure  3.6B),  using  the  sum-of-squared  differences  between  the  unwarped 
images as goodness of fit.  
3.5.2.2  Correcting for eddy currents and motion 
The rapid switching of gradients in diffusion imaging leads to the induction of 
electric currents in components of the MR scanner, such as the headcoil. These Methods 
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currents  themselves  create  small  magnetic  fields  that  affect  the  Larmor 
frequency of protons in the brain, in turn distorting the spatial reconstruction of 
the MR signal. The eddy currents become larger as we move from weaker to 
stronger gradients, e.g. from b=1000 s mm
-2 to b=3000 s mm
-2. The artefacts 
are visible as contractions, shifts and shears, and additionally depend on the 
direction  of  the  gradient.  We  thus  need  to  model  the  distortions  based  on 
knowledge of the strength (b-value) and direction of the field. Additionally, head 
motion interacts with eddy currents, such that simple realignment of the head as 
done for functional MR images would not take into account the variable effect of 
eddy currents dependent on head location in the coil. I used FSL’s function 
EDDY which uses a single model that incorporates TOPUP’s field coefficients, 
motion,  eddy  currents,  gradient  strengths  and  gradient  directions  to  correct 
each individual volume (Figure 3.6C).  
3.5.3  Estimating the diffusion tensors 
We can  estimate  a diffusion  tensor D for each  voxel that  is described  by  6 
unique elements 
? = [
??? ??? ???
??? ??? ???
??? ??? ???
] 
where ???, ??? and ??? are the diffusion coefficients in the scanner’s frame of 
reference, and ???, ??? and ??? reflect the correlations in displacement along 
the dimensions. These 6 elements can be estimated independently for each 
voxel by regressing the signal attenuation ? in volume ? on the strength and 
direction of the diffusion gradient associated with the same volume (Basser et 
al., 1994; Le Bihan et al., 2001): Methods 
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ln(?) = −[??? ??? ???][
???
???
???
] − 2[??? ??? ???][
???
???
???
] 
ln  (?) = −?????? − ?????? − ?????? − 2?????? − 2?????? − 2?????? 
Matrix D can be diagonalised, which yields eigenvalues λ and eigenvectors. The 
latter describes the three principal directions of diffusion, and λ describes the 
diffusivity for each direction independent of the other directions. The fractional 
anisotropy then quantifies the degree to which diffusion is different along ?, ? 
and ?: 
?? = √
1
2
∗
√(𝜆1 − 𝜆2)2 + (𝜆2 − 𝜆3)2 + (𝜆3 − 𝜆1)2
√𝜆1
2 + 𝜆2
2 + 𝜆3
2  
Note  that  if  𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜆3  then  the  numerator  and  therefore  FA  equals  zero, 
indicating there is no anisotropy. In the converse, e.g. 𝜆1 ≫ 𝜆2 = 𝜆3, the FA will 
approach one, indicating all diffusion occurs along the direction described by 
the first eigenvector. Typical values for FA in grey matter are between 0 and 
0.1, whereas FA in white matter can reach as high as 0.9 (Figure 3.6D). I used 
FSL’s dtifit function to estimate the diffusion tensor. 
3.5.4  Generating distributions for the diffusion parameters 
Although FA maps are widely used to compare diffusion properties of tissue 
across  individuals,  the  diffusion  tensor  cannot  be  used  for  probabilistic 
tractography. The reason is that the tensor characterises the principal diffusion 
direction, but does not contain a measure of the confidence that can be placed 
in  this  direction,  i.e.  it  returns  a  point  estimate  rather  than  a  distribution. 
However, probabilistic tractography as implemented in FSL works by sampling 
this  distribution  of  principal  diffusion  directions.  I  used  FSL’s  bedpostx  to Methods 
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generate, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling, the distributions of up to 
three  principal  directions  per  voxel  (Behrens  et  al.,  2003b;  Behrens  et  al., 
2007b;  Sotiropoulos  et  al.,  2011;  Jbabdi  et  al.,  2012).  The  peak  of  this 
distribution is shown for each of the three fibres in Figure 3.6E. These estimates 
are  then  used  for  probabilistic  tractography  (e.g.  from  the  putamen,  Figure 
3.6F). 
 
Figure 3.6: diffusion data preprocessing pipeline. (A) The raw data, here shown 
in  the  absence  of  a  diffusion  signal  for  best  signal-to-noise  ratio,  shows 
distortions along the phase encoding direction (x) especially in ventral parts of 
the  brain.  (B) TOPUP  estimates  these  distortions,  generating  a map  of  field 
coefficients. Note the black areas indicating strong distortion, as can be seen in 
A. (C) EDDY combines information from TOPUP with estimate of eddy currents 
and movement into a single model. The same slice as in A is shown here, but 
after correction by EDDY. Note the alleviated distortion in the ventral parts of 
the brain. (D) Using function dtifit I estimated the diffusion tensors that best Methods 
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explained the data, without an estimate of the uncertainty. This yields fractional 
anisotropy (FA) and mean diffusivity (MD) maps, amongst others. (E) The eddy-
corrected data also allows estimation of the distributions of fibre directions as 
implemented in bedpostx. Shown here are the peaks of these distributions, but 
critically,  the  entire  distribution  is  estimated  to  allow  for  probabilistic 
tractography. (F) An example of probabilistic tractography, seeded from every 
voxel in the right putamen. Hotter colours indicate more streamlines passing 
through. 
3.5.5  Probabilistic tractography 
3.5.5.1  Rationale 
The anatomical connectivity of the brain provides a blueprint for its function. 
Prior to the 21
st century the only way of studying these connections was through 
post-mortem dissection and vivisection (as in ancient Greece by Herophilus, the 
first known anatomist; Bay and Bay, 2010) or white matter lesions and tracing 
studies in model organisms (Mesulam, 1978). None of these techniques can be 
used  to  study  the  relationship  between  anatomy  and  function  in  healthy 
humans. Furthermore, single-neuron tracing studies in non-human primates are 
painstaking (Markov et al., 2012), although recent developments promise more 
efficient tracing (Brainbow; Livet et al., 2007) 
The development of diffusion MRI paved the way for in vivo tractography. By 
knowing the direction of fibres in each voxel of the brain it becomes possible to 
estimate what the likely white matter pathways are across multiple voxels. The 
characteristics  of  these  pathways  can  then  be  linked  to  function  to  provide 
support for the widely assumed notion that connectivity underpins function in 
the central nervous system (Johansen-Berg et al., 2005; Neubert et al., 2010; 
Coxon et al., 2012; Saygin et al., 2012; e.g. Chowdhury et al., 2013). Methods 
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3.5.5.2  Method 
The first methods for constructing white matter pathways from diffusion data 
took a deterministic approach, reconstructing a single best guess based on the 
data (Mori et al., 1999; Basser et al., 2000). However, this approach did not 
reflect the often considerable uncertainty in the direction of fibres, leading to the 
introduction  of  probabilistic  tractography  (Behrens  et  al.,  2003b).  Here, 
thousands of ‘streamlines’ are drawn for each seed voxel, sampling from the 
fibre  distribution  from  bedpostx  at  each  subsequent  step.  Over  many 
streamlines  this  builds  up  a  map  of  the  brain  quantifying  the  number  of 
streamlines that pass through each voxel. Further development of this method 
achieved  more  accurate  tractography  for  multi-shell  data  (Behrens  et  al., 
2007b).  This  approach  has  been  validated  against  non-human  primate  data 
(Croxson et al., 2005; Jbabdi et al., 2013), suggesting that a reconstruction of 
white matter pathways in this stochastic framework can accurately capture even 
detailed characteristics of the anatomy. 
3.5.5.3  Limitations 
“It seems strange, therefore, that the connectivity of the brain depends on the 
parameters of the MR experiment.” Derek K. Jones, 2013 
An initial excitement with in vivo tractography has led, in some cases, to an 
over-interpretation of the data  (Jones et al., 2013). There are many ways in 
which (probabilistic) tractography can run into problems and yield  misleading 
results.  For  example,  crossing  white  matter  fibres  often  look  isotropic,  i.e. 
lacking directional diffusion, despite the underlying pathways. Solving this has 
been a major focus of developments in tractography from the start (Basser et 
al., 2000; Behrens et al., 2003b; Behrens et al., 2007b; Wedeen et al., 2008) Methods 
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and is still ongoing (Sotiropoulos et al., 2013). Another issue, also present in 
data  in  chapter  8,  is  strong  distortion  with  longer  acquisition  times  at  high 
resolution along the phase encoding direction (Van Essen et al., 2012; Glasser 
et al., 2013). This can be particularly severe in ventral areas of the brain. Lastly, 
the  probabilistic  nature  of  the  reconstruction  makes  it  particularly  hard  to 
reconstruct  long  fibres.  Taken  together,  the  measurement  of  connectivity 
between two voxels directly depends on the quality and quantity of the MR data. 
For this reason, these values cannot directly represent connection probability or 
fibre density (Jones et al., 2013). However, by using the same MR sequence for 
each participant as well as relative measures of connectivity (e.g. compared to 
some participant-specific baseline, which accounts for MR quality) it is possible 
to get informative estimates of how reliably two regions are connected. Such 
estimates  can  then  be  related  to  individual  differences  in  behaviour  and 
functional data (chapter 8).  
3.6  Neurostimulation techniques 
In most of cognitive neuroscience our only way of manipulating neural activity is 
through the sensory channels. For example, we can cause a change in BOLD 
signal in occipital cortex by flashing a checkerboard pattern in the participant’s 
eyes,  or  in  S1  by  tactile  stimulation  of  the  skin.  This  contrasts  with 
neurostimulation, as noted by Bestmann et al. (2008): “[Neurostimulation] can 
bypass the sensory pathways that provide the conventional alternative source 
of causal inputs.” By directly stimulating regions of interest we can study the 
necessary role for those regions in information processing, which is impossible 
in  fMRI.  Neurostimulation  has  been  used  in  humans  for  over  a  century 
(Thompson, 1910), but especially the last three decades (Merton and Morton, Methods 
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1980;  Barker  et  al.,  1985)  have  seen  major  advances  in  the  protocols 
(Hoogendam  et  al.,  2010)  and  widespread  adoption  in  research  and  clinic 
(Kolbinger et al., 1995; Pascual-Leone et al., 2005; Rossi et al., 2009; Freitas et 
al.,  2011).  Here  I  used  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS)  to  disrupt 
processing in a cortical area for tens of minutes (chapter 6; Huang et al., 2005) 
as well as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to increase excitability 
of the same region of cortex for a similar amount of time (chapter 7; Nitsche and 
Paulus,  2001;  Nitsche  et  al.,  2008).  It  remains  largely  unknown  how  these 
neurostimulation techniques exert their effects (though see Stagg and Nitsche, 
2011; Stagg et al., 2013) and their efficacy is primarily based on changes in 
excitability of motor cortex as measured by motor-evoked potentials (MEPs, e.g. 
Penfield  and  Boldrey,  1937;  Nitsche  and  Paulus,  2000).  Indeed,  a  meta-
analysis  published  recently  suggests  tDCS  does  not  have  any  effect  on 
cognition  (Horvath  et  al.,  2015).  Additional  methodological  details  regarding 
positioning, stimulation parameters and blinding can be found in chapters 6 and 
7.  
3.7  Oral levodopa to alter dopamine levels 
Levodopa  (L-DOPA)  is  transformed  into  the  neuromodulator  dopamine  by 
decarboxylation inside dopaminergic cells. Critically, the carboxylic acid on L-
DOPA allows it to cross the blood-brain barrier, unlike its derivative dopamine. 
Much of the development of this molecule as a drug was due to its remarkable 
benefit to Parkinson’s disease patients (Cotzias et al., 1969). In chapter 5 I used 
a  modern  version  of  the  drug,  which  is  co-administered  with  the  peripheral 
decarboxylation inhibitor benserazide, to increase dopamine levels across all 
dopaminergic neurons in the brain (Everett and Borcherding, 1970). This has Methods 
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particularly  pronounced  effects  in  the  striatum  (Lloyd  et  al.,  1975),  but  also 
directly or indirectly affects prefrontal function (Cools et al., 2002). The half-life 
of L-DOPA/benserazide is approximately 1.5 hours (Fabbrini et al., 1987), its 
concentration  in  the  blood  plasma  peaking  approximately  1  hour  after  oral 
administration, though it depends on factors such as last meal ingestion time 
(Baruzzi et al., 1987). The experiment in chapter 5 was performed double-blind 
with counterbalanced administration of placebo. 
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4.1  Introduction 
An overarching view of adaptive behaviour is that humans and animals act to 
maximise reward and minimise punishment as a consequence of their choices. 
There are multiple ways this can be realised (see section 2.2) and mounting 
evidence indicates model-based and model-free forms of reinforcement learning 
(RL) contribute to behavioural control (Doya, 1999; Daw et al., 2005; Balleine 
and  O'Doherty,  2010;  Redgrave  et  al.,  2010;  Boureau  and  Dayan,  2011; 
Wunderlich et al., 2012b).  
To study these two forms of control I used a task first developed by Daw et al. 
(2011). The defining feature of the task is that it has an associative structure 
that can be exploited by a model-based, but not a model-free, controller. The 
extent  to  which  participants  use  this  structure  during  choice  is  used  as  a 
measure of model-based control; conversely, the extent to which they ignore 
the structure during value updating is used as a measure of model-free control. 
Here I describe the task and analysis methods used in 3 experiments involving 
an L-DOPA manipulation (chapter 5), transcranial magnetic stimulation (chapter 
6) and transcranial direct current stimulation (chapter 7).  
4.2  Task 
Each trial consisted of two stages, both requiring a choice between two stimuli. 
Each choice option was represented by a fractal in a coloured box on a black 
background (Figure 4.1). At every choice, participants had to respond within two 
seconds using the left/right cursor keys or the trial was aborted. Participants 
rarely missed a trial (e.g. in chapter 5, mean proportion of missed trials: 0.4%, 
SD: 1.5%), and those missed trials were omitted from analysis. Choice at the 
first  stage  always  involved  the  same  two  stimuli  left/right  randomised.  After Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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participants made their response the rejected stimulus disappeared from the 
screen and the chosen stimulus moved to the top of the screen. After a delay 
(see  Table  4.1  for  experiment-specific  settings)  one  of  two  second  stage 
stimulus pairs appeared, with the transition from first to second stage following 
fixed transition probabilities. Each first stage option is more strongly (with a 70% 
transition  probability)  associated  with  one  of  the  two  second  stage  pairs,  a 
crucial  factor  in  allowing  the  dissociation  of  model-free  from  model-based 
behaviour. After the second choice, the chosen option remains on the screen, 
together with a reward symbol (a pound coin) or a ‘no reward’ symbol (a red 
cross). Each of the four stimuli in stage 2 had a reward probability between 0.2 
and 0.8. Those reward probabilities drifted slowly and independently for each of 
the four second stage options in every trial through a diffusion process with 
Gaussian  noise  (mean  0,  SD 0.025). The walks  were  not  truly  random  as I 
selected a number of walks that would ensure that participants needed to keep 
learning and switching their preference for second-stage cues throughout the 
experiment  (see  section  4.5  for  validation  of  these  walks).  For  experiment-
specific settings see Table 4.1. 
Prior to the experiment participants were given explicit information about the 
task structure; namely that for each stimulus on the first stage one of the two 
transition  probabilities  was  higher  than  the  other,  and  that  these  transition 
probabilities  remained  constant  throughout the  experiment. Participants  were 
also  told  that  reward probabilities  on  the  second  stage  were  independent of 
each  other  and  would  change  slowly  over  time.  Before  starting  the  testing 
session,  participants  practiced  50  trials  with  different  stimuli  and  outcome 
probabilities. Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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Figure 4.1: Two-step task design (A) On each trial a choice between two stimuli 
led probabilistically to one of two further pairs of stimuli, which then demanded 
another choice followed by reward or no-reward according to the p(reward) of 
the  chosen  second-stage  stimulus  that  fluctuated  over  time.  Importantly, 
participants could learn that each first-stage stimulus led more often (70/30%) to 
one of the pairs; this task structure could then be exploited by a model-based, 
but not by a model-free controller. (B) Model-based and model-free strategies 
for  reinforcement  learning  predict  differences  in  feedback  processing 
particularly after uncommon transitions. If choices were exclusively model-free, 
then a reward would increase the likelihood of staying with the same stimulus 
on  the  next  trial,  regardless  of  the  type  of  transition  (left).  Alternatively,  if 
choices  were  driven  by  a  model-based  system,  the  impact  of  reward  would 
interact  with  the  transition  type  (middle).  As  shown  previously  behaviour  in 
healthy participants resembles a hybrid of model-based and model-free control 
(right; Daw et al., 2011). I can thus quantify model-free control by estimating the Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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main effect of reward, and model-based control by estimating the reward-by-
transition interaction. Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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Table 4.1: Experiment-specific settings. The timings in the TMS and tDCS experiment were faster to allow for more choices per unit time 
in the experiment. ITI = inter-trial interval; L-DOPA = levodopa; TMS = transcranial magnetic stimulation; tDCS = transcranial direct 
current stimulation; 𝑈(1,3) = uniform distribution between 1 and 3; nRewards = total number of rewarded trials in the session. 
Study  Sessions  different 
sets of 
walks  
double 
blind 
settings per session 
performance-
based pay-out (£) 
trials  # 
break
s 
ITI (s)  time for 
choices 
(s) 
transition 
time (s) 
reward 
duration 
(s) 
L-DOPA 
(Ch. 5) 
2 (on/off)  2  yes  0.25*(nRewards - 
85) 
201  2  𝑈(1,3)  2.0  1.5  2.0 
TMS  
(Ch. 6) 
3 (vertex, 
left/right 
dlPFC) 
3  no  0.25*(nRewards - 
85) 
201  2  𝑈(1,2)  2.0  0.5  1.5 
tDCS 
(Ch. 7) 
2 
(sham/active) 
3  yes  0.2*(nRewards - 
170) 
350  4  𝑈(1,2)  2.0  0.5  1.5 
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4.3  Basic analysis of behaviour 
The logic of the task is based on the fact that a dependence on model-based or 
model-free  strategies  predicts  different  patterns  through  which  feedback 
obtained after the second stage should impact future first stage choices (Daw et 
al., 2011). A model-free reinforcement learning strategy predicts a main effect of 
reward  on  stay  probability.  This is because  model-free  choice  works without 
considering  structure  in  the  environment;  hence  rewarded  choices  are  more 
likely to be repeated, regardless of whether that reward followed a common or 
rare  transition.  A  reward  after  an  uncommon  transition  would  therefore 
adversely increase the value of the chosen first stage cue without updating the 
value of the unchosen cue. In contrast, under a model-based strategy I expect a 
crossover interaction between the two factors, because a rare transition inverts 
the  effect  of  a  subsequent  reward  (Figure  4.1).  Under  model-based  control, 
receiving a reward after an uncommon transition increases the propensity to 
switch.  This  is  because  the  rewarded  second  stage  stimulus  can  be  more 
reliably accessed by choosing the rejected first stage cue than by choosing the 
same cue again.  
Thus, the influence of the controllers can be inferred in terms of the main effect 
of  reward  (model-free)  and  the  interaction  between  reward  and  transition 
likelihood (model-based) on the probability of staying with the same first-stage 
stimulus on the next trial (as in Daw et al., 2011; Figure 4.1). This “1 trial back” 
analysis can be performed using a simple ANOVA over p(stay|reward,transition) 
with  factors  reward,  transition  and  manipulation  (e.g.  L-DOPA  or  placebo  in 
chapter 5), or in a logistic regression as in chapters 6 and 7. In the latter, the 
dependent variable is stay (1) or switch (0), and I used the Linear Mixed Effects Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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4 toolbox for R (R Development Core Team, 2008; R Core Team, 2011; Bates 
et al., 2012) to estimate population coefficients for each regressor. I could then 
use the esticon function in package “doBy” (Højsgaard, 2012) to test contrasts 
of interest. In chapter 7 I further extended this framework to examine influences 
of both controllers extending more than 1 trial back, by coding the dependent 
variable as “Chose A” (1) or “Chose B” (0), where A and B are the two first-
stage stimuli. The regressors code for whether a model-free or model-based 
agent, based on the first-stage choice, reward and transition in trials prior to the 
choice, would promote choosing A (1) or B (-1; see Table 6.1 for a list of all 
regressors).  
4.4  Reinforcement learning models 
In the following I denote the model-free value ??1
𝑀? and the model-based value 
??1
𝑀𝐵  for first  stage  stimuli  ?1 ∈ {1,2}.  The  hybrid  model  computes  the  actual 
value ??1
𝐻????? used in determining choice as weighted linear combination  
??1
𝐻????? = ? ∗ ??1
𝑀𝐵 + (1 − ?) ∗ ??1
𝑀? 
where ? ∈ [0,1] quantifies the extent of model-based and model-free control. 
Values  for  the  four  stimuli  at  the  second  stage  (stimuli  ?2 ∈ {3,4,5,6})  are 
updated  identically  for  both  controllers  according  to  reward  prediction  errors 
(Watkins, 1989):  
??2(? + 1) = ??2(?) + ?2 ∗ (? − ??2(?)) 
Where ?2 ∈ [0,1] is the learning rate, and ? ∈ {0,1} the absence or presence of 
a reward on trial ?. At the first stage, model-free ‘cached’ values are updated Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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according to on-policy temporal difference learning with reward prediction errors 
and eligibility traces (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994):  
??1
𝑀?(? + 1) = ??1
𝑀?(?) + ?1 ∗ (??2 ?ℎ????(?) − ??1
𝑀?(?)) + 𝜆 ∗ ?1 ∗ (? − ??2
𝑀?(?)) 
Here ?1 ∈ [0,1] is the learning rate for the first stage, and 𝜆 ∈ [0,+∞) is a gain 
parameter representing the eligibility trace. 
Model-based values are calculated anew for each and every trial in a forward 
looking manner by multiplying the state values of the better option at the second 
stage with the state transition probabilities:  
?1
𝑀𝐵 = 0.7 ∗ max(?3,?4) + 0.3 ∗ max(?5,?6) 
?2
𝑀𝐵 = 0.3 ∗ max  (?3,?4) + 0.7 ∗ max  (?5,?6) 
Based on simulations by the authors of the original task I likewise simplified 
model-based  learning  under  the  premise  that  learning  of  state  transitions 
quickly converges to stable values and hence transition probabilities were not 
updated  by  explicitly  modelling  state  prediction  errors  (see  supplemental 
material in Daw et al., 2011).  
I  computed  the  probability  ?  of  choosing  stimulus  1  (in  a  choice  between 
stimulus 1 with value ?1 and stimulus 2 with value ?2) at stage 1 according to a 
softmax choice rule, which depends on the relative stimulus values and choice 
in the previous trial (C = 1 if s1 was chosen on the previous trial, -1 if s2 was 
chosen) 
?(?1) =
1
1 + e−β1∗(Q1−Q2)−π∗C 
 Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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and similarly in stage 2, e.g. when observing the s3-s4 pair: 
?(?3) =
1
1 + e−β2∗(Q3−Q4) 
 
The model thus includes 7 possible parameters to optimise over: two inverse 
temperatures  β1  and  β2,  two  learning  rates  1  and  α2,  an  eligibility  trace  λ, 
perseverance  ,  and  a  parameter    for  the  relative  degree  of  model-based 
versus model-free control. The learning rate  captures the extent to which new 
information at outcome is used for learning, i.e. the learning speed;  measures 
the discriminability between two options, with a larger value pertaining to more 
predictable choices (i.e. a more predictable link between values and choices); 
the persistency  is an index of the tendency to choose the same option as in 
the  previous  trial  regardless  of  value  (Lau  and  Glimcher,  2005;  Kable  and 
Glimcher, 2007), and parameter  represents the extent to which one or other 
system drives a participant’s behaviour. Reduced versions of the model were 
compared using model comparison techniques in chapter 5, and a 5-parameter 
model was used in section 4.5 to simulate data from the task
 
I  applied  logistic  or  exponential  transformations  before  fitting  parameters  to 
transform  bounded  parameters  into  transformed  space  which  spanned 
[−∞,+∞]  to  accommodate  maximum  likelihood  (ML)  and  expectation 
maximization (EM) estimation. I transformed  and  using the logistic function 
???????? =
1
1 + 𝑒−?𝑢???𝑢???? 
???????? =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝜔𝑢???𝑢???? Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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and  and λ using the exponential function 
???????? = 𝑒?𝑢???𝑢???? 
𝜆??????? = 𝑒𝜆𝑢???𝑢???? 
4.5  Validation of random walks 
A purely model-free agent can, under restricted circumstances, generate data 
that contains a reward-by-transition interaction in the 1-back analysis described 
above (p(stay) analysis). This confound arises when the second-stage reward 
probabilities are relatively static, because the participant might settle on the best 
first-stage stimulus rather than switch between the two first-stage stimuli on a 
regular  basis.  This  would  then  lead  to  a  situation  where  most  common 
transitions  are  rewarded,  and  most  uncommon  transitions  are  unrewarded, 
when choosing the best stimulus. In both cases, the participant likely stays with 
the  same  first-stage  stimulus  on  the  first  trial,  even  if  the  participant  is 
completely model-free, thus leading to a reward-by-transition interaction that is 
inferred as model-based control. This confound is quickly alleviated when the 
second-stage reward probabilities become less static, or indeed truly random. In 
chapter 6 I used 3 random walks randomly assigned to sessions. To confirm 
that these walks (and by extension the walks from my other studies, which were 
generated with similar levels of drift) are not confounded I generated data from 
a model-free agent playing on these random walks and examined the inferred 
levels of model-based and model-free control. The prediction was that data from 
a model-free agent should not show model-based characteristics. 
First, I generated choices on the three walks using a reinforcement learning 
model identical to that used by Otto et al. (2013), which has 5 parameters: a Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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model-free learning rate shared between the first and second stage (α), inverse 
temperature for the softmax choice rule (β), eligibility trace which carries the 
second-stage  prediction  error  over  to  the  first-stage  stimuli  (λ),  a  weighting 
parameter  between  model-based  and  model-free  control  (ω)  and  a 
perseverance parameter which accounts for a propensity to stay regardless of 
previous events (π). For details of the model see Otto et al. (2013). I selected 
representative values for all but α: β = 4, λ = 0.6, ω = 0 (i.e. purely model-free), 
π  =  0.1  (Daw  et  al.,  2011).  As  the  potential  confound  can  depend  on  α,  I 
generated data for α between 0.001 and 0.600 in steps of 0.001, simulating 
3000  datasets  of  201  trials  for  each  configuration  of  parameters.  I  then 
calculated  p(stay)  for  each  of  the  four  reward/transition  conditions  and 
calculated the magnitude of the main effect of reward, and reward-by-transition 
interaction from these p(stay) values. Note this is a different approach from the 
hierarchical analysis, but along identical lines of reasoning. Crucially, I predicted 
that a model-free agent should not show any reward-by-transition interaction in 
any of the walks, as that would indicate a potential confound in the walks. As 
expected, these walks did not show such a confound (Figure 4.2), such that the 
level  of  model-based  control  was  close  to  zero  for  all  learning  rates. 
Interestingly, the level of inferred model-free control scaled close to linear with 
learning  rate.  In  conclusion,  in  the  random  walks  used  in  this  thesis  the 
estimation of model-based control is not confounded by model-free influences 
on behaviour. Empirical studies on model-based and model-free control 
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Figure  4.2:  inferred  level  of  model-based  and  model-free  control  in  a  purely 
model-free agent as a function of learning rate of this agent. I simulated 3000 
agents playing the 2-step task for every learning rate to verify that the analysis 
method  would  not  infer  model-based  control  even  though  the  underlying 
generative model was purely model-free. For all three walks used in chapter 6, 
the  analysis  correctly  estimated  model-based  control  to  be  around  zero 
irrespective of the learning rate. Random walks in the other experiments had 
similar generative settings. 
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5.1  Abstract 
Dopamine has been implicated in virtually all aspects of reward-guided learning 
and choice, including reward prediction errors, motivation and planning. Here, 
rather than studying the role of dopamine in one specific process, I asked how a 
dopaminergic challenge could alter the extent to which model-based and model-
free decision-making strategies are used. I used the two-stage Markov decision 
task, as outlined in the introduction to these chapters, to quantify model-based 
and model-free control. I found that administration of L-DOPA promoted model-
based  over  model-free  choice,  specifically  by  strengthening  model-based 
control in response to the absence of reward. In contrast, I observed no effect of 
L-DOPA on model-free control.  
5.2  Introduction 
Previous research had focused on the role of dopamine in model-free learning, 
and value updating via reward prediction errors. For example, phasic firing of 
dopaminergic VTA neurons encodes reward prediction errors in reinforcement 
learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998), and in humans, 
drugs enhancing dopaminergic function (e.g. L-DOPA) augment a striatal signal 
that  expresses  reward  prediction  errors  during  instrumental  learning 
(Pessiglione  et  al.,  2006).  In  so  doing,  L-DOPA  increases  the  likelihood  of 
choosing  stimuli associated  with  greater monetary  gains  (Frank et  al., 2004; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Bodi et al., 2009). However, dopamine’s role in model-
based  choice  remains  poorly  understood,  most  likely  due  to  its  widespread 
rather than isolated effects. For example, it is unknown if and how it impacts on 
performance in model-based decisions, and on the arbitration between model-
based  and  model-free  controllers.  This  is  the  question  I  addressed  in  the Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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present study where I formally tested whether dopamine influences the degree 
to which behaviour is governed by either control system.  
5.3  Methods 
5.3.1  Participants 
18  healthy  males  (mean  age:  23.3  (SD:  3.4))  participated  in  two  separate 
sessions. Data from two additional participants were not included in the analysis 
as those participants misunderstood instructions and performed at chance level. 
The UCL Ethics committee approved the study and participants gave written 
informed consent before both sessions.  
5.3.2  Dopamine drug manipulation 
Participants  were  tested  in  a  double-blind,  fully  counterbalanced,  repeated 
measures setting on L-DOPA (150 mg L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine / 37,5 mg 
benserazide;  Madopar®,  Roche  UK),  and  on  placebo  (500mg  calcium 
carbonate;  Calcit®,  Procter  and  Gamble)  dispersed  in  orange  squash  (see 
section 3.7 for a description of levodopa). The task was administered 55.0 (SD: 
4.7) minutes after drug administration. Session 1 and 2 were approximately one 
week apart (at least 4, but no more than 14 days) with both sessions at the 
same  time  of day.  All  participants  except one  participated  in  the  morning  to 
minimise time-of-day effects. I assessed drug effects on self-reported mental 
state using a computerised visual analogue scale immediately before starting 
the task (Bond and Lader, 1974) 
5.3.3  Task & Analysis 
I used the task and analysis strategies as described in chapter 4. 
5.4  Results Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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Using repeated measures ANOVA I examined the probability of staying at the 
first stage dependent on drug state (L-DOPA or placebo), reward on previous 
trial  (reward  or no-reward),  and  transition  type  on  previous  trial (common or 
uncommon) (Figure 4.1). A significant main effect of reward, F(1,17) = 23.3, p < 
0.001,  demonstrated  a  model-free  component  in  behaviour  (i.e.  reward 
increases  stay  probability  regardless  of  the  transition  type).  A  significant 
interaction between reward and transition, F(1,17) = 9.75, p = 0.006, revealed a 
model-based  component  (i.e.  participants  also  take  the  task  structure  into 
account). These  results  show  both a  direct  reinforcement  effect (model-free) 
and an effect of task structure (model-based) and replicate previous findings 
(Daw et al., 2011). 
The  key  analyses  here  concerned  whether  L-DOPA  modulated  choice 
propensities.  Critically,  I  observed  a  significant  drug*reward*transition 
interaction,  F(1,17)  =  9.86,  p=0.006,  reflecting  increased  model-based 
behaviour  under  L-DOPA  treatment.  I  also  observed  a  main  effect  of  drug, 
F(1,17) = 7.04, p = 0.017, showing that participants were less perseverative 
under L-DOPA treatment. Interactions between drug and transition, F(1,17) = 
4.09,  p  =  0.06,  or  drug  and  reward  (which  would  indicate  a  drug-induced 
change in model-free control), F(1,17) = 1.10, p = 0.31, were not significant.  Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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Figure  5.1:  (A)  Participants’  task  behaviour  showed  characteristics  of  both 
model-free  and  model-based  influences,  demonstrating  that  participants 
combined  both  strategies  in  the  task.  The  reward*transition  interaction  (a 
measure of the extent to which participants consider the task structure) was 
significantly larger in L-DOPA compared to placebo, indicating stronger model-
based  behaviour.  (B)  Difference  in  stay  probability  between  L-DOPA  and 
placebo  condition,  corrected  for  the  main  effect  of  drug.  The  observed 
interaction indicates a shift towards model-based choice (see F) while there is Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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no resemblance to any of the three effects implicating the model-free system 
(see  C-E).  (C-F)  Illustration  of  expected  differences  in  stay  probability  for 
hypothetical drug effects. See Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 for validation of these 
hypotheses.  (C)  Trials  after  uncommon  transitions  (2
nd  and  4
th  bar)  are 
discriminatory  between  model-free  and  model-based  choice,  whereas  both 
models make equal predictions for trials after common transitions (cf. Figure 
4.1).  A  shift  towards  model-free  control  would  be  indicated  by  an  increased 
propensity to stay with the chosen pattern after uncommon rewarded trials and 
an  increase  in  switching  after  uncommon  unrewarded  trials.  (D)  Stronger  or 
faster model-free learning would increase the reward-dependent effect and be 
expressed  as  general  increase  to  stay  after  rewarded  trials,  and  general 
decrease  to  stay  after  unrewarded  trials.  (E)  A  selective  enhancement  of 
positive updating paired with impairment in negative updating might not change 
mean-corrected stay probabilities. This is because enhanced positive updating 
leads  to  a  stronger  propensity  to  stay  after  rewarded  trials,  while  impaired 
updating  of  unrewarded  trials  decreases  the  propensity  to  switch  after  such 
trials. (F) Opposite to C, a shift towards model-based control is expressed by 
enhanced sensitivity to the task structure. 
Figure  5.1B  shows  the  difference  in  stay  probability  between  drug  states 
corrected for a main effect of drug. Note that dopamine treatment particularly 
affected choices after unrewarded trials and a post-hoc contrast, testing for a 
differential drug effect after unrewarded compared to rewarded trials, confirmed 
this was significant, F(1,17) = 12.68, p = 0.002. Figure 5.1C-F illustrate how a 
number of hypothesised effects of L-DOPA might manifest itself in a stay-switch 
analysis (see Figure 5.2 for a validation of these hypotheses using simulations). 
Qualitatively,  the  data  in  Figure  5.1B  resemble  a  shift  towards  model-based 
control,  most  notable  after  unrewarded  trials.  In  contrast,  my  results  do  not 
resemble  any  of  the putative  model hypotheses  that  invoke  modulation  of a 
model-free system.  Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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To confirm that the winning model can capture key behavioural findings (i.e. the 
drug*reward*transition interaction on stay-switch behaviour) I generated data for 
500 virtual participants on this task using representative parameters from the 
hybrid reinforcement learning model from section  4.4. These data were then 
subjected to a stay-switch analysis. I found an identical pattern of effects in 
these generated data as observed empirically in the participants (Figure 5.2A). 
Most importantly, the data generated by the model showed a significant 3-way 
interaction, indicating that the model indeed captures key components of the 
data (see Table 5.1). Note that, as expected, the model did not replicate the 
asymmetry in rewarded versus unrewarded trials shown in Figure 5.1B.  
The  idealised  hypotheses  put  forward  for  the  stay-switch  analysis  in  Figure 
5.1C-F were based on ideas derived from previous literature. To validate these 
hypotheses  I  generated  choices  for  virtual  participants,  but  now  with 
adjustments to parameters based on specific hypotheses (Figure 5.2B-D). The 
key  hypotheses  are  fully  supported  by  these  simulations,  showing  that  the 
computational models capture the key behavioural signatures of model-free and 
model-based behaviour. The data generated by this model was subjected to the 
same ANOVA as the participant data, showing the same effects as found in 
participants, most notably the three-way interaction that supports the claim that 
L-DOPA  enhances  model-based  behaviour.  The  model  thus  provides  a 
reasonable  account  of  the  data.  Identical  patterns  exist  between  the  two 
datasets, given the statistical model used. Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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Figure  5.2:  (A)  Mean-corrected  P(stay)ON  -  P(stay)OFF  for  18  participants 
reported  in  the  study  (left)  and  500  virtual  participants  using  representative 
parameters for the reinforcement learning model (right). (B) Modulation of the 
model-free learning rate α. A change in learning rate alters stay probability after 
rewarded versus unrewarded trials, but does not interact with transition. This is 
equivalent to Figure 5.1D. (C) Model-based (ω = 1) versus model-free agent (ω 
= 0) shows a stronger reward*transition interaction. This is equivalent to Figure 
2F. (D) Increase in positive learning rate and decrease in negative learning rate 
does not change relative stay probabilities, similar to the prediction in Figure 
5.1E. 
Table  5.1:  statistical  comparison  of  model-generated  versus  participant  data 
(related to Figure 5.2) 
Effect  18 participants  500 virtual 
participants 
  F(1,17)  p  F(1,499)  p 
drug  7.04  = .02  83.00  < .001 
reward  23.30  < .001  6.01  = .02 
transition  < 1  ~  < 1  ~ 
drug x reward  1.10  = .31  < 1  ~ 
drug x transition  4.09  = .06  < 1  ~ 
reward x transition  9.75  = .006  561.79  < .001 
drug x reward x transition  9.86  = .006  16.62  < .001 
 Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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There was no evidence for differences in drowsiness or general alertness (Bond 
and Lader, 1974) between sessions (paired t-tests over each score; smallest p 
> 0.1) or in average response times between drug states (first stage RTL-DOPA = 
593ms, RTPlacebo = 586ms; paired t-test, p = 0.70).  
Finally, I tested for order effects by repeating the analyses with session instead 
of drug as factor. There were no significant differences in stay-switch behaviour 
(repeated  measures  ANOVA:  main  effect  of  session  F(1,17)  <  1; 
session*reward,  F(1,17)  <  1;  session*(reward*transition),  F(1,17) =  1.37,  p  = 
0.26). Thus these results provide compelling evidence for an increase in the 
relative degree of model-based behavioural control under conditions of elevated 
dopamine. 
5.5  Discussion 
It  is  widely  believed  that  both  model-free  and  model-based  mechanisms 
contribute to human choice behaviour. In this study I investigated a modulatory 
role of dopamine in the arbitration between these two systems and provide the 
first evidence that L-DOPA increases the relative degree of model-based over 
model-free behavioural control. 
The  use  of  systemic  L-DOPA  combined  with  a  purely  behavioural  approach 
precludes  strong  conclusions  about  the  precise  anatomical  location  of 
physiological  changes  that  led  to  the  observed  shift  to  model-based  control. 
Nevertheless, I provide a number of possible explanations for how this effect 
might be mediated in the brain that could guide further studies. First, increased 
dopamine  levels  may  improve  performance  of  component  processes  of  a 
model-based  system.  Dopamine  has  previously  been  associated  with  an Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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enhancement of prefrontal cognitive functions such as reasoning, rule learning, 
set  shifting,  planning  and  working  memory  (Cools  et  al.,  2002;  Lewis  et  al., 
2005;  Mehta  et  al.,  2005;  Clatworthy  et  al.,  2009;  Cools,  2011),  and  these 
processes  are  most  likely  co-opted  during  model-based  decisions.  Previous 
theoretical considerations link a system’s performance to its relative impact on 
behavioural  control,  such  that  the  degree of  model-based  versus  model-free 
control depends directly on the relative certainties of both systems (Daw et al., 
2005).  Increased  processing  capacity  might  enhance  certainty  in  the  model-
based system and would thus predict the observed shift in behavioural control 
that I detail here.  
Second,  a  more  conventional  account  is  that  increased  dopamine  exerts  its 
effect  through  an  impact  on  a  model-free  system.  According  to  this  view, 
excessive dopamine disrupts model-free reinforcement learning, which is then 
compensated for by increased model-based control. Specifically, elevated tonic 
dopamine  levels  may  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  negative  prediction  errors 
(Frank  et  al.,  2004;  Voon  et  al.,  2010).  However,  this  explanation  fails  to 
account  for  the  results  presented  here.  Firstly,  a  disruption  of  negative 
prediction errors under L-DOPA would change stay probabilities independent of 
transition type (Figure 5.1E), which is incompatible with the reward*transition 
interaction observed here (Figure 5.1B). This argues against the idea that L-
DOPA in this study enhanced the relative  degree of model-based behaviour 
through a disruption of the model-free system. 
Finally, dopamine could facilitate switching from one type of control to the other 
akin to the way it decreases behavioural persistence (Cools et al., 2003). It is 
known  that  over  the  course  of  instrumental  learning  the  habitual  system Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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assumes control from the goal-directed system (Adams and Dickinson, 1981; 
Yin  et  al.,  2004),  but  the  goal-directed  system  can  quickly  regain  control  in 
unforeseen situations (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2011). 
This could explain why I observed a stronger switch to model-based behaviour 
following  unrewarded  trials:  the  lack  of  rewarding  feedback  may  prompt  the 
need  to  re-evaluate  available  options  and  invest  more  energy  to  prevent 
another non-rewarding event by switching to model-based control. Note that it is 
possible and indeed likely that a facilitation of control switching under L-DOPA 
works in concert with an enhancement of the model-based system itself. 
The predominant view in computational and systems neuroscience holds that 
phasic dopamine underlies model-free behaviour by encoding reward prediction 
errors. On the other hand, animal and cognitive approaches emphasise a role 
for  dopamine  in  model-based  behaviour  such  as  planning  and  reasoning 
(Berridge,  2007;  Robbins  and  Everitt,  2007;  Clatworthy  et  al.,  2009;  Cools, 
2011).  Contrasting  with  interest  in  the  model-free  and  model-based  system 
separately is the lack of data on the arbitration between these two behavioural 
controllers. Our experiment fills this gap by pitting model-free and model-based 
control against each other in the same task and in so doing provides strong 
evidence for an involvement of dopamine in the arbitration between model-free 
and model-based control over behaviour. 
Our findings advocate an effect of L-DOPA on the arbitration between model-
based and model-free control, without a modulation of the model-free system 
itself. Note that the majority of studies reporting enhanced or impaired learning 
under dopaminergic drugs used either Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients (Frank 
et  al.,  2004;  Voon  et  al.,  2010)  or  involved  agents  that  primarily  act  at  D2 Dopamine enhances model-based over model-free choice behaviour 
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receptors  (Cools,  2006;  Frank  and  O'Reilly,  2006).  In  contrast  with  these 
studies, I did not find evidence for any modulation by L-DOPA of model-free 
learning or indeed evidence of impaired model-free choices. These deviations 
might  partly  be  explained  by  PD  patients’  more  severely  reduced  dopamine 
availability off their dopamine replacement therapy (in contrast to the placebo 
condition), and the much higher doses of medication involved in PD treatment. 
Consistent with this explanation is that the effect of L-DOPA on instrumental 
learning in healthy volunteers was found to be significant only when compared 
to  an  inhibition  of  the  dopamine  system  (via  haloperidol)  but  not  when 
compared to placebo (Pessiglione et al., 2006). 
Dopamine itself is a precursor to norepinephrine and epinephrine, potentially 
contributing to the observed effects. However, L-DOPA administration causes a 
linear increase in dopamine levels in the brain without affecting norepinephrine 
levels  (Everett  and  Borcherding,  1970).  Another  possibility  would  be  that  L-
DOPA exerts effects through interactions with the serotonin system. Such an 
interaction, between dopamine and serotonin, is known to play a role in a range 
of higher-level cognitive functions (Boureau and Dayan, 2011). 
These  data  open  the  door  to  further  experiments  aimed  at  elucidating  the 
precise neural mechanisms underlying the arbitration between both controllers. 
In  the following  chapters  6 and  7 I focused  in on the  dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex as one such neural mechanism of model-based control specifically. 
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6.1  Abstract 
In chapter 6 I hypothesised that L-DOPA might increase model-based control 
through a modulation of prefrontal cortex. Here I set out to test whether I could 
achieve  the  opposite  effect,  whereby  a  disruption  of  prefrontal  cortex  might 
impair  model-based  but  not  model-free  control.  I  specifically  focused  on 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and show it is possible to reduce model-
based control by disruption of right dlPFC via transcranial magnetic stimulus 
(TMS). In contrast, disruption of left dlPFC impaired model-based performance 
only in those participants with low working memory capacity. Neither left nor 
right dlPFC disruption had an effect on the level of model-free control, in line 
with  the  notion  of  dissociable  neural  circuits  supporting  model-based  and 
model-free control.  
6.2  Introduction   
In this study the goal was to manipulate the relative balance between model-
based  and  model-free  control  in  human  participants.  I  focused  on  the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as a substrate for model-based processes 
based  on  previous  evidence  for  its  role  in  the  construction  and  use  of 
associative models (Gläscher et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012b; Xue et al., 
2012) and the coding of hypothetical outcomes (Abe and Lee, 2011).  
In addition I took into account work from studies in non-human primates which 
also implicated the dlPFC as a site for convergence of reward and contextual 
information (Lee and Seo, 2007), while lesions of rat prelimbic region—argued 
by  some  to  be  equivalent  to  primate  dlPFC  (Uylings  et  al.,  2003;  Fuster, 
2008)—abolish flexible decision-making (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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Therefore, while the literature suggests a crucial role for this region in model-
based control at the time of the study there was no evidence for a necessary 
role that might support this hypothesis. Here I used a transient lesion model, as 
engendered by theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TBS), to provide 
evidence for a necessary role of dlPFC in model-based behaviour. 
6.3  Methods 
6.3.1  Participants 
I recruited 25 human participants (mean age (SD): 24.2 (4.0) years; 15 females) 
to  perform  the  two-step  task  (see  chapter  4  and  Daw  et  al.,  2011).  All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and without a history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorder. All participants provided written informed 
consent prior to start of the experiment, which was approved by the Research 
Ethics  Committee  at  University  College  London  (UK).  No  participants  were 
excluded over the course of the experiment.  
6.3.2  Theta burst stimulation 
Participants received TBS (see methods section 3.6) over the right dlPFC, left 
dlPFC, and vertex on three separate occasions, with site order counterbalanced 
across 24 participants, and the 25
th participant received a randomly selected 
session order. I identified stimulation sites as follows: the MNI coordinates for 
the right dlPFC (x = 37, y = 36, z = 34) were taken from a previous study that 
used  a  combination  of  individual  anatomy  and  fMRI  results  to  pinpoint  the 
dlPFC (Feredoes et al., 2011). For the left dlPFC (x = -37, y = 36, z = 34) I took 
the  negative  of  the  right  dlPFC  x-coordinate.  These  MNI  coordinates  were 
transformed to coordinates in native space by taking the inverse normalization 
parameters from unified segmentation of a previously acquired T1w structural Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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image  as  implemented  in  SPM8  (Wellcome  Trust  Centre  for  Neuroimaging, 
UCL,  UK).  I  visually  confirmed  that  the  coordinates  in  native  space 
corresponded  to  middle  frontal  gyrus  (as  in  Feredoes  et  al.,  2011).  These 
coordinates were then entered as targets into Visor2 (ANT B.V.), which uses a 
3D camera to guide the stimulation coil (Magstim) to the target coordinate. The 
vertex  was  set  to  the  Cz  of  the  10-20  system.  To  mimic  the  stimulation 
experience for the participant, I entered the vertex coordinates into Visor2 and 
used 3D navigation to target the stimulation coil. 
I administered stimulation in 5 Hz bursts of 3 pulses set 20 ms apart, for 40 s, 
amounting  to  a  total  of  600  pulses.  Stimulation  intensity  was  set  for  each 
individual participant as 90% of active motor threshold (AMT). AMT was defined 
as  the  lowest  stimulation  intensity,  expressed  as  %  of  max  output  of  the 
Magstim equipment that reliably (3/5 times) yielded a visible muscle twitch in 
the hand when stimulating the hand area of the contralateral motor cortex with a 
single pulse. During this procedure participants held (lightly) an item in the hand 
contralateral  to  the  stimulation  site.  For  technical  and  safety  reasons,  the 
maximum stimulation intensity was set to 51% of maximum output; as such, any 
participant with an AMT > 56% received TBS at 51% of maximum output. Note 
that such reduced stimulation will make it less likely to find significant effects of 
TMS. The average stimulation intensity was 49% (range: 40 - 51%) of maximum 
output. 
6.3.3  Task & analysis 
I used the task and analysis strategies that are described in the introduction to 
this thesis in chapter 4. 
6.3.4  Baseline working memory capacity Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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On the first session, before any TBS or practice on the main task, participants 
performed a 7-minute task to establish visuospatial working memory capacity. 
In  short,  participants  had  to  remember  the  location  of  5  simultaneously 
presented dots in a circular array of 16 positions. After a delay the participant 
was asked whether, for one of the 16 locations, a red dot was presented. From 
these data I calculated a K-value, reflecting the amount of information that the 
participant can store in working memory. For details of the task and analysis, 
see McNab and Klingberg (2008). 
6.4  Results 
Participants’  first-stage  choices  for  all  three  TBS  conditions  qualitatively 
reflected a hybrid of model-based and model-free control (Figure 6.1, cf. Figure 
4.1).  I  estimated  the  main  effect  of  reward  and  the  reward-by-transition 
interaction  for  each  TBS  site  using  hierarchical  logistic  regression,  with  all 
coefficients taken as random effects across participants (see Table 6.1 for list of 
regressors, and section 4.3 for a description of the regression analysis).    Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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Table 6.1: Regressors for hierarchical logistic regression on stay (coded as 1) 
or switch (coded as 0) for each first-stage choice. Reward is coded as 1 and -1 
for  presence  and  absence,  respectively;  transition  is  coded  as  1  and  -1  for 
common and uncommon, respectively. The main effect of vertex is subsumed in 
the intercept. 
Intercept 
left dlPFC 
right dlPFC 
left dlPFC * reward 
right dlPFC * reward 
vertex * reward 
left dlPFC * transition 
right dlPFC * transition 
vertex * transition 
left dlPFC * reward * transition 
right dlPFC * reward * transition 
vertex * reward * transition 
 
I  observed  positive  coefficients  for  the  reward  and  reward-by-transition 
regressors  for  all  three  TBS  sites  (all  p  <  .006),  confirming  that  behaviour 
comprised a hybrid of model-free and model-based control. Levels of model-
based  and  model-free  control  after  left  and  right  dlPFC  TBS  were  then 
contrasted with vertex (Figure 6.1B). I observed that TBS to either left (p = .52) 
or  right  (p  =  .20)  dlPFC  did  not  significantly  change  model-free  control 
compared to vertex. By contrast, model-based control was disrupted following 
TBS to right (p = .01) but not left (p = .89) dlPFC compared to vertex. I observed 
no difference in model-based control between left and right dlPFC (p = .13). Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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Figure 6.1: (A) The probability of repeating the same first-stage choice is shown 
as a function of reward and transition experienced on the previous trial. The 
pattern of choices qualitatively resembles influences of both model-based and 
model-free control for all three stimulation sites (cf. Figure 4.1). (B) I quantified Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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model-free  and  model-based  control  as  the  main  effect  of  reward  and  the 
reward-by-transition interaction, respectively, in a hierarchical logistic regression 
on stay/switch behaviour on each trial. Disruption of right dlPFC reduced model-
based control compared to vertex. TBS did not significantly affect model-free 
control.  (C)  The  relative  balance  between  the  controllers  was  calculated  as 
βmodel-based  –  βmodel-free.  The  balance  significantly  shifted  towards  model-free 
control after disruption of right, but not left, dlPFC compared to vertex. Error 
bars indicate SEM. 
I also computed a measure of the relative balance between these two systems 
as βmodel-based - βmodel-free (Figure 6.1C). This showed a significant shift towards 
model-free control caused by TBS to right (p = .01) but not left (p = .63) dlPFC 
compared to vertex. I observed no difference between left and right dlPFC (p = 
.11). Together these results provide evidence that right dlPFC exerts a causal 
role in model-based control, and show that the balance between model-based 
and  model-free  control  can  be  manipulated  through  prefrontal  disruption  via 
TBS.  
I then repeated these analyses to examine order effects. In pairwise session 
comparisons I found no effect of session on model-free or model-based control, 
or on the balance between model-based and model-free control (all p > .14), 
except for an increase in model-free control in session 3 compared to session 1 
(p = .04). 
Model-based control is thought to depend on a number of processes including 
prefrontal  working  memory  (WM)  capacity.  Given  that  studies  of  WM  report 
lateralised  functionality  (e.g.  Mull  and  Seyal,  2001)  I  asked  whether  the 
magnitude of a TBS effect might be related to WM capacity. To examine such 
inter-individual differences I could not use the population parameter estimates Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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obtained through the regression. Instead, I extracted the numerical magnitude 
of  the  main  effect  of  reward,  the  reward-by-transition  interaction  and  the 
difference between the two from each participant’s average stay probability in 
each of the four reward/transition conditions in each stimulation condition.  
 
Figure 6.2: Working memory capacity interacts with stimulation in left dlPFC. 
Working memory (WM) capacity did not predict the balance between model-
based  and  model-free  control  after  disruption  of  vertex  (left)  or  right  dlPFC 
(right). In contrast, higher WM was associated with relatively stronger model-
based control after disruption of left dlPFC (middle) with the correlation being 
significantly more positive than for right dlPFC (permutation test, p = .009) or 
vertex (p = .06). 
I  first  asked  whether  model-free  or  model-based  control  independently 
correlated with WM in any of the 3 stimulation conditions. Only the magnitude of 
the reward-by-transition interaction, inferred as model-based control, correlated 
with WM following disruption to left dlPFC (r = .45, p = .02; all other p > .10). I 
then  correlated  the  balance  between  the  two  systems  in  all  stimulation 
conditions with WM. Strikingly, only behaviour after disruption of left dlPFC was 
WM-dependent (Figure 6.2; vertex, r = .09, p = .68; left dlPFC r = .53, p = .006; 
right  dlPFC,  r  =  -.05,  p  =  .80).  Pairwise  permutation  tests  revealed  the 
correlation was significantly more positive in left compared to right dlPFC (10
5 Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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permutations,  p  =  .009),  marginally  more  positive  in  left dlPFC compared to 
vertex (p = .06), and not significantly different between right dlPFC and vertex 
(p  =  .52).  Taken  together,  these  data  show  that  the  effect  of  left  dlPFC 
disruption  on  the  balance  between  model-based  and  model-free  control 
depends  on  WM  capacity,  with  high  WM  participants  retaining  more  model-
based control compared to those with low WM. 
Whereas first-stage choices allowed me to dissociate model-based from model-
free control, both types of control make equivalent predictions for second-stage 
choices as there is no task structure to exploit. It has, however, been shown 
that TBS to left, but not right, dlPFC modulates probabilistic instrumental reward 
learning (Ott et al., 2011). I therefore sought to explore the effects of TBS on 1-
step  reward  learning  here  as  well  (Figure  6.3).  I  examined  second-stage 
choices using hierarchical logistic regression similar to the analysis of first-stage 
choices: stay-switch behaviour was regressed against reward received on the 
most recent trial involving that second-stage pair. Transition was not included 
as a factor because second-stage choices are assumed to be independent of 
the  transition  type  that  led  to  the  state.  I  observed  that  TBS  to  left  dlPFC 
affected second-stage choices by making them more perseverative (p = .02) 
and more sensitive to reward (p = .006) compared to vertex (see Figure 6.3). No 
such effect was found for right dlPFC (p = .11 and p = .10, respectively). There 
was no difference between left and right dlPFC (perseveration: p = .35, effect of 
reward: p = .20).  Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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Figure  6.3:  analysis  of  second-stage  choices.  The  main  effect  of  each 
stimulation  site  (left) captures  the  propensity  to  stay  with  the  same  stimulus 
irrespective  of  reward,  relative  to  the  vertex  condition.  Participants  become 
more  perseverative  after  left  dlPFC  TBS  compared  to  vertex  (p  =  .02)  on 
second-stage choices. Note that the main effect of vertex is subsumed in the 
intercept of  the  regression,  such that  a  coefficient  significantly  different  from 
zero indicates a significant deviation from vertex. The main effect of reward in 
each stimulation condition (right) indicated participants tended to stay with a 
rewarded stimulus more than with an unrewarded stimulus (all p < .001), but 
this propensity was stronger after left dlPFC TBS compared to vertex (p = .006). 
Error bars indicate SEM.  
6.5  Discussion 
The balance between model-based and model-free control is often framed as a 
competition  between  a  flexible,  forward-looking,  system  and  a  simpler 
retrospective stimulus-response-based system (Daw et al., 2005). These results Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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show that the balance between these two systems can be causally manipulated 
in the human brain by a disruption of prefrontal cortex. The data suggest that 
TBS to right dlPFC impairs a key node in a network that underpins model-based 
control (cf. Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Gläscher et al., 2010). I further show 
an involvement of left dlPFC in model-based control that is related to individual 
differences in working memory, suggesting  differential roles for left and right 
dlPFC in the functional architecture underlying deliberative choice.  
Animal lesion and human imaging work suggest that sectors of prefrontal cortex 
are  involved  in  high-level  cognition  and  decision-making  (Miller  and  Cohen, 
2001).  These  studies  have  shown  correlates  of  model-based  control  in 
ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex  and  dlPFC  as  well  as  outside  the  prefrontal 
cortex,  e.g.  dorsomedial  striatum  (Gallagher  et  al.,  1999;  Killcross  and 
Coutureau, 2003; Hikosaka, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2009; 
Gläscher et al., 2010; Liljeholm and O'Doherty, 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012b; 
Xue et al., 2012). In contrast, model-free control is most strongly associated 
with the dorsolateral striatum and infralimbic cortex (Yin et al., 2004; Balleine 
and  O'Doherty,  2010;  Wunderlich  et  al.,  2012b).  Furthermore,  a  strong 
dependence of model-based control on prefrontal systems is hinted by a finding 
that its dominance can be abolished during dual-task performance (Otto et al., 
2013). However, up to now the key human evidence for dlPFC involvement in 
model-based control has been based on correlational evidence using functional 
imaging (fMRI). Here I show that model-based control is impaired by a transient 
disruption of the right dlPFC, providing causal evidence for its involvement in 
complex, flexible, decision-making. I note this effect was significant only when 
compared to the vertex, the control site, but not when compared to left dlPFC. I Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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speculate this might be due to individual variation in the role of the left dlPFC in 
model-based control, or in the strategies employed by the participants to solve 
the task.  
An influential hypothesis about the balance between model-based and model-
free control states that their individual influence over behaviour is governed by 
their  respective  uncertainties  (Daw  et  al.,  2005).  Within  this  framework,  my 
results can be interpreted as emerging out of a disruption to a key component 
process  of  model-based  control  (e.g.  the  utilization  of  associative  models, 
Gläscher  et  al.,  2010).  This  would  lessen  the  certainties  of  model  based 
predictions leading to an attenuated dominance over behaviour—similar to that 
observed when participants are distracted by a dual task  (Otto et al., 2013). 
However, whereas disruption of right dlPFC led to an unambiguous impairment 
of model-based control, the effect of TBS on the left dlPFC was dependent on 
baseline WM capacity. Specifically, higher WM capacity conferred a degree of 
protection  against  a  shift  towards  model-free  control  upon  disruption  of  left 
dlPFC,  whereas  participants  with  low  WM  capacity  appear  to  require  an 
uncompromised  left  dlPFC  for  the  exercise  of  model-based  control.  I 
acknowledge uncertainty as to what precise factors might explain this finding.  
An  increase  in  perseveration  might  be  caused  by  a  reduction  in  striatal 
dopamine after left TBS (Ko et al., 2008), which is known to affect behavioural 
flexibility  and  perseverance  (Cools et  al.,  2006).  It  is,  however,  unclear  why 
such a reduction in striatal dopamine would be associated with improved reward 
learning. However, this finding replicates a previous study that found improved 
reward learning after left, but not right, TBS (Ott et al., 2011). Arguing against a 
role  for  dopamine  in  this  increase  in  reward  sensitivity  is  a  null  effect  of Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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dopamine  administration  on  second-stage  choices  shown  previously 
(Wunderlich et al., 2012a). 
The effect of TBS on sub-cortical dopamine might also play a role in first-stage 
choices.  The  reduction  in  dopamine  might  interact  with  baseline  dopamine 
levels that are known to co-vary with WM capacity (Cools et al., 2008), such 
that high WM participants are more resilient against TBS-induced decreases in 
dopamine than low WM participants. I, with colleagues, previously showed that 
dopamine levels modulate the balance between model-based and model-free 
control (de Wit et al., 2011; de Wit et al., 2012b; Wunderlich et al., 2012a), and 
a TBS-induced depletion in low WM (i.e. low dopamine) individuals might have 
a  more  pronounced  effect  than  a  similar  depletion  in  high  WM  (i.e.  high 
dopamine) individuals. However, given that I did not directly measure dopamine 
levels,  future  work  could  usefully  explore  potential  interactions  between WM 
and model-based control to fully understand the effect reported here. 
The findings speak to the literature on goal-directed and habitual behaviours 
(Balleine  and  O'Doherty,  2010).  Although  model-based/model-free  and  goal-
directed/habitual  control  are  not  synonymous,  the  former  provides  a 
computational framework that can encompass key features of goal-directed and 
habitual  control  (for  a  review,  see  Dayan  and  Niv,  2008).  I  would  predict  a 
disruption  of  right  dlPFC  would  also  impair  goal-directed  behaviour  in 
devaluation and contingency degradation tests in humans, as has been shown 
in rats (Balleine and O'Doherty, 2010). 
In  summary,  I  provide  evidence  for  a  necessary  role  of  the  right  dlPFC  in 
flexible, model-based decision-making. Our findings invite the question as to Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs model-based control 
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whether  naturally  occurring  variation  in  dlPFC  function  and  connectivity  is  a 
marker  for  predisposition  towards  model-free  as  opposed  to  model-based 
control,  and  whether  an  enhancement  of  dlPFC  function  (e.g.  through  other 
stimulation protocols) might improve rather than impair model-based control. I 
set out to test whether a putative improvement of right dlPFC would indeed lead 
to stronger model-based control in the next chapter.  
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7.1  Abstract 
There  is  broad  consensus  that  the  prefrontal  cortex  supports  goal-directed, 
model-based decision-making. Consistent with this I showed in chapter 6 that 
model-based control can be impaired through transcranial magnetic stimulation 
of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in humans. Here I tested the hypothesis 
that  an  enhancement  of  model-based  control  could  be  achieved  by  anodal 
transcranial direct current stimulation of the same region. I tested 22 healthy 
adult human participants in a within-participant, double-blind design in  which 
participants were given Active or Sham stimulation over two sessions. I show 
active  stimulation  had  no  effect  on  model-based  or  on  model-free  control 
compared to Sham stimulation. I also introduced a novel regression analysis 
that examines model-based and model-free influences multiple trials into the 
past,  which  also  showed  no  effect  of  stimulation.  These  null  effects  are 
substantiated by a power analysis, which suggests that the study had at least 
60% power to detect a true effect, as well as a Bayesian model comparison, 
which favours a model of the data that assumes stimulation had no effect over 
models that assume stimulation had an effect on behavioural control. Although I 
cannot entirely exclude more trivial explanations for the null effect, for example 
related  to  (faults  in)  the  experimental setup,  these  data  suggest  that  anodal 
transcranial  direct  current  stimulation  over right  dorsolateral  prefrontal cortex 
does  not  improve  model-based  control,  despite  existing  evidence  that 
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  can  disrupt  such  control  in  the  same  brain 
region. 
7.2  Introduction Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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Electrical stimulation of the human brain has received widespread attention over 
recent years. It has been used to study the function of healthy cortex (Marshall 
et al., 2004), connectivity between regions (Mars et al., 2009), as an avenue for 
treatment  in  disorders  such  as  depression,  Parkinson’s  disease  and  stroke 
(Fregni et  al.,  2005b;  Boggio  et  al.,  2006; Boggio  et  al., 2008; Baker et  al., 
2010a), and to improve normal function such as in skill learning (Nitsche et al., 
2003; Reis et al., 2009). 
Here I used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), a technique whereby 
two electrodes are placed on the skull and a fixed current level is applied (also 
see  Methods  chapter,  and  Nitsche  and  Paulus,  2001).  This  technique  is 
reported to increase and decrease the excitability of the neural tissue underlying 
the  anodal  and  cathodal  electrode  respectively  (Nitsche  and  Paulus,  2001; 
Nitsche  et  al.,  2003).  A  number  of  studies  have  suggested  that  high-level 
cognition  can  be  improved  by  anodal  stimulation  of  the  prefrontal  cortex. 
Specifically, stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) has been 
shown to decrease risk-taking (Fecteau et al., 2007a), improve working memory 
(Fregni et al., 2005a; Mulquiney et al., 2011) and improve classification learning 
(Kincses et al., 2004).  
I focused  on  the  right  dlPFC based  on  evidence for  its  role  in model-based 
processes such as the construction and use of associative models (Gläscher et 
al.,  2010;  Wunderlich  et  al.,  2012b;  Xue  et  al.,  2012)  and  the  coding  of 
hypothetical outcomes (Abe and Lee, 2011). Work on non-human primates also 
implicates  the  dlPFC  as  a  site  for  convergence  of  reward  and  contextual 
information (Lee and Seo, 2007). Furthermore, in chapter 6 I showed that right, 
but  not  left,  dlPFC  is  necessary  for  model-based  control,  evidenced  by  a Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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reduction  in  model-based  control  after  disruptive  theta-burst  transcranial 
magnetic  stimulation  to  the  right  dlPFC  (Smittenaar  et  al.,  2013b).  Here,  to 
complement these previous findings, I sought to enhance, rather than disrupt, 
model-based control through anodal stimulation. I used a task which has been 
shown  to  quantify  model-based  and  model-free  control  (Daw  et  al.,  2011; 
Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Otto et al., 2013) and tested participants undergoing 
anodal  or  Sham  tDCS  stimulation  to  the  right  dlPFC  in  a  double-blind, 
counterbalanced design. I hypothesised that anodal stimulation would improve 
model-based control without affecting model-free control, an effect driven by an 
enhancement of a component process of model-based control subserved by the 
right dlPFC.  
7.3  Methods 
I  recruited  23  healthy  participants  to  participate  in  an  experiment  over  2 
sessions.  All  participants  had  normal  or  corrected-to-normal  vision  and  no 
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. One participant was excluded 
from  analysis  due  to  failed  stimulation  after  an  increase  in  resistance  from 
drying electrodes, leaving 22 participants (11 female, mean age ± SD: 22.5 ± 
5.3 years, all participants were at least 18 years of age at the time of consent) 
for analysis. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to 
the experiment and the UCL Research Ethics Committee approved the study 
(project number 3450/003).  
7.3.1  Setup of experiment and double-blinding procedure 
Participants were tested on 2 occasions between 3 and 8 days apart, going 
through the same procedure on each day: after obtaining informed consent I 
determined  the  electrode  locations,  explained  the  task,  guided  participants Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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through a short practice session, placed the electrodes on the scalp, turned on 
stimulation, and started the task. The experiment was double-blind, with both 
experimenter  and  participant  unaware  of  the  stimulation  condition  (Active  or 
Sham). This was achieved through a system of blinding codes embedded in the 
stimulation machine (NeuroConn, Germany). First, researcher GP selected 24 
pairs of 5-digit codes, each pair containing one code associated with Active and 
one code associated with Sham stimulation as programmed into the stimulation 
machine.  These  were  then  permuted  such  that  half  the  pairs  had  Active 
stimulation on session 1 and Sham stimulation on session 2, whereas the other 
half of pairs had the reversed order. GP kept the unblinded version of the codes 
and handed the permuted set to PS, who acquired the data. Each participant 
was assigned a pair in order of testing date. When the participant was prepped 
for  stimulation,  their  session-specific  code  was  entered  into  the  stimulation 
machine, which then administered the corresponding Active or Sham protocol 
without any indication as to the stimulation condition. I tested the participant’s 
awareness of the stimulation condition at the end of the experiment (see below). 
PS was deblinded after acquisition of all 23 datasets.  
7.3.2  Task & analysis 
Whereas in previous chapters I examined only influences from 1 trial back using 
regressions, here I expanded on this approach to examine model-based and 
model-free influences that go up to 3 trials in the past. This provides a more 
fine-grained  dissection  of  the  influences  of  each  system  on  behaviour.  The 
dependent variable for trial t was 1 when stimulus A was chosen and 0 when 
stimulus  B  was  chosen  in  the  first  stage.  Each  regressor  then  described 
whether  events  on  trial  t-1,  t-2,  and  t-3  would  increase  (coded  as  +1)  or Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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decrease (coded as -1) the likelihood of choosing A according to a model-based 
or model-free system. If a trial contained a common transition the model-based 
and model-free system would make identical predictions, whereas on trials with 
uncommon  transitions  these  predictions  would  be  inverted.  I  additionally 
modelled the main effect of transition type (common as +1, uncommon as -1) 
on trial t-1, t-2 and t-3, which I predicted would have no effect on the propensity 
to choose stimulus A. I also tested 3 alternative models that used 1) one set of 
model-based regressors for both conditions, 2) one set of model-free regressors 
for both conditions and 3) one set of model-based and one set of model-free 
regressors for both conditions (‘null model’). These models allowed me to test 
whether  the  additional  complexity  of  having  separate  regressors  for  the 
stimulation conditions was appropriate. These models were compared using the 
BIC and AIC values provided by the lme4 package. 
I  performed  contrasts  over  the  population  coefficients  to  test  for  differences 
between  conditions  in  model-free  and  model-based  control.  All  p-values 
reported in the manuscript that pertain to the logistic regression were estimated 
using the “esticon” procedure in the “doBy” package which relies on the chi-
square distribution (Højsgaard, 2012). Power analyses were performed using 
the Matlab 7.12.0 ‘sampsizepwr’ function and G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul et al., 2007; 
Faul et al., 2009). Other tests were performed in SPSS 17.0. 
7.3.3  Stimulation 
On both sessions the anodal electrode was placed over right dlPFC and the 
cathodal electrode over the inion. The inion was chosen for cathodal electrode 
placement in order to maximise current flow through the dlPFC. The right dlPFC 
was located using the 10/20 system, which is appropriate given the limited level Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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of spatial resolution of tDCS (Herwig et al., 2003). In brief, I first located Fpz, Fz 
and Oz as 10%, 30% and 90% of the nasion-inion distance, measured from the 
nasion.  I  then  located  F8  as  30%  of  the  distance  between  Fpz  and  Oz, 
measured from Fpz passing over the ears. Electrode F4, commonly used for the 
right dlPFC (Herwig et al., 2003), was then determined as 50% of the distance 
between F8 and Fz. I used conductive rubber electrodes inserted in a sponge 
cover measuring 7.5 by 6 cm, secured to the head using a bandage. I placed 
the electrode along the gyrus, i.e. the electrode was placed in superior-medial 
to inferior-lateral direction.  
I used a DC-stimulator system (NeuroConn, Germany). In the Active condition a 
2 mA current was delivered for 25 minutes with 15 s ramping-up and ramping-
down. In the Sham condition the current ramped up then down over 15 s, and 
then performed continuous impedance testing. This manipulation made it very 
hard for the participant to tell which type of stimulation was given at what time. I 
confirmed  this by  giving  a  2-alternative  forced-choice at  the  very  end  of  the 
experiment  asking  which  session  contained  the  Active  stimulation.  This  test 
showed that participants as a group were not significantly different from chance 
at  determining  the  session  that  contained  Active  stimulation  (10  out  of  22 
participants guessed correctly, binomial test, p = .83). I employed a number of 
post-hoc checks to safeguard against experimental error. Firstly, I monitored the 
resistance reported by the DC-stimulator throughout the experiment, rejecting 
one  participant for whom  stimulation  was  stopped  after a  strong  increase  in 
resistance (>55 kΩ). Secondly, after the experiment I confirmed for a random 
set of 4 sham and 4 active codes that they were correctly linked to the sham or 
active  stimulation  procedure by  examining  the  current  with  an amperometer. Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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This was the case for all 8 codes. Thirdly, I note that of the 100,000 possible 
codes  that  can  be  entered  into  the  DC-stimulator  only  200  are  allowed, 
minimizing the possibility of erroneously entered codes. 
After turning on stimulation the participant waited for 10 minutes before starting 
the  task  in  order  to  ensure  the  effects  of  stimulation  were  fully  established 
(Nitsche  and  Paulus,  2001).  Altogether  participants  received  25  minutes  of 
stimulation at 2 mA. It is known that cortical excitability changes outlast such 
stimulation durations by over an hour (Nitsche and Paulus (2001), though see 
Stagg et al. (2013)). The window of stimulation therefore need not fully overlap 
with  the  task,  and  in  the  design  stimulation  ended  approximately  halfway 
through the task. It should be noted that choices for stimulation parameters are 
based  on  studies  of  motor  cortex  stimulation.  It  is  possible  that  these 
parameters,  when  used  on  frontal  areas,  have  different  effects.  To  my 
knowledge  there  is no  published data on  this,  though  I  note  this  protocol is 
similar  to  that  of  other  studies  using  tDCS  on  dlPFC  (Kincses  et  al.,  2004; 
Fecteau et al., 2007a). 
7.4  Results 
Participants earned £8.25  ± 2.56 during Active stimulation and £8.30  ± 2.39 
during  Sham  stimulation  (no  difference  in  paired  samples  t-test,  t(21)  <  1). 
Participants missed 0.10 ± 0.37% of trials during Active stimulation and 0.09 ± 
0.18% of trials during Sham stimulation (no difference in paired sampled t-test, 
t(21) < 1).  
For comparison to previous studies using this task I plotted the stay probabilities 
based on reward/no-reward and common/uncommon transition on the previous Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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trial (Figure 7.1). Qualitatively the pattern in both the Active and Sham condition 
resembles that of a hybrid controller (Figure  4.1, right) in which  choices are 
influenced both by model-based and model-free control.  
 
Figure 7.1: Stay probabilities as a function of reward and transition on previous 
trial. Participants showed a pattern of stay probabilities characteristic of hybrid 
model-based/model-free  control  during  both  Sham  and  Active  stimulation  of 
dlPFC. Error bars indicate SEM. Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
Chapter 7 
 
141 
 
To quantify these influences and examine effects of trials that extend beyond 
the previous  (lag-1) trial,  I performed  a  hierarchical regression  analysis (see 
Table 7.1 for regressors).  
Table 7.1: Regressors in the full model for first-stage choices. MF = model-free; 
MB = model-based; SE = standard error. Lag denotes the effect of time. Bold-
face indicates p < .05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. 
regressor 
estimate  SE 
z-
value  p 
intercept  0.25  0.03  7.81  <0.0001 
Active  -264.18  194.46  -1.36  0.1743 
Active MF Lag-1  287.02  62.06  4.63  <0.0001 
Active MF Lag-2  293.64  50.73  5.79  <0.0001 
Active MF Lag-3  172.87  51.73  3.34  0.0008 
Active MB Lag-1  244.48  72.35  3.38  0.0007 
Active MB Lag-2  180.58  66.90  2.70  0.0069 
Active MB Lag-3  200.76  44.92  4.47  <0.0001 
Sham MF Lag-1  374.51  51.11  7.33  <0.0001 
Sham MF Lag-2  287.55  54.85  5.24  <0.0001 
Sham MF Lag-3  246.79  59.53  4.15  <0.0001 
Sham MB Lag-1  226.13  64.93  3.48  0.0005 
Sham MB Lag-2  207.15  77.43  2.68  0.0075 
Sham MB Lag-3  170.37  60.91  2.80  0.0052 
Active transition 
Lag -1  -4.62  36.24  -0.13  0.8985 
Active transition 
Lag -2  9.20  32.34  0.28  0.7760 
Active transition 
Lag -3  -19.03  34.09  -0.56  0.5767 
Sham transition 
Lag -1  -6.61  42.27  -0.16  0.8758 
Sham transition 
Lag -2  15.68  33.42  0.47  0.6389 
Sham transition 
Lag -3  -2.77  36.88  -0.08  0.9400 
 
This revealed that all model-based and model-free regressors were significantly 
larger than zero, meaning both systems rely on events at least 3 trials into the 
past (Figure 7.2; see Table 7.1 for statistics).  Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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Table  7.2:  Contrasts  performed  on  the  full  model.  MF  =  model-free;  MB  = 
model-based; SE = standard error; χ
2 = chi-square distribution; df = degrees of 
freedom; Lag denotes the effect of time. Bold-face indicates p < .05 uncorrected 
for multiple comparisons. 
contrast   
estimate  SE 
χ
2 (1 
df)  p 
MF Active > Sham  -155.32  119.50  1.69  0.1937 
MB Active > Sham  22.17  131.42  0.03  0.8661 
MF/MB x 
Active/Sham  -177.49  192.33  0.85  0.3561 
MF Lag-1 Active > 
Sham  -87.49  55.46  2.49  0.1146 
MF Lag-2 Active > 
Sham  6.09  54.82  0.01  0.9115 
MF Lag-3 Active > 
Sham  -73.93  50.87  2.11  0.1461 
MB Lag-1 Active > 
Sham  18.35  59.86  0.09  0.7592 
MB Lag-2 Active > 
Sham  -26.57  60.15  0.20  0.6587 
MB Lag-3 Active > 
Sham  30.39  54.31  0.31  0.5758 
Lag MF Active  114.16  55.61  4.21  0.0401 
Lag MF Sham  127.72  45.43  7.90  0.0049 
Lag MB Active  43.72  60.32  0.53  0.4686 
Lag MB Sham  55.76  45.04  1.53  0.2157 
Lag MF > MB  142.40  124.64  1.31  0.2532 
Lag MF Active > 
Sham  -13.57  65.62  0.04  0.8362 
Lag MB Active > 
Sham  -12.04  70.89  0.03  0.8651 
Lag MF/MB x 
Active/Sham  -1.53  102.76  0.00  0.9882 
 
Contrary to my hypothesis I did not find a difference between the Active and 
Sham  stimulation  conditions  in  any  of  the  contrasts  (Table  7.2).  I  therefore 
report the absence of evidence for an effect of anodal tDCS to right dlPFC on 
model-free or model-based control. In subsequent analyses I explored whether 
this null effect was due to a lack of power in the experiment or due to an inability 
of tDCS to right dlPFC to modulate model-based or model-free control. Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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Figure 7.2: Model-based and model-free influences on choice. I estimated the 
dependence of a choice at trial t on reward and transition events in trials t-1 up 
to t-3. These regression coefficients can be interpreted as model-based and 
model-free  influences  on  choice,  and  larger  coefficients  indicate  a  stronger 
influence  over  choice.  Firstly,  all  regression  coefficients  in  the  plot  are 
significantly  larger  than  zero,  suggesting  that  model-based  and  model-free 
systems did not just rely on events on the previous trial but rather on events as 
far as 3 trials in the past. I did not observe any difference between Active and 
Sham conditions. Error bars indicate SEM. 
To estimate the power in the experiment I gathered effect size estimates in the 
published literature for manipulations involving the 2-step task (Wunderlich et 
al.,  2012a)  and  for  two  tDCS  experiments  on  dlPFC:  an  enhancement  of Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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working memory (Fregni et al., 2005a) and a reduction in risk-taking (Fecteau et 
al., 2007a). I was unable to extract effect size estimates from three other tDCS 
studies on the dlPFC (Kincses et al., 2004; Boggio et al., 2007; Fecteau et al., 
2007b). For purposes of the power analyses I assumed that a tDCS effect on 
model-based control has an effect size, expressed in Cohen’s d, similar to these 
studies. Our power to detect this effect, given a two-tailed alpha of 0.05 and 
sample size of 22, was then at least 0.60 (Figure 7.3). Although this is not as 
high as the normative power of 0.80, it is considerably higher than many studies 
in cognitive neuroscience (Button et al., 2013). However, to support my claim 
that tDCS to right dlPFC does not affect model-based and model-free control I 
formally tested this hypothesis in a model comparison. 
 Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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Figure 7.3: Statistical power to detect true effects. I estimated statistical power 
in the study based on effect size estimates taken from the published literature. I 
could then compute the power in the study based on 22 participants and a false 
positive rate of 0.05 (two-sided alpha). Assuming any true effect of tDCS would 
have a similar magnitude as the studies shown in the figure, the current study 
had a power of 50-80%. 
The analyses presented above rely on a frequentist approach and hence are 
framed in terms of null hypothesis testing, which precludes strong conclusions 
being drawn about the absence of an experimental effect. Hence, based on the 
preceding analyses I cannot decisively conclude that the null model is more 
likely compared to the full model that allows for differences in model-free or 
model-based control in Active versus Sham conditions. Bayesian statistics, by 
contrast,  allow  inferences  to  be  made  about  the  absence  of  experimental 
effects, and I thus exploited this approach to further probe the results. Thus, I fit 
three models to the data that were identical to the full model, except that the 
model-free  and/or  model-based  regressors  were  assumed  identical  between 
stimulation  conditions.  The  first  model  contained  a  single  set  of  model-free 
regressors for both stimulation conditions; the second contained a single set of 
model-based  regressors  for  both  stimulation  conditions;  and  the  third  (‘null’) 
contained a single set of model-based and a single set of model-free regressors 
for  both  stimulation  conditions  (see  Table  7.3  for  the  regressors  in  the  null 
model).  
Table 7.3: Regressors in the null model which contains the same MB and MF 
regressors for the Active and Sham stimulation conditions. MF = model-free; 
MB = model-based; SE = standard error. Lag denotes the effect of time. Bold-
face indicates p < .05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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regressor 
estimate  SE 
z-
value  p 
intercept  0.24  0.03  7.78  <0.0001 
Active  -269.68  179.42  -1.50  0.1328 
MF Lag-1  332.27  48.71  6.82  <0.0001 
MF Lag-2  285.59  43.58  6.55  <0.0001 
MF Lag-3  208.50  48.78  4.27  <0.0001 
MB Lag-1  234.64  61.35  3.82  0.0001 
MB Lag-2  194.46  64.68  3.01  0.0026 
MB Lag-3  180.81  45.37  3.99  0.0001 
Active transition 
Lag -1  -11.12  35.88  -0.31  0.7566 
Active transition 
Lag -2  7.89  31.01  0.25  0.7993 
Active transition 
Lag -3  -20.15  33.11  -0.61  0.5428 
Sham transition 
Lag -1  0.98  40.73  0.02  0.9809 
Sham transition 
Lag -2  15.32  32.40  0.47  0.6365 
Sham transition 
Lag -3  2.99  35.05  0.09  0.9320 
 
I  then  performed  Bayesian  model  selection  using  the  Bayesian  Information 
Criterion (BIC) and Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC) that are returned by the 
lme4  package  for  each  model  (Table  7.4).  Although  derived  within  different 
frameworks, both the BIC and AIC can be thought of as approximations to the 
true  model  evidence  (Penny,  2012),  both  containing  a  term  reflecting  the 
likelihood of the model given the data (the ‘accuracy’ term) and a penalization 
term reflecting the number of parameters in the model (the ‘complexity’ term). 
As such, the difference in the values of the Information Criteria between models 
approximates  the  log  Bayes  factor,  which  is  the  ratio  of  probabilities  of  the 
model given the data. The BIC difference was 900 in favour of the null model 
when compared to the full model that contains a separate set of model-based 
and model-free regressors for the Active and Sham condition. This indicates the Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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null  model  was  e
900  times  more  likely  than  the  full  model.  The  AIC,  which 
penalises model complexity less harshly than the BIC, was 100 in favour of the 
null model compared to the full model, i.e. the null model was e
100 times more 
likely. I found a similar pattern of results for the model-free clamped and model-
based clamped models which were >e
29 and >e
44 less likely than the null model, 
respectively.  Therefore  I  can  conclude  that  it  is  significantly  more  likely  that 
tDCS had no effect on model-based or model-free control than that it did.  
Table 7.4: Model comparison between a null model (one set of model-based 
and model-free regressors for both stimulation conditions) and more complex 
models  that  allow  for  an  effect  of  tDCS  on  model-based  control,  model-free 
control, or both, which shows the null model is significantly more plausible than 
any of the models that allow for an effect of tDCS on behavioural control. The 
second column refers to the number of regressors in the hierarchical regression 
at the individual participant level (cf. Table 7.1 and Table 7.3). BIC: Bayesian 
Information Criterion; AIC: Aikaike’s Information Criterion. 
model  No. of 
regressors 
per 
participant 
BIC  ΔBIC  AIC  ΔAIC  Bayes 
factor in 
favour of 
null model 
based on 
AIC 
null model  13  18553  0  17752  0  - 
separate 
model-free 
regressors for 
Active and 
Sham 
16  18962  409  17796  44  1.3 x 10
19 
separate 
model-based 
regressors for 
Active and 
Sham 
16  18947  394  17781  29  3.9 x 10
12 
full model  19  19453  900  17852  100  2.7 x 10
43 
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To test for session effects I performed a hierarchical logistic regression with 
identical regressors as those described in Table 7.1, but instead of Active and 
Sham I coded the regressors as session 1 and 2, respectively. The equivalent 
contrasts to Table 2 were all p > .15 except effect for Lag on MF in session 1, p 
= .003, and session 2, p = .06. This suggests that model-based and model-free 
control  do not  change  with  additional exposure  to  the  task,  which  replicates 
previous chapters (Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Smittenaar et al., 2013b).  
Both  model-based  and  model-free  control  make  equivalent  predictions  for 
second-stage choices as there is no task structure to exploit. I nevertheless 
explored  the  effects  of  stimulation  on  1-step  reward  learning.  I  examined 
second-stage  choices  using  hierarchical  logistic  regression  similar  to  the 
analysis  of  first-stage  choices:  stay-switch  behaviour  was  regressed  against 
reward received on the most recent trial involving that second-stage pair (i.e. 
lag-1  only).  Transition  was  not  included  as  a  factor  because  second-stage 
choices are assumed to be independent of the transition type that led to the 
state. I observed that in both stimulation conditions there was a main effect of 
reward,  such  that  if  a  particular  stimulus  was  rewarded  in  the  most  recent 
encounter with that second-stage pair it was more likely to be chosen again 
(Active, mean ± SE = 0.96 ± 0.13, p = 9.4 x 10
-13; Sham, mean ± SE = 0.82 ± 
0.11, p = 5.46 x 10
-13). There was a trend-level effect of stimulation-by-reward 
suggesting a stronger influence of reward under Active stimulation (mean ± SE 
difference = 0.14 ± 0.08; p = .07), but given the large amount of statistical tests 
performed I do not further consider this marginal effect. Together, these results 
suggest stimulation had no effect on second-stage choices.  
7.5  Discussion Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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Here I provide evidence that tDCS to right dlPFC does not affect model-based 
or model-free control in an established behavioural paradigm. In a double-blind 
design  I  confirmed  that  participants  used  both  model-free  and  model-based 
strategies  to  solve  the  task,  and  I  could  quantify  the  extent  to  which  either 
strategy  was  used.  A  putative  enhancement  of  right  dlPFC  activity  through 
Active compared to Sham anodal tDCS stimulation did not significantly change 
the level of model-based or model-free control. Formally testing this null effect, I 
provide evidence that a null model predicting no effect of stimulation performed 
significantly better than more complex models predicting an effect of stimulation 
on model-based control, model-free control, or both.  
I hypothesised that an enhancement of right dlPFC would improve model-based 
control, similar to beneficial tDCS effects observed on risk taking (Fecteau et 
al., 2007a), probabilistic learning (Kincses et al., 2004) and working memory 
(Fregni et al., 2005a). Based on published tDCS studies and studies of model-
based control, I estimated this study had more than 60% statistical power to 
detect such an effect were it to exist. Although the power was potentially lower 
than  the  often  cited  80%  power  standard  (e.g.  Cohen,  1992),  it  was 
considerably higher than >75% of neuroscience studies as determined recently 
in a meta-analysis (Button et al., 2013). Despite this, I observed a null effect of 
tDCS on model-based control. However, frequentist statistics do not allow me to 
conclude  the  null  hypothesis  was  a  significantly  better  explanation  than  the 
alternatives in which stimulation does have an effect. I therefore performed a 
complementary  model  comparison  using  information-theoretic  measures  to 
formally show this (Stephens et al., 2005). Together, these analyses support the Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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conclusion that tDCS to right dlPFC has no effect on model-based or model-free 
control. 
There is a modest literature on improvement in cognition through tDCS of the 
right  dlPFC,  and  this  begs  the  question  why  no  effect  was  found  in  this 
experiment. This is even more surprising because the dlPFC is implicated in 
model-based processes (Lee and Seo, 2007; Gläscher et al., 2010; Abe and 
Lee, 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012b; Xue et al., 2012) and when the region is 
transiently  disrupted  using  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation,  model-based 
control is selectively impaired (Smittenaar et al., 2013b). Here I speculate that 
the null result is most likely due to an inability of tDCS to improve the specific 
component processes of model-based control subserved by the dlPFC.  
Firstly, little is known about the physiological effects of tDCS in prefrontal cortex 
(Stagg and Nitsche, 2011), though this is a rapidly developing field (Stagg et al., 
2013). While there is evidence that anodal stimulation over M1 increases the 
motor evoked potential (MEP) size elicited by TMS (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000), 
it is not clear how the cellular physiology of the dlPFC is changed following 
anodal stimulation,  nor what  the  physiological underpinnings  of model-based 
control  in  the  dlPFC  are.  Despite  these  unknowns,  I  suggest  here  that  the 
neural mechanisms for model-based control in right dlPFC are not amenable to 
improvement through anodal tDCS.  
Secondly, I used a task to assess model-based control that has previously been 
shown to be susceptible to manipulation (Wunderlich et al., 2012a; Otto et al., 
2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013b). I used a set of stimulation parameters that are 
widely  used  in  the  tDCS  community  (Nitsche  et  al.,  2008),  and  replicated Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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previous observations of dual control by model-based and model-free systems. 
Together, this suggests the null result is not due to the introduction of uncertain 
elements (e.g. novel task or novel stimulation parameters) into the study design. 
Despite  the  use  of  established  methods,  I  cannot  exclude  methodological 
issues as the cause of the null effect altogether. Although I am confident the null 
effect is not due to faulty equipment or errors in the double-blinding procedure 
(see  Methods),  potential  other  issues  might  include  inaccurate  electrode 
placement, a problem that can be alleviated by stereotactic navigation using 
anatomical scans as commonly used in transcranial magnetic stimulation, and 
unpredictable  current  flow  based  on  electrode  placement,  which  might  be 
alleviated by computational models of current flow (Wagner et al., 2007).  
I was particularly careful to employ a double-blinded design to eliminate any 
stimulation-dependent  influence  from  the  experimenter  on  task  performance. 
The  task  used  here  requires  relatively  extensive  involvement  of  the 
experimenter in the task instructions. In a double-blinded design, these effects 
can  be  most  reliably  attributed  to  the  experimental  manipulation  of  interest 
rather than to unintended information biases (Schulz and Grimes, 2002). I note 
that no published work has manipulated the instruction of the 2-step task to 
examine its influence on model-based and model-free performance. 
In conclusion, I provide evidence that anodal stimulation of the right dlPFC by 
tDCS does not alter model-based or model-free control in the paradigm. This 
observation was made in the context of extensive and causal evidence for a 
role  of  right  dlPFC  in  model-based  control  in  humans.  As  such,  my  results 
should  not  be  interpreted  as  providing  evidence  that  the  right  dlPFC  is  not Transcranial direct current stimulation does not affect model-based control 
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involved  in  model-based  control;  rather,  my  main  finding  is  that  anodal 
stimulation  does  not  necessarily  enhance  this  function.  An  open  question  is 
whether tDCS might improve performance on tasks that are more taxing on the 
model-based system (e.g. Huys et al., 2012).   Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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8.1  Abstract 
A  defining  feature  of  the  basal  ganglia  structures  are  their  anatomical 
organization into multiple corticostriatal loops, which themselves subdivide into 
direct  and  indirect  pathways  in  the  basal  ganglia.  A  central  tenet  of  this 
framework is that local striatal function is determined by its connectivity with 
cortex, which creates the functional topography that is mirrored within cortex 
and striatum. In this chapter I formally test this notion by asking whether it is 
possible  to  leverage  the  information  contained  in  corticostriatal  anatomical 
connectivity to predict local function of the striatum in a reinforcement learning 
task. Using high-resolution functional and diffusion MRI, combined with leave-
one-out cross-validation methods, I show that connectivity profiles can indeed 
predict reward and action value signals in the caudate nucleus. I then describe 
the cortical regions that contribute most strongly to this prediction. Future work 
can  explore  in  more  detail  the  precise  mechanisms  by  which  structural 
connectivity between the striatum and specific cortical regions predict functional 
activity, including studying functional representations across the corticostriatal 
network.  
8.2  Introduction 
In  chapter  2  I  went  into  some detail  explaining  the  anatomical  layout  of  the 
basal  ganglia,  including  the  remarkable  parallel  corticostriatal  loops  that 
comprise  its  defining  structural  and  functional  feature  at  the  macro-scale 
(Alexander et al., 1986; Haber, 2003). We can take a more abstract view of the 
brain  and  consider  that  the  function  of  any  neural  region,  and  indeed  any 
neuron, is to a large extent governed by its inputs. This has led to the prediction 
that knowledge of the ‘connectivity fingerprint’ of the brain is sufficient to predict Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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its  ‘functional  fingerprint’    (Passingham  et  al.,  2002).  This  notion  was  most 
directly  tested  in  a  combined  fMRI/DTI  study  by  Saygin  et  al.  (2012).  The 
authors predicted functional responses to face stimuli for individual voxels in the 
fusiform  gyrus  from  connectivity  fingerprints  of  these  same  voxels.  Critically, 
functional  responses  for  an  individual  participant  were  better  predicted  by  a 
connectivity fingerprint than by the average functional response of the group. 
Although  this  approach  has  been  extended  to  other  functions  of  the  visual 
system (Osher et al., 2015), it has not been applied to higher cognitive functions 
or subcortical structures. 
In this chapter I ask whether functional responses across the striatum during 
value-based learning show a reliable relationship with anatomical inputs from 
cortex (Haber and Behrens, 2014). The striatum has been suggested to serve 
as a focal point for associative, reward and motor information, though with each 
input defining only partially overlapping functional regions (Haber et al., 2006). 
Instrumental learning is widely accepted to engage the striatum both in animal 
models (Samejima et al., 2005; e.g. Lau and Glimcher, 2007; Samejima and 
Doya, 2007) and human studies (e.g. O'Doherty et al., 2004; Wunderlich et al., 
2012b). However, the relationship between function and structural connectivity 
has not been explored in detail in humans, instead there has been a relatively 
exclusive focus on purely structural connectivity of the corticostriatal network 
(e.g.  Leh  et  al.,  2007),  or  between-participant  correlations  of  structure  and 
function (e.g. corticostriatal connectivity predicts habitual versus goal-directed 
control; de Wit et al., 2012a). In this chapter I use a method applied between-
voxels  that  attempts  to  understand  what  makes  some  parts  of  the  striatum 
respond differently from other parts based on structural connectivity fingerprints. Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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I predicted that reward signals associated with action values during choice as 
well as rewards and expected value at the time of outcome can be predicted 
from cortical connectivity fingerprints for voxels in the caudate nucleus.  
8.3  Methods 
8.3.1  Participants 
Twenty-four adults participated in the experiment (14 female; age range 18-36 
years;  mean  ±  SD  =  22.5  ±  4.5  years).  All  participants  were  right  hand 
dominant, had no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder, were not taking 
any  medication  known  to  affect  neural  or  cognitive  function,  had  normal  or 
corrected-to-normal vision and passed the safety requirements to enter a MRI 
scanner. All participants provided written informed consent prior to the start of 
the  experiment,  which  was  approved  by  the  Research  Ethics  Committee  at 
University College London (UK). One further participant was excluded due to 
excessive movement (images could not be realigned successfully). 
8.3.2  Overview of the approach 
The  goal  of  the  experiment  was  to  test  the  notion  that  corticostriatal  input 
governs  representations  of  action  values,  reward  and  expected  value  in  the 
striatum. To understand the link between the anatomical pathways and their 
contribution to reinforcement learning I estimated for each voxel in the striatum 
its  functional  response  to  reward  and  expected  values.  These  same  voxels 
were  characterised  in  terms  of  their  structural  connectivity  to  148  cortical 
regions  through  diffusion  imaging  techniques.  This  allowed  a  prediction  of 
functional  activation  from  structural  connectivity  with  the  cortex.  All  these 
analyses were performed in participant space, with only summary statistics for Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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each participant taken to the group level (see Figure 8.1 for overview of study 
design).  
 
Figure 8.1: overview of the acquired data and processing steps central to this 
chapter. Each of these steps is further expounded in the methods section. 
8.3.3  Task 
The task required a participant to track stimulus-specific action values in order 
to  probe  how  these  action  values  are  represented  and  updated  in  neural 
structures during choice and feedback (Figure 8.2A). Participants had to learn 
two separate two-armed bandits which were distinguished by their colour (red or 
blue;  see  Figure  8.2A).  On  each  trial,  one  of  these  two  slot  machines  was 
presented to the participant, requiring a response using either right index finger 
or right ball of the foot. Binomial feedback was then presented which indicated a 
reward or no-reward. The probability of reward given a bandit s and action a, Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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𝑝(? |??,??)  where  ? ∈ {1,2}  and  ? ∈ {1,2},  changed  slowly  over  trials,  forcing 
participants to keep exploring throughout the experiment in order to maximise 
the number of rewards obtained.  
 
Figure  8.2:  reinforcement  learning  task  involving  right  hand  and  right  foot 
responses.  (A)  A  single  trial  consisted  of  the  following  sequence:  a  fixation 
cross (inter-trial interval) was presented for 750-1500 ms, drawn from a uniform 
distribution; either the red or blue slot machine was presented for 1250-3000 
ms, drawn from a uniform distribution; on half the trials (‘abort’ trials) the slot 
machine disappeared and the next trial started; on the other half (‘response’ 
trials)  lights  on  the  slot  machine  would  turn  green,  serving  as  a  Go  signal; 
participants  responded within  1500  ms  by depressing  force-sensitive  buttons 
with either their right hand or foot, and upon reaching the force threshold the 
corresponding lever immediately became brighter until the 1500 ms were up; Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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feedback was then presented on the slot machine for 1000 ms, consisting of 
either “+ £2.00” in green, or “+ £0.00” in red. (B) The probability of obtaining the 
reward varies over time per response per slot machine. This meant participants 
were required to track 4 random walks that could go between 0.15 and 0.85. 
Participants  performed  512  trials  (approximately  42  minutes)  consisting  128 
red-abort,  red-response,  blue-abort,  and  blue-response  trials  each  (Figure 
8.2A). The order of these four trial types was randomly determined and only 
constrained such that no trial type occurred for more than 3 trials in a row.  
Participants came in 1 to 20 days before the scanning session to perform a full 
set  of  512  trials  (mean  ±  SD  =  7  ±  4.4  days).  A  different  set  of  reward 
probabilities was used each day but otherwise the parameters of the experiment 
were identical. Participants could also use the training session to get used to 
the foot and hand force buttons.  
8.3.3.1  Fixed reward walks 
The 𝑝(? |??,??,?), where t indicates trial number, was generated by a Gaussian 
random walk for each action a and stimulus s as follows:  
𝑝(? |??,??,? + 1) = 𝑝(? |??,??,?) + 𝑁(0,0.01) 
where for the first trial the probability was randomly drawn from U(0.15,0.85). 
The walks were not generated anew for each participant—rather, one set of two 
pairs was used for each participant’s practice, and one set was used for each 
participant’s scanning session. However, the assignment of these two pairs to 
the red and blue slot machine was randomised, and the subsequent assignment 
of random walk to the two available actions was also randomised. This meant 
that volatility and availability of reward were matched between participants. The Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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walks were constrained in their upper (0.85) and lower (0.15) values and in their 
mean value (between 0.4 and 0.6; see Figure  8.2B). The highest correlation 
between any two of the four walks was 0.38, forcing participants to learn about 
the value of each option through trial-and-error rather than inferring the value of 
choice options based on a level of correlation between the walks. 
8.3.3.2  Cancelling half the trials 
Examining  value  representations  in  the  BOLD  signal  at  both  choice  and 
outcome  phase  can  be  challenging  due  to  the  sluggishness  of  the  BOLD 
response  (see  section  3.2.2),  and  the  resulting  correlated  regressors  in  the 
design matrix if the choice and feedback are presented close together in time. I 
considered  two  options  to  minimise  this  potential  confound:  a  slow  design 
where choice and feedback events are separated by at least 8 s (e.g. Behrens 
et al., 2008), and a fast design in which half the trials are cancelled at any point 
between choice and feedback phase (e.g. Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). Pilot data 
with both designs (data not shown) suggested participants were more accurate 
at  learning  reward  probabilities  in  the  fast  design,  possibly  due  to 
disengagement from  the  task  when participants  are faced  with  long  pauses. 
Also, a slow design might lead to non-striatal learning mechanisms dominating 
behaviour,  whereas I was specifically interested in such striatal mechanisms 
(Foerde et al., 2012). I thus opted for the fast design. 
8.3.4  Reinforcement learning models 
I used temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning models as described in 
chapter 2 to model participants’ behaviour and estimate quantities that might be 
represented  in  the  BOLD  signal  in  the  striatum,  most  notably  rewards  and 
action values. Each slot machine i defines a state si where two actions aj are Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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available. The reward r on trial t can be either 0 or 1. The value of action j in 
state i is updated after feedback by: 
???,??(? + 1) = ???,??(?) + ? ∗ ?(?) 
where α = 0 for all states and actions that did not occur on trial  t-1. As the 
reward  probabilities  change  independently  for  each  state  and  action,  the 
participant only learns about the chosen action in the current state, rather than 
inferring changes in value for non-chosen state-action pairs in a ‘model-based’ 
way (except for value decay—see below). ?(?) represents the RPE at trial t, 
defined as 
?(?) = ?(?) − ???,??(?) 
The probability of each action given these cached values ? are then given by 
the softmax equation with inverse temperature β: 
𝑝(?? | ??) = 𝑒
?∗𝑄𝑠?,?? ∑𝑒
?∗𝑄𝑠?,??
2
?=1
⁄  
I used an expectation maximization (EM) approach as implemented in Guitart-
Masip et al. (2012) to simultaneously fit parameters at the level of participants 
and population.  
In addition to this basic model with a learning rate and inverse temperature I 
examined  a  number  of  more  complex  models  that  might  provide  a  better 
explanation for the data. For each of these models I estimated the negative log-
likelihood  and  Bayesian  Information  Criterion  (BIC)  to  select  the  model  that 
optimally  described  the  participant’s  behaviour  on  this  task.  The  additional 
parameters are described in Table 8.1. All parameter combinations were tested. Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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Table 8.1: additional parameters for the reinforcement learning model. 
Parameter 
name 
Description 
Negative 
learning rate 
Separate learning rate for negative and positive feedback 
Effector bias  A fixed bias towards hand or foot responses 
Lapse rate  A value that constrains the softmax between ε and 1-ε 
rather than 0 and 1 to account for occasional lapses 
Decay  Implements the notion that unsampled actions do not 
maintain their value but decay back to 0.5. The parameter 
describes the time constant of exponential decay. 
Perseverance  A tendency to stick with the same action for a given 
stimulus, irrespective of value. 
 
8.3.5  Magnetic resonance imaging 
For each participant I acquired 1.5 mm isotropic restricted volume echo-planar 
imaging (EPI) data during task performance, 0.8 mm isotropic whole-brain multi-
parameter maps (MPMs) consisting of a T1-, proton density- and magnetisation 
transfer-weighted  volume,  1.5  mm  isotropic  whole-brain  diffusion  weighted 
images, 1.1 mm restricted volume diffusion weighted images, and B0 field maps 
to correct for field inhomogeneity for the EPI data. The parameters of these 
scans are detailed in Table 8.2. I also acquired a single whole-brain volume 
using  otherwise  identical  settings  for  the  EPI  sequence.  Cardiac  rate  was 
recorded  using  an  MRI-compatible  pulse  oximeter  (Model  8600  F0,  Nonin 
Medical),  and  respiration  was  monitored  using  a  pneumatic  belt  positioned 
around  the  abdomen.  I  processed  these  data  as  described  in  the  literature 
(Hutton et al., 2011) and included them as regressors of no interest in the first-
level general linear models (see below). 
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Table 8.2: MRI acquisition parameters. 
Sequence  Parameters 
B0 field map  Double echo FLASH sequence (matrix size = 64 x 64; 64 
slices; spatial resolution = 3 x 3 x 3 mm
3; gap = 1 mm; short 
TE = 10 ms; long TE = 12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms) to correct 
EPI images for distortion in the B0 field (Weiskopf et al., 
2006). 
Functional, 
EPI 
Restricted volume, 44 slices (40 in slab with 10% 
oversampling), FoV read 192 mm, transverse slices tilted 20 
degrees, anterior-posterior phase encoding, 12% phase 
oversampling, 10% slice oversampling, 40 slices per slab, 
voxel size 1.5 mm isotropic, TR = 78 ms, TE = 37.3, 
GRAPPA2 along phase encoding (144 PE ref. lines, 44 3D 
ref. lines), 180-185 volumes per block depending on 
duration of block over 4 ~10 min blocks in total. 
Multi-
parameter 
maps 
Proton density (PD)-weighted, T1-weighted, and 
magnetization transfer (MT)-weighted images at 0.8 mm 
isotropic resolution for each participant using multi-echo 3D 
FLASH (Helms et al., 2008a). A B1-map was acquired using 
a 3D SE/STE EPI method (Lutti et al., 2012) to correct for 
the effects of inhomogeneous radio-frequency excitation on 
the quantitative maps. Total time of acquisition was ~40 min. 
Diffusion-
weighted, 
whole-brain 
Whole-brain 1.5x1.5x1.5 mm
3 resolution diffusion-weighted 
images with settings similar to the Human Connectome 
Project (Van Essen et al., 2012; Sotiropoulos et al., 2013). 
Three shells (b=900/1800/2700) for both right-left and left-
right phase-encoding directions. Each of these 6 scans 
contained 10 images with no diffusion weighting (b=0) and 
100 directions spread out over a full sphere. I used 
multiband 3 but no further acceleration. Acquisition time was 
10 min 20 s for each of the 6 scans. No phase 
oversampling, 75 transverse slices, FoV read 192 mm, FoV 
phase 100%, slice thickness 1.5 mm with 0 distance 
between slices, TR 5440, TE 130 ms. I additionally acquired 
a single b0 image with identical settings, but phase encoding 
along anterior-posterior and along posterior-anterior. These 
additional phase encoding directions should aid in 
estimating distortions due to distortions along the phase 
encoding direction.  
Diffusion-
weighted, 
restricted 
volume 
These images were acquired but not further analysed in this 
chapter. 47 slices, distance factor 10%, transverse 
orientation, anterior-posterior phase-encoding, 35% phase 
oversampling, FoV read 156 mm, FoV phase 40.8 %, 1.1 
mm slice thickness, TR = 7200 ms, TE = 87.6 mm, b = 900, 
100 directions over full sphere, 10 b0 images interspersed, 
acquisition time 13 min 19s per scan, two averages 
acquired. Additional single b0 image acquired with posterior-
anterior phase encoding to correct for distortions along the 
phase-encoding direction, otherwise identical parameters.  Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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8.3.5.1  Multi-parameter maps processing 
Fully  quantitative  maps  of  the  MR  parameters  MT,  R1,  PD  and  R2*  were 
extracted from the acquired data as described previously (Helms et al., 2008a). 
I extracted a brain mask in structural space from the  T1w image using BET 
implemented in FSL (Smith, 2002).  
8.3.5.2  Semi-automatic segmentation of basal ganglia substructures 
Whereas the striatum can be reasonably defined using automated algorithms, 
other parts of the basal ganglia require manual segmentation. These were the 
globus  pallidus  pars  interna  (GPi)  and  externa  (GPe),  subthalamic  nucleus 
(STN) and substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA). I used FSL 
FIRST to automatically segment the bilateral caudate and putamen (Patenaude 
et al., 2011), and ITK-SNAP to segment the remaining regions (Yushkevich et 
al.). Note that segmentation was performed bilaterally for each participant as it 
is unclear to what extent basal ganglia function is lateralised (e.g. Scholz et al., 
2000).  
8.3.5.3  Automatic segmentation of cortex using FreeSurfer 
To  obtain  cortical  targets  for  tractography  I  used  FreeSurfer’s  RECON-ALL 
pipeline to generate 148 cortical labels in structural (participant) space following 
the  Destrieux  atlas  (Destrieux  et  al.,  2010;  Fischl,  2012).  These  were 
transformed  into  volumetric  ROIs.  Two  participants  lacked  1  and  3  labels, 
respectively, so these were added as empty ROIs for tractography (see below). 
The FreeSurfer segmentation pipeline has been described in detail elsewhere 
(Fischl et al., 2004).  Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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8.3.5.4  FMRI preprocessing 
I analysed the fMRI data in SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
UCL, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The images were corrected for signal 
bias  at  low  spatial  frequencies,  realigned  to  the  first  functional  image  and 
distortion  corrected  using  the  B0  field  maps.  The  first  functional  image  was 
coregistered to the MT image for its superior subcortical performance in white- 
and grey-matter segmentation compared to T1-weighted images (Helms et al., 
2009) and these transformation parameters were then applied to all restricted-
volume functional images to bring them into structural space. Notably, SPM’s 
coregistration  of  the  restricted-volume  EPI  to  the  MT  image  worked  well, 
obviating  the  need  for  an  intermediate  step  involving  the  whole-brain  EPI 
images.  For  additional  analyses  of  group-level  responses  I  applied 
normalization parameters to the functional images to bring them into MNI space 
and  applied  a  6  mm  full-width-half-maximum  (FWHM)  smoothing  kernel.  All 
participant-level  statistics  were  performed  on  voxels  within  an  explicit  mask 
(rather than the more commonly used implicit mask) to prevent brain voxels with 
low  signal  from  being  excluded.  The  explicit  mask  for  structural  (i.e.  native) 
space was constructed by restricting the whole-brain mask (see multi-parameter 
maps) to the volume of the EPI sequence using SPM’s IMCALC.  
8.3.5.5  FMRI general linear model 
The preprocessed images were analysed in an event-related design using a 
general linear model (GLM). The first model contained 8 explanatory variables 
of interest (EVs) defined at the onset of the visual stimulus (2 identical EVs), the 
‘go’ cue when choosing hand (1 EV) or foot (1 EV), the onset of feedback after 
choosing hand (2 identical EVs), and the onset of feedback after choosing foot Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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(2 identical EVs). A number of identical EVs were entered to be able to add 
multiple, non-orthogonalised parametric modulators to specific events. These 
parametric  modulators  were  the  Q-value  for  the  hand  and  foot  at  visual 
stimulus; the Q-value for the hand and foot on the respective response EVs, 
and whether reward was received for the respective feedback EVs. 
I  added  the  following  nuisance  regressors:  1  regressor  for  trials  where  no 
response was recorded in the 1500 ms response window, 1 regressor when the 
trial  was  aborted,  6  movement  regressors  produced  by  the  realignment 
procedure,  14  physiological  regressors  for  cardiac  and  respiratory  variables 
(Hutton et al., 2011), and 3 block regressors covering run 1 to 3, respectively. 
The 4
th block was subsumed in the constant of the design matrix. The GLM was 
estimated  separately  for  each  participant.  All  EVs  (but  not  physiological 
regressors) were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function 
(Friston et al., 1995). 
8.3.5.6  Diffusion weighted imaging preprocessing 
The diffusion data was preprocessed using FSL (Smith et al., 2004). I estimated 
the distortions along phase-encoding directions by entering 8 b0 images into 
TOPUP (1 from each of 2 blips * 3 shells + 1 AP + 1 PA blip; Andersson et al., 
2003). The field coefficients were then supplied to EDDY, which corrects for the 
phase-encoding distortion, movement, and eddy currents in all 660 volumes (3 
shells  *  2  phase-encoding  directions  *  110  images  each).  The  corrected  b0 
volume  from  TOPUP  was  entered  into  BET  to  obtain  a  brain  mask.  I  used 
DTIFIT to estimate fractional anisotropy (FA) maps and BEDPOSTX to estimate 
up to three fibres per voxel using custom settings for multishell data (Behrens et 
al.; Behrens et al., 2007b; Jbabdi et al., 2012). Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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8.3.5.7  Probabilistic tractography 
I used PROBTRACKX2 implemented in FSL to estimate connectivity profiles for 
each 0.8 mm isotropic voxel in the striatum. Each voxel was seeded with 10k 
streamlines  and  standard  parameter  settings.  I  then  extracted  connectivity 
profiles  for  voxels  at  coordinates  specified  by  the  anatomical  masks.  The 
locations  of  these  voxels  were  recorded  and  used  later  to  extract  functional 
signals from identical locations.  
8.3.6  Relating structure to function  
For the left and right caudate I extracted functional signals for the reward, Q-
value at choice, and Q-value at outcome contrasts at voxel locations identical to 
the  diffusion  data.  I  then  used  a  leave-one-out  cross-validation  (LOOCV) 
approach  to  predict  functional  activation  in  participant  n  based  on  the 
relationship between structure and function in participants n-1 (Figure 8.3). All 
functional data were smoothed at 6 mm FWHM and z-scored before entering 
the regression (though leaving the data unsmoothed does not drastically alter 
results, cf. Saygin et al., 2012). The design matrix for each participant contained 
149  columns  (1  intercept  and  148  target  regions)  and  the  number  of  rows 
corresponded to the number of voxels in the seed region. Each value indicated 
the number of samples that reached the target region, z-scored across voxels 
for each region separately. The dependent variable was each voxel’s functional 
response  to  a  contrast,  also  z-scored.  The  regression  coefficients  for  n-1 
participants  were  averaged  and  used  to  predict  each  voxel’s  functional 
response in participant n based on its connectivity profile. Each voxel had some 
error in its predicted value, and the mean absolute error (MAE) was calculated 
for  each  participant  (Saygin  et  al.,  2012).  This  was  used  as  a  standardised Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
Chapter 8 
 
168 
 
measure of predictive  capacity. I also performed an identical analysis to the 
connectivity LOOCV approach, but instead randomly permuted the regression 
coefficients before estimating functional signals for the n-th participant. By doing 
this permutation 10k times I built up a null distribution for comparison against 
the true connectivity model. 
   Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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Figure 8.3: overview of regression approach. The betas are estimated based on 
n-1 participants and used to predict the reward signals in participant n. The 
mean absolute error (MAE) of the prediction is recorded and the approach is 
repeated for every participant. In this example the reward response is predicted, 
and I also used this method on action values at the time of choice and expected 
values at the time of outcome. 
8.4  Results 
8.4.1.1  Reinforcement learning model 
The  model  comparison  revealed  that  a  separate  learning  rate  for  negative 
feedback and a decay parameter for unchosen values are consistently present 
in the best models (Table 8.3). Adding further parameters did not yield sufficient 
improvements  to  warrant  additional  complexity,  such  that  the  winning  model 
was  a  four-parameter  model  including  two  learning  rates,  an  inverse Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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temperature  and a  decay  rate. Table  8.4  shows  descriptive  statistics  for the 
parameters fit to the behavioural data from the scanning session.  
Table 8.3: model comparison results with only the five best models shown here. 
Each  reinforcement  learning  model  had  a  single  learning  rate  and  inverse 
temperature parameter. Added to this base model was perseverance, effector 
bias, separate learning rate for positive and negative feedback (‘neg α’), a lapse 
rate,  and  exponential  decay  for  unchosen  options  back  to  ? = 0.5.  The 
integrated Bayesian Information Criterion was estimated for 200k samples each 
from the practice and scanning session, and summed over both sessions and 
participants to arrive at final BICi. For details of this approach see Guitart-Masip 
et al. (2012). 
Additional parameters  BICi  δBICi 
neg α, decay  12393  0 
perseverance, neg α, decay  12400  +7 
lapse rate, neg α, decay  12427  +34 
perseverance, lapse rate, neg α, 
decay 
12435  +42 
 
Table 8.4: parameter estimates from winning model for the scanning session. 
Parameter  25
th percentile  median  75
th percentile 
Positive learning rate  0.54  0.61  0.72 
Negative learning rate  0.20  0.32  0.38 
Inverse temperature  3.12  5.01  5.87 
Decay  0.36  0.55  0.73 
 
8.4.1.2  Semi-automated segmentation 
The volumes for the segmented basal ganglia structures are presented in Table 
8.5. These values are compared to values from the literature, which shows no 
discrepancies.  Figure  8.4  shows,  for  illustration  purposes,  a  thresholded 
probabilistic map of normalised ROIs. 
Table 8.5: Average region of interest volumes. Values indicate volume of each 
structure  averaged  over  left  and  right,  with  95%  CI  across  participants. 
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Keuken et al. (2014), 
2 approx. values from  Lenglet et al. (2012), 
3 average 
value between left and right from Ahsan et al. (2007). 
Structure  volume (mm
3) ± 95% CI  volumes (mm
3) from 
literature ± SD  
Caudate  3679 ± 153 
2 4.1e3, 
3 4102 
Putamen  4796 ± 233 
2 4.5e3, 
3 4615 
Accumbens  460 ± 33 
3 341 
Globus pallidus pars 
externa 
1152 ± 42 
1 918 ± 123, 
2 1.2e3 
Globus pallidus pars 
interna 
532 ± 31 
1 366 ± 60, 
1 405 ± 68, 
2 
0.7e3 
Subthalamic nucleus  81 ± 5 
1 56 ±16 
substantia nigra & 
ventral tegmental area 
490 ± 24 
3 373 
 
 
Figure 8.4: normalised ROIs thresholded at p = 0.27 viewed from caudal looking 
rostral. Cyan = caudate nucleus; pink = putamen; beige = accumbens; red = 
globus  pallidus  pars externa;  green  =  globus  pallidus  pars  interna;  yellow  = 
substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area; blue = subthalamic nucleus. Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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8.4.1.3  Functional results in ROIs 
The extracted contrast values from the anatomical ROIs in each participant’s 
native  space  showed  a  largely  familiar  pattern  of  reward  and  value  signals 
(Figure 8.5). Action values at the time of choice (irrespective of actual choice), if 
represented, did not survive averaging across the ROI, with only the caudate 
showing a weak signal at p = .08. The reward prediction error is calculated as 
reward - expectation, and a region representing the RPE should thus show a 
positive effect of reward and negative effect of expectation. This was indeed the 
case  in  the  putamen  and  caudate  nucleus,  whereas  the  accumbens  only 
showed a reward signal but lacks an expected value signal. None of the other 
ROIs  showed  any  significant  effects,  including  a  null  effect  for  reward  and 
expected value at outcome in the SNVTA (Figure 8.5). Together, this suggests 
the task was able to elicit value signals similar to those reported previously in 
the literature. Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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Figure  8.5:  extracted  betas  for  four  reinforcement  learning  contrasts.  Using 
anatomically defined  regions  of  interest  I  extracted  regression  coefficients  in 
participant space. The Q value at choice, which is the representation of the 
action value irrespective of choice, shows only a weak effect in the caudate. 
Significant activations are reward across the striatum and nucleus accumbens; 
negative expected value at outcome, but only in caudate nucleus and putamen; 
and reward prediction error again across the striatum and nucleus accumbens. 
The EV at outcome, which together with reward is what makes up the reward 
prediction  error,  is  not  observed  in  the  accumbens.  Reassuringly,  the  other 
regions of the basal ganglia show no value-related signals, despite e.g. the GPe 
bordering  the  putamen  directly.  This  emphasises  the  specificity  of  these 
activations and potentially of the computations performed in these regions. Error Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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bars indicate 95% CI. Stars indicate p-values from 1-sample t-test against zero: 
* < .05, ** < .001, *** < .0001. 
8.4.1.4  Functional-DTI relationship 
The aim of this chapter was to predict functional signals in the striatum based 
on  corticostriatal  connectivity.  As  described  in  the  methods  I  calculated  the 
mean absolute error (MAE) for the connectivity model to compare against the 
null  model  from  the  permutation.  The  focus  here  is  on  the  caudate  as  this 
structure  is  most  likely  to  represent  the  variables  of  interest  and  is  more 
amenable to tractography than the putamen due to its shape. As can be seen in 
Figure 8.6 the connectivity prediction was significantly more accurate than the 
permuted connectivity prediction (Cohen’s d = 0.46, 1.04 and 0.88 for action 
values, reward and EV outcome, respectively; all p < .003 in paired t-test). This 
provides  evidence  that  at  the  level  of  a  single  participant,  knowledge  of 
structural connectivity contains information pertaining to the functional signals.  
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Figure 8.6: Using structural connectivity to predict functional activity. Functional 
signals  in  individual  voxels  related  to  action  values  at  choice,  reward,  and 
expected value at outcome (‘EV outcome’) were predicted from corticostriatal 
connectivity  in  those  same  voxels.  A  10k  permutation  test  in  which  the 
regression  weights  were  shuffled  before  calculating  the  prediction  revealed 
significantly  better  predictions  by  connectivity  compared  to  chance  (all  p  < 
.003). 
I then examined what cortical regions contributed to the functional prediction by 
testing all regression coefficients against zero across participants. The cortical 
regions that significantly contributed to functional signals in the right caudate (at 
p  <  .05  uncorrected  for  illustration  purposes)  are  shown  in  Table  8.6.  This 
statistical test measures the magnitude and reliability of the structure-function 
relationship across participants. As an example, voxels in the right caudate that 
are more strongly connected, as measured by probabilistic tractography, to the 
left middle frontal gyrus have weaker reward responses (Table 8.6). Notably, 
each individual region contributes only weakly to the prediction as evidenced by 
none of the regions surviving Bonferroni correction. 
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Table 8.6: overview of regions most strongly contributing (in terms of absolute 
standardised coefficient magnitude) to the prediction of the functional contrast. 
In the LOOCV approach each region has a standardised regression coefficient, 
i.e. weight, in its prediction of functional activity for each contrast. Data shown 
here are for the right caudate only. rh = right hemisphere; lh = left hemisphere; 
G = gyrus; S = sulcus; CI = confidence interval across participants. 
Region  Coefficient  lower 95% 
CI 
upper 95% 
CI 
Action values 
rh G Ins lg and S cent ins  0.037  0.010  0.064 
lh G temp sup-Lateral  0.015  0.003  0.027 
rh S calcarine  0.058  0.012  0.105 
rh G temp sup-Plan tempo  -0.040  -0.073  -0.006 
rh S front sup  0.047  0.006  0.087 
lh G front inf-Triangul  0.056  0.007  0.106 
lh Pole occipital  0.030  0.003  0.057 
rh S front inf  -0.084  -0.161  -0.006 
rh G temporal middle  -0.074  -0.144  -0.005 
lh G and S transv frontopol  -0.037  -0.071  -0.002 
lh G and S cingul-Ant  -0.039  -0.078  -0.001 
Reward 
rh G cingul-Post-ventral  -0.087  -0.128  -0.045 
lh G front middle  -0.105  -0.188  -0.023 
lh S intrapariet and P trans  -0.024  -0.043  -0.005 
rh G and S frontomargin  0.157  0.028  0.286 
EV outcome 
rh S collat transv ant  -0.096  -0.161  -0.030 
rh S temporal inf  -0.045  -0.076  -0.014 
lh S oc sup and transversal  0.013  0.002  0.023 
rh G and S cingul-Mid-Ant  0.043  0.007  0.079 
lh S occipital ant  -0.005  -0.009  -0.001 
lh S orbital med-olfact  0.058  0.007  0.108 
lh G front sup  -0.074  -0.139  -0.009 
rh G oc-temp lat-fusifor  0.020  0.002  0.038 
rh G cingul-Post-ventral  0.047  0.003  0.091 
lh G temporal middle  -0.013  -0.025  -0.001 
 
In Figure 8.7 to Figure 8.9 I show all 148 regression weights averaged across 
participants  projected  back  into  the  148  masks  used  for  probabilistic 
tractography.  These  figures  show  the  weights  for  the  structure-function 
relationship in the right caudate. That is, positive values indicate that a voxel in Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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the  right  caudate  has  a  relatively  stronger  response  to  the  contrast  if  it  is 
relatively  stronger  connected  to  that  part  of  cortex.  I  note  a  number  of 
observations: coefficients for action values at choice are particularly strong in 
right dorsolateral and bilateral ventromedial PFC; coefficients for reward signals 
are particularly large in right cingulate cortex and right anterior temporal lobe, 
and  show  a  negative-to-positive  gradient  from  motor  to  occipital  cortex;  and 
coefficients for EV at outcome are particularly large in ventromedial prefrontal 
and  orbitofrontal  cortex.  Across  all  three  contrasts  connectivity  to  the  dorsal 
regions  of  right  parietal,  sensory  and  motor  cortex  seem  to  show  a  strong 
predictive  power—sometimes  positive,  sometimes  negative  (see  slices  with 
high z-coordinates).  
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Figure 8.7: regression weights averaged across participants predicting action 
values  signals  in  the  right  caudate  nucleus  from  structural  connectivity.  The 
regression  from  Figure  8.6  yields  1  regression  coefficient  for  each  of  148 
cortical regions. In this figure these weights are averaged across participants 
and projected onto a normalised set of 148 cortical ROIs, here overlaid onto the 
MNI152T1  template.  Warm  colours,  such  as  those  in  ventral  prefrontal  and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, indicate connectivity to these areas is associated 
with stronger action values responses in those caudate nucleus voxels. The 
units on the colour bar are standardised regression coefficients, the coordinates 
are z-coordinates in MNI space.   Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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Figure 8.8: structural connectivity regression weights for reward signals in the 
right caudate. See Figure 8.7 for details. 
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Figure 8.9: structural connectivity regression weights for EV outcome signals in 
the right caudate. See Figure 8.7 for details. 
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8.5  Discussion 
In this chapter I used a reinforcement learning task to elicit BOLD responses in 
the striatum related to action values, rewards and expected values. The aim 
was to explain local variation in these responses based on local variation in the 
corticostriatal  connectivity  fingerprint.  Focusing  on  the  caudate  nucleus,  the 
results show that the connectivity fingerprint of a voxel can be used to predict its 
response to action values, reward and expected value better than chance. This 
result supports the widely held belief that partially distinct functional zones in the 
striatum are determined by inputs from cortex (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber, 
2003; Draganski et al., 2008; Averbeck et al., 2014; Haber and Behrens, 2014).  
Using an anatomical ROI approach I observed reinforcement learning-related 
signals in the striatum, replicating previous work (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi 
et al., 2004; Rutledge et al., 2009; Jessup and O'Doherty, 2011; Guitart-Masip 
et al., 2012). However, regions downstream of the striatum such as the internal 
and external globus pallidus, subthalamic nucleus and SN/VTA showed no such 
BOLD  modulation  by  task  variables.  This  can  be  considered  surprising  for 
various  reasons:  firstly,  a  basic  view  of  brain  function  would  assume  that  a 
change in neural activity in the striatum is propagated through the basal ganglia 
network to effect some change in cortical excitability (e.g. Mink, 1996). The lack 
of propagation as expressed through average BOLD signal suggests a more 
subtle mechanism of excitation/inhibition  (Cui et al., 2013) or effects through 
oscillatory mechanism (Brown, 2003), both of which are virtually impossible to 
measure through fMRI. The second surprise is a lack of reward prediction error 
signals in the dopaminergic SN/VTA complex  (D'Ardenne et al., 2008; Klein-
Flugge et al., 2011). It is unclear why the current study does not show such Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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signals though it might relate to the relative unreliability of BOLD in the midbrain 
(though see Duzel et al., 2009). In any case, the results from the current study 
suggest a strong dissociation between striatum and its downstream regions in 
their representation of reinforcement-related values.  
The main  goal was  to  understand  how  these  striatal functional  signals arise 
from cortical inputs. The notion that anatomical connectivity determines function 
is pervasive in neuroscience, and in the striatum it is known that cell populations 
with projections along the direct and indirect pathway have distinct functional 
roles  in  movement  (Kravitz  et  al.,  2010;  Cui et  al.,  2013)  and  reinforcement 
learning (Kravitz et al., 2012). In humans connectivity fingerprints have been 
used  to  segment  individual  brain  structures  with  remarkable  similarity  to 
functional zones (Behrens et al., 2003a; Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Lyness et 
al.,  2014).  This  same  technique  has  revealed  anatomical  parcellation  of  the 
striatum (Draganski et al., 2008; Georgiou-Karistianis et al., 2011; Verstynen et 
al., 2012; Tziortzi et al., 2014), but this has not been directly linked to functional 
activations.  
Saygin  et  al.  (2012)  and  Osher  et  al.  (2015)  introduced  a  cross-validation 
technique to assess the predictive power that connectivity has over functional 
signals. In this chapter I applied this method to reward and value signals in the 
caudate nucleus. I show that spatial variance in reinforcement learning signals 
within  this  region  can  in  part  be  explained  by  differences  in  corticostriatal 
connectivity. 
The predictions of functional activity arise from a linear regression model with 
weights  attributed  to  each  corticostriatal  connection  (Figure  8.6).  The Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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distribution of these weights across the cortical surface provides a glimpse of 
what parts of cortex might be involved in driving activity in the striatum—or in 
this  study,  the  right  caudate  nucleus.  At  a  macro-anatomical  level,  the 
topography  of  cortex  is  maintained  in  striatal  topography  (Alexander  and 
Crutcher, 1990; Haber, 2003), though at a finer scale there is also evidence for 
‘hot spots’ of convergence where widely separated cortical regions converge on 
a single striatal patch of tissue (Averbeck et al., 2014). At a microscopic scale it 
has been suggested direct and indirect pathway medium spiny neurons (MSNs) 
differentiate in their cortical inputs (Wall et al., 2013). They show that motor 
cortex projects more strongly to the indirect pathway, whereas somatosensory 
cortex projects more strongly to the direct pathway. Curiously, in the prediction 
of reward activity (Figure 8.8) a similar gradient can be observed along motor-
to-somatosensory  cortex.  The  results  further  revealed  various  value-related 
prefrontal  regions  that  might  contribute  to  functional  activity  in  the  caudate 
nucleus  (Rangel  et  al.,  2008;  Rangel  and  Hare,  2010;  Haber  and  Behrens, 
2014). A careful study of the relationship between frontostriatal functional and 
anatomical connectivity could help understand what information is transferred 
between cortex and striatum along specific anatomical connections.  
There are a number of limitations of this study. Firstly, diffusion connectivity is 
not ideally placed to pick up on crossing connections, of which there may be 
many in the striatal system. This weakness was also discussed in chapter 2, but 
it is noted again here to acknowledge the difficulties in dissociating connectivity 
fingerprints  of  neighbouring  voxels.  That  is,  the  nature  of  probabilistic 
tractography  will  contribute  a  certain  spatial  smoothness  to  connectivity 
fingerprints.  Therefore,  these  results  are  agnostic  regarding  the  spatial Predicting striatal reward signals from corticostriatal connectivity 
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frequency  of  the  signal  that  is  contributing  to  the  predictive  power  of  the 
connectivity model—it might be spread across multiple centimetres rather than 
among directly neighbouring voxels. The second limitation relates to chapters 4-
7. By using a simple reinforcement learning task it is impossible to tell whether 
behaviour is driven by model-based or model-free influences, or both. Despite 
the use of a model-free algorithm in this chapter I make no claim regarding the 
origin of these values in terms of model-based or model-free systems. After 
further development of the imaging approach in this chapter it would be useful 
to dissociate cortical contributions to model-free and model-based components 
of striatal function, respectively.  
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9.1  Abstract 
In previous chapters I discussed mechanisms of adaptive action selection. A 
complementary component to selecting the right action is inhibiting the actions 
that  are  not  appropriate  to  a  situation.  Here  I  examine  the  behavioural  and 
neural basis of selective inhibition focusing on the role of preparation. In 18 
healthy human participants I manipulated the extent to which they could prepare 
for selective inhibition of specific actions by providing or withholding information 
on what actions might need to be stopped. I show that, on average, information 
improves  both  speed  and  selectivity  of  inhibition.  BOLD  data  shows  that 
preparation  for  selective  inhibition  engages  the  inferior  frontal  gyrus, 
supplementary motor area and striatum. Examining inter-individual differences, I 
find the benefit of proactive control to speed and selectivity of inhibition trade off 
against  each  other,  such  that an  improvement  in  stopping  speed  leads  to a 
deterioration  of  selectivity  of  inhibition,  and  vice  versa.  This  trade-off  is 
implemented  through  engagement  of  the  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  and 
putamen.  The  results  suggest  proactive  selective  inhibition  is  implemented 
within  frontostriatal  structures,  and  I  now  provide  evidence  that  a  speed-
selectivity trade-off might underlie a range of findings reported previously. 
9.2  Introduction 
The  prefrontal  cortex  is  thought  to  represent  goals  that  are  subsequently 
imposed on the motor system (Koechlin et al., 2003). Such executive control 
also involves the inhibition of actions that are misaligned with current goals, for 
example when overriding habits or impulsive responses (Isoda and Hikosaka, 
2011).  Failures  of  executive  control,  and  in  particular  its  expression  during Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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inhibition, are thought to be common in disorders such as addiction (Ersche et 
al., 2012) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Casey et al., 1997).  
Response  inhibition  is  often  studied  using  the  stop-signal  task  (SST),  which 
requires the inhibition of an action following an unpredictable stop signal (Logan 
et al., 1984). This type of inhibition has been referred to as ‘global’ because all 
actions are inhibited, and ‘reactive’ because no information is used to prepare 
for inhibition (Aron and Verbruggen, 2008). 
The  antipodes  of  reactive  and  global  inhibition  are  proactive  and  selective 
inhibition, respectively (Aron, 2011). ‘Proactive’ refers to the use of information 
from the environment that helps prepare an upcoming stop response. ‘Selective’ 
refers to the inhibition of only a subset of all ongoing actions. When selective 
inhibition is executed without preparation, i.e. reactively, it causes interference 
with all ongoing actions (Coxon et al., 2007; Aron and Verbruggen, 2008; Coxon 
et  al.,  2009).  This  suggests  inhibition  is  implemented  by  a  global  ‘brake’ 
followed by re-initiation of the remaining action. One framework suggests such 
a  global  stop  involves  the  subthalamic  nucleus  (STN)  in  the  hyperdirect 
pathway, whereas selective inhibition engages a more action-specific indirect 
pathway  of  the  basal  ganglia  (Aron,  2011).  However,  others have found  the 
IFG, SMA/pre-SMA and entire basal ganglia are involved in preparing for global 
inhibition (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2012).  
Behavioural  and  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  studies  have  shown  that 
preparation  reduces  interference  between  the  inhibitory  process  and  the 
remaining  actions,  potentially  mediated  by  selective  suppression  of  action 
representations in primary motor cortex (Aron and Verbruggen, 2008; Mars et 
al., 2009; Claffey et al., 2010; Neubert et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2011a; Majid et Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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al.,  2012;  Majid  et  al.,  2013).  However,  there  is  to  my  knowledge  no 
characterization  of  the  full  neural  network  underlying  prepared  versus 
unprepared  selective  inhibition.  Such  data  might  extend  models  of  inhibition 
beyond a current emphasis on reactive global inhibition (Aron, 2011; Schall and 
Godlove, 2012). 
I  investigated  proactive  selective  inhibition  in  healthy  human  adults  by 
manipulating  the  information  provided  about  the  potential  stop  target.  I 
hypothesised  that  preparation  would  reduce  interference  caused  by  an 
inhibitory process upon the remaining response, and such an improvement in 
selectivity might lead to a deterioration in the speed of inhibition, essentially 
posing a speed-selectivity trade-off in inhibition (Aron and Verbruggen, 2008). 
An existing framework predicts such an improvement in selectivity, rather than 
speed, reflects greater engagement of an indirect relative to hyperdirect basal 
ganglia  pathway,  and  involvement  of  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  (dlPFC) 
rather than rIFG (Aron, 2011). Thus, this model predicts that proactive selective 
inhibition will engage striatum and dlPFC, but not STN and rIFG (Aron, 2011). 
9.3  Methods 
9.3.1  Participants 
Nineteen  healthy  adults  participated  in  the  experiment.  I  excluded  one 
participant because a brain mask could not be created for all functional scans 
due to movement in the scanner, leaving 18 participants for further analysis (11 
females;  age  range  19-25  years;  mean  =  21.2,  SD  =  2.1  years).  Fifteen 
participants  were  classified  as  right-handed  and  three  as  ambidextrous 
(Oldfield, 1971). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no 
history  of  psychiatric  or  neurological  disorder,  and  provided  written  informed Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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consent  for  the  experiment,  which  was  approved  by  the  Research  Ethics 
Committee at University College London (UK). 
9.3.2  Experimental design 
I modified a task previously used to study prepared and unprepared selective 
action inhibition (Figure 9.1; Aron and Verbruggen, 2008). In brief, on each trial 
participants  responded  to  a  Go  signal  with  either both  middle  or  both  index 
fingers, depending on whether the top or bottom circles displayed on a screen 
were filled, respectively. On some trials a red cross was presented over one of 
the two filled circles of the Go signal after a stop-signal delay (SSD). The stop 
signal  indicated  that  the  response  with  the  corresponding  finger  should  be 
withheld, whereas the other finger should still press down as fast as possible. 
 
Figure 9.1: Proactive selective inhibition task. The task was designed to study 
the  influence  of  prior  information  about  inhibition  targets  on  behaviour  and 
neural responses. Responses were made using both index or middle fingers, 
the four circles on the screen corresponding to fingers on a keypad as indicated 
by the lower left inset. At the start of each trial faded red crosses cued the 
participant  about  the  potential  locations  of  a  stop  signal.  In  the  Prepared 
condition this would be either both the left or right circles (left or right hand, 
respectively); in the Unprepared condition the stop signal could appear over any Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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of the four circles; in the noStop condition there would never be a stop signal. 
After  a  jittered  anticipation  period  a  Go  cue  was  presented,  consisting  of  4 
circles with either the top or bottom two filled. The fingers corresponding to the 
filled  circles  had  to  press  down  as  fast  as  possible.  In  the  Prepared  and 
Unprepared  condition  a  stop  signal  was  presented  on  30%  of  trials  after  a 
staircased stop signal delay. The location of the stop signal always followed the 
restrictions set by the cue (i.e. the cued side in Prepared condition, or either 
side in Unprepared condition). Participants had to stop the finger corresponding 
to the stop signal, but still go with the finger corresponding to the filled circle 
without the stop signal. No feedback was provided. 
To  specifically  study  preparation  for  selective  inhibition  each  Go  signal  was 
preceded by one of four cues showing the potential locations of the stop signal 
for that trial. In the Unprepared condition the cue indicated the stop signal could 
appear anywhere by showing faded red crosses over all four circles, precluding 
participants from setting up a selective inhibitory representation. In the Prepared 
condition the cue indicated that the stop signal could only appear on the left or 
only on the right by showing faded red crosses only over the left or right circles, 
respectively. Previous work has shown that participants use such cues to set up 
an inhibitory process specific to the actions that need to be inhibited (Claffey et 
al., 2010; Majid et al., 2012). In both Unprepared and Prepared conditions the 
overall probability of a stop signal occurring was 30%. To balance the factor of 
Information  (with  levels  Unprepared  and  Prepared),  40%  of  trials  were 
Unprepared, 20% of trials Prepared-left and 20% of trials Prepared-right. The 
remaining 20% of trials were noStop trials: the cue consisted of 4 filled white 
circles  with  no  faded  red  crosses,  indicating  that  no  stop  signal  would  be 
presented  on  that  trial.  This  control  condition  can  reveal  strategic  slowing 
(Jahfari  et  al.,  2012),  but  was  not  used  in  the  imaging  analysis  as  their Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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frequency was not matched with the Information conditions. The design was 
fully counterbalanced over index and middle fingers.  
Trial timings took the following form: the cue was presented for 1 s, followed by 
1,  2  or  3  s  of  anticipation  (intervals  with  probability  0.4,  0.2,  and  0.4, 
respectively). The Go signal appeared on the screen for 1 s, and in 30% of trials 
was overlaid by a stop signal after a SSD. The Go stimulus remained on the 
screen for 1 s regardless of button presses, after which a 2 s ITI started. No 
feedback was provided. 
Participants completed 100 trials per block (10 minutes) in the scanner, for 4 
blocks during one session. Participants were then taken from the scanner and 
given 45 to 90 minutes of rest. During this time they were asked to wait in a 
waiting  room  and  I  provided  no  feedback  on  their  performance.  They  then 
underwent  another  4  blocks  for  a  total  of  800  trials  per  participant  over  80 
minutes of functional imaging. This yields 96 stop trials in both the Unprepared 
and Prepared condition, in line with the number of stop trials in previous studies 
using  the  stop  signal  task  (e.g.  Aron  and  Poldrack,  2006;  Li  et  al.,  2006; 
Chikazoe et al., 2009). Trial order was randomised for every block. 
I used four independent SSD staircases, one for each of the cue-stop signal 
combinations (Unprepared left stop, Unprepared right stop, Prepared left stop, 
Prepared  right  stop).  The  SSD  became  longer  after  a  successful  stop,  and 
shorter  after  a  failed  stop,  in  50  ms  steps.  This  tracking  procedure  yields  a 
p(stopSuccess) of approximately 0.5, which is optimal for estimation of the stop-
signal  reaction  time  (SSRT,  see  below;  Verbruggen  and  Logan,  2009b; 
Congdon et al., 2012). The staircases started at values determined during a 
training session 1 to 7 days before the scanning session. Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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During that training session, the participant first learned how to respond to Go 
cues (10 trials) and stop signals (20 trials), and then performed 2 blocks of 100 
trials on the full task. Trial-by-trial feedback up until halfway through the first full 
training  block  aided  instruction.  Feedback  consisted  of  success  and  error 
messages  and  a  warning  when  the  left  and  right  buttons  on  Go  trials  were 
pressed  more  than  70  ms  apart  (asynchronous  response).  The  4  SSD 
staircases started off at 100 ms for the last full block, and the participant’s last 
SSD in each staircase became the starting SSD for the scanning session. I 
instructed  participants  to  use  the  cue  to  prepare  for  the  Go  signal,  and 
explained it would be impossible to stop every time the stop signal appeared. I 
also emphasised that responding fast would be more important than correctly 
stopping  on  every  stop  trial.  These  instructions  aim  to  prevent  a  ‘waiting’ 
strategy  which  invalidates  assumptions  of  the  horse  race  model  used  to 
calculate the SSRT (Logan, 1994). 
This  experiment  was  realised  using  Cogent  2000  developed  by  the  Cogent 
2000 team at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging and the Institute of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, and John Romaya developed Cogent Graphics at the 
Laboratory  of  Neurobiology  at  the  Wellcome  Department  of  Imaging 
Neuroscience.  
9.3.3  Behavioural data analysis 
Our analyses followed recommendations from the literature (Logan, 1994; Band 
et al., 2003; Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b; Congdon et al., 2012). I excluded 
participants if: p(stop) for any of the 4 SSD staircases was lower than 0.25, or 
higher than 0.75; proportion of correct Go trials (cued fingers pressed down 
within 70 ms of each other) following any of the 4 cues was below 0.7. All 18 Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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participants  passed  these  criteria.  I  further  computed,  for  each  condition, 
measures of the Go distribution and number of errors. To validate assumptions 
of the independent race model I computed stopFail RT as a function of SSD, 
and  z-scored  relative  finishing  time  (ZRFT)  calculated  as  (Gomean  –  SSD  – 
SSRT)/GoSD, evaluated at SSDs of 150-500 ms in 50 ms steps (Logan et al., 
1984; Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b).  
Two key behavioural measures characterizing stopping in this task are 1) the 
stop signal reaction time (SSRT), which represents the speed of inhibition, and 
2) interference, which represents the inverse selectivity of inhibition. I computed 
SSRT using the quantile method (Band et al., 2003; Congdon et al., 2012). For 
each  condition  (Prepared  left,  Prepared  right,  Unprepared)  all  Go  RTs  were 
arranged  in  descending  order.  The  RT  corresponding  to  the  participant’s 
probability of successfully stopping in that condition was selected (e.g. for a 
p(stop) of 0.45 I selected the RT 45% down the ordered list), and I subtracted 
the  mean  SSD  to  yield  the  SSRT.  SSRT  in  the  Prepared  condition  was 
averaged across left and right cues as an estimate of the time it takes for the 
participant to inhibit an upcoming motor response after presentation of the stop 
signal.  
I  calculated  interference  of  inhibition,  or  inverse  selectivity,  as  RT  on 
stopSuccess trials minus RT on Go trials for each condition separately (Aron 
and Verbruggen, 2008). Recall that in all stop trials, participants had to stop one 
finger and still press down with the other as fast as possible. A positive value in 
this measure of  interference  indicates that responses  were  slower when  the 
participant  had  to  stop  a  finger  compared  to  Go  trials.  Interference  in  the 
Prepared condition was averaged across left and right cues. I then compared Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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these  values  across  conditions  to  observe  changes  in  interference,  i.e. 
selectivity, with experimental condition. 
I observed that the benefit of Information on SSRT and interference trade off, 
such that participants seem to focus on improving either speed or selectivity of 
inhibition,  but  not  both.  I  therefore  computed  a  measure  of  this  trade-off  as 
(SSRTUnprepared - SSRTPrepared) - (InterferenceUnprepared - InterferencePrepared). This 
means that a high trade-off represents a focus on improvement of SSRT with 
Information,  whereas  a  low  value  represents  a  focus  on  improvement  of 
interference (i.e. selectivity) with Information. Furthermore, I observed that the 
trade-off is not static over time (see Results: correlation between trade-off in 
first half versus second half of experiment, r = -10, p = .68), suggesting use of 
information to prepare selective inhibition is not necessarily homogenous across 
the entire duration of an experiment.  
In order to characterise the brain correlates of this fluctuating use of information 
for proactive selective inhibition I calculated the magnitude of the trade-off for 
each trial t and used it as a parametric modulator in the fMRI analysis. This trial-
by-trial trade-off estimate was calculated using a running average from RT data 
from trial t-75 to t+75 (i.e. sliding window of 150 trial width). For trial 1 to 75, the 
window spanned [1 t+75], and for trial 725 to 800 the window spanned [t-75 
800]. Although a smaller width would provide a more fine-grained estimate of 
the trade-off, this has to be balanced against the number of data points used to 
calculate the interference and SSRT. With a window size of 150 trials, each 
Information condition contains 18 stop trials in each window on average, which 
is sufficient for reliable estimation of the SSRT (Congdon et al., 2012). Using Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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this dynamic measure we could then interrogate neural signatures of this trade-
off as expressed during Go and Stop trials in the task.  
Behavioural analyses were performed in Matlab (The Mathworks Inc) and SPSS 
19 (IBM). I used two-tailed permutation tests with 10
4 draws for paired tests (or 
10
7  draws  for  p-values  <  .001),  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  to  test  for 
interactions, and 1-sample t-tests to compare outcomes to zero. 
9.3.4  MRI data acquisition and preprocessing   
I  performed  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (MRI)  on  a  3-Tesla  Siemens  Trio 
magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Functional data 
were  acquired  over  8  runs,  each  run  consisting  of  208  whole-brain  3D  EPI 
volumes with spatial resolution = 2.3 x 2.3 x 2.3 mm^3, 80 slices, echo time 
(TE)  =  32.84  ms,  volume  repetition  time  (TR)  =  2.96  s  (Lutti  et  al.,  2013). 
Parallel  imaging  (GRAPPA  image  reconstruction;  Griswold  et  al.,  2002), 
acceleration factor 2 along the partition-encoding direction) was used to speed-
up  the  acquisition  of  each  image  volume.  Acquisition  of  dummy  volumes  to 
allow for longitudinal magnetization to reach steady-state and of the GRAPPA 
reconstruction kernel was implemented prior to the acquisition of image data. I 
acquired B0 field maps for each session using a double echo FLASH sequence 
(matrix size = 64 x 64; 64 slices; spatial resolution = 3 x 3 x 3 mm
3; gap = 1 mm; 
short TE = 10 ms; long TE = 12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms) to correct EPI images for 
distortion in the B0 field  (Weiskopf et al., 2006). Field maps were estimated 
from the phase difference between the short and long TE using the FieldMap 
toolbox for SPM (Hutton et al., 2002). Cardiac rate was recorded using an MRI-
compatible pulse oximeter (Model 8600 F0, Nonin Medical), and respiration was 
monitored using a pneumatic belt positioned around the abdomen. I processed Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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these data as described in the literature (Hutton et al., 2011) and included them 
as regressors of no interest in all first level GLM models (see below). I acquired 
proton density (PD)-weighted, T1-weighted, and magnetization transfer (MT)-
weighted images at 1x1x1 mm
3 resolution for each participant using multi-echo 
3D FLASH (Helms et al., 2008b). Fully quantitative maps of the MR parameters 
MT, R1, PD and R2* were extracted from the acquired data as described in the 
Methods (chapter 2, also see Helms et al., 2008b). A B1-map was acquired 
using a 3D SE/STE EPI method (Lutti et al., 2012) to correct for the effects of 
inhomogeneous radio-frequency excitation on the quantitative maps. 
I analysed the MRI data in SPM8 as described in chapter 2. Functional data 
were smoothed using either a 4 or 10 mm full width at half maximum Gaussian 
kernel.  I  used  two  smoothing  levels  to  optimise  sensitivity  to  widespread 
activations as well as focused sub-cortical activations in e.g. pallidum and STN.  
9.3.5  FMRI data analysis 
The preprocessed images were analysed in an event-related design using a 
general linear model (GLM) with 15 explanatory variables (EVs) of interest. I 
modelled 12 EVs as stick regressors at time of Information cue onset. Of these, 
four EVs described correct Go trials (Unprepared, Prepared left, Prepared right, 
noStop),  and  8  EVs  described  stop  trials,  crossing  information  (Unprepared, 
Prepared), stop-signal side (left, right), and outcome (stopSuccess or stopFail). 
A further 3 regressors were added at time of the imperative cue (i.e. the go 
signal):  one  for  all  Go  trials,  one  for  all  stopSuccess  trials,  and  one  for  all 
stopFail trials. As all these imperative cues are identical between Information 
conditions,  I  did  not  separately  model  the  information  regressors  at  the 
imperative cue. As such, the 12 regressors modelled at the time of the precue Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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capture  BOLD  during  both  the  anticipation  epoch  and  the  action  execution 
epoch.  I  opted  for a  fast-event  related  design  with  a  large  number  of  trials, 
foregoing the opportunity to dissociate activity from these two epochs in each 
trial.  
As described I obtained a measure of the speed-selectivity trade-off, i.e. the 
extent  to  which  the  participant  uses  Information  to  improve  the  speed  or 
selectivity of inhibition, for each trial. I hypothesised that a focus on speeded 
inhibition  would  result  in  a  differential  engagement  of  a  stopping  network 
compared to a focus on selective inhibition (Aron, 2011). I modelled the trade-
off as a parametric modulator on the stick events of each of the 12 regressors at 
the  time  of  precue,  allowing  me  to  examine  how  each  of  these  events  was 
modulated  by  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off.  I  decided  to  test  for  effects  of 
trade-off on Go trials as well as Stop trials in view of the fact that the trade-off is 
a dynamic state measure, such that participants focus relatively more on speed 
or selectivity across trials. Although such focus only manifests on stop trials, the 
participant  cannot  dissociate  stop  from  go  trials  until  the  stop-signal  is 
presented. Thus, it can be reasonably expected that changes in trade-off are 
also  reflected  in  proactive  control  during  Go  trials.  I  added  the  following 
nuisance regressors: 2 regressors for error trials with or without a response, 
respectively, 6 movement regressors produced by the realignment procedure, 
14 physiological regressors for cardiac and respiratory variables (Hutton et al., 
2011), and 7 block regressors covering run 1 to 7, respectively. The 8
th block 
was subsumed in the constant of the design matrix. The GLM thus contained a 
total of 57 regressors over 1664 volumes per participant, and each GLM was 
estimated  separately  for  each  participant  for  the  4  and  10  mm  smoothed Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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images.  All  EVs  (but  not  physiological  regressors)  were  convolved  with  a 
canonical haemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1995). 
My primary interest was a comparison of Go trials between Unprepared and 
Prepared conditions. Such a contrast elucidates the implementation of proactive 
control without contamination by the execution of stops as both conditions are 
equal in  terms of motor execution.  Furthermore these  trials  are matched for 
(violations  of) expectations  related  to  stop signal probability  (Zandbelt  et  al., 
2012). To obtain group statistics each participant’s contrast image was entered 
into  a  second  level  random-effects  analysis  using  one-sample  t-tests  across 
participants.  I  used  10  mm  smoothed  images  for  whole-brain  analyses,  and 
corrected for multiple comparisons with cluster-level correction at p < .05 (initial 
threshold  at  p  <  .001  uncorrected).  I  further  used  a  region-of-interest  (ROI) 
approach  to  examine  four  areas  for  which  I  had  strong  a  priori  hypotheses 
regarding their involvement in proactive selective control (Aron, 2011; Jahfari et 
al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2012): the right STN (unthresholded probabilistic ROI 
as created by Forstmann et al., 2012) and the right caudate, right putamen and 
right  pallidum  from  the  Automated  Anatomical  Labeling  (AAL)  atlas.  I  chose 
right-lateralised ROIs based on previous work (Jahfari et al., 2012). 
For analysis of the parametric modulators I used a similar approach. First I used 
a whole-brain analysis at cluster-level corrected p < .05 (initial threshold at p < 
.001  uncorrected).  Second,  I  extracted  parameter  estimates  from  functional 
ROIs  resulting  from  the  Prepared  >  Unprepared  Go  contrast  at  4  mm 
smoothing,  thresholded  at  p  <  .01  uncorrected,  and  masked  by  anatomical 
ROIs. In addition to the anatomical ROIs described above, I also examined the 
right IFG (as defined by inferior operculum in the AAL atlas) and left SMA/pre-Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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SMA  from  the  AAL  atlas  (Tzourio-Mazoyer  et  al.,  2002).  These  two  regions 
were  included  based  on  their  activation  in  Prepared  versus  Unprepared  Go 
trials (Figure 9.5). In all cases where parameter estimates were extracted from 
ROIs I used MarsBar  (Brett et al., 2002) on the 4 mm smoothed images to 
minimise inclusion of signal not originating from the ROI itself. 
9.4  Results 
9.4.1  Accuracy and SSD staircase procedure 
Go trials were matched between the Unprepared and Prepared condition for 
overall  accuracy  (mean  (SD)  proportion  correct  Go  trials:  Unprepared  =  .87 
(.01), Prepared = .86 (.01), noStop = .87 (.01); Unprepared versus Prepared, p 
= .39). The SSD staircase procedure ensured p(stop) remained close to 0.50 for 
both  Information  conditions.  I  observed  a  small,  but  significant,  increase  in 
p(stop) for the Prepared compared to Unprepared condition (mean (SD) p(stop): 
Unprepared  =  .52  (.01),  Prepared  =  .53  (.01),  p  =  .01).  This  suggests 
participants gradually slowed down responses in Go trials over the course of the 
experiment  (Logan, 1994), marginally more so during Prepared compared to 
Unprepared trials. Note that this difference does not impact on the applicability 
of the race model (see below).  Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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Figure 9.2: Reaction time data satisfies race model assumptions. (A) Reaction 
times  were  faster  in  stopFail  trials  compared  to  Go  trials  for  both  the 
Unprepared and Prepared condition. I further observed that noStop trials were 
faster  than  Go  trials  in  both  Information  conditions,  indicative  of  strategic 
slowing.  (B)  StopFail  RT  increased  linearly  with  SSD,  as  predicted  by  the 
independent  race  model.  (C)  The  z-scored  relative  finishing  time  (ZRFT) 
indicates  the  finishing  time  of  a  Stop  and  Go  process,  with  higher  values 
indicating a late finishing time for the stop process relative to the go process. 
Each participant is represented by a thin grey line. A cumulative Gaussian was 
fit for each participant, and the bold black lines were generated by averaging 
parameter  fits  over  participants.  Both  Unprepared  (left)  and  Prepared  (right) 
conditions show that as ZRFT increases, the probability of stopFail increases. 
When the ZRFT is 0 the probability of stopSuccess and stopFail was close to 
0.5, as predicted by the independent race model. Error bars represent SEM. Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
Chapter 9 
 
201 
 
Previous work has emphasised that participants show a general slowing (rather 
than  slowing  over  time)  when  faced  with  a  potential  stop  versus  noStop 
(Chikazoe  et  al.,  2009;  Verbruggen  and  Logan,  2009a;  Jahfari  et  al.,  2010; 
Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2012). In keeping with this I observed a 
significantly higher RT compared to noStop for both the Unprepared (p = 8.9 x 
10
-6) and Prepared (p = 5.4 x 10
-6) Go conditions consistent with such strategic 
slowing, but at the same time I found no evidence for a difference between 
Information conditions (GoUnprepared versus GoPrepared, p = .24). Participants also 
committed more asynchronous (two fingers > 70ms apart) Go responses in the 
Prepared  compared  to  Unprepared  condition  (mean  (SD)  proportion 
asynchronous Go: Unprepared = .03 (.005), Prepared = .05 (.006), noStop = 
.02 (.005); Unprepared versus Prepared, p = .02). An increase in asynchronous 
errors suggests a higher degree of lateral asymmetry in action preparation. To 
avoid contamination in other analyses, asynchronous responses were treated 
as  errors  and  discarded  from  further  analysis.  For  the  remaining  trials  I 
computed  the  frequency  of  left  responses  leading  right  responses,  and  vice 
versa, for Prepared-left, Prepared-right, and Unprepared trials. I observed no 
difference in frequency of these events between Prepared-left and Unprepared 
(chi-squared test with Yates’ correction, χ
2 (1) = 0.06, p = .81) or Prepared-right 
and Unprepared (χ
2 (1) = .03, p = .86). This suggests excluding asynchronous 
trials successfully removed the asymmetry in action execution. 
9.4.2  Selective inhibition satisfies independent race model assumptions 
A  dominant  model  in  the  inhibition  literature  is  the  independent  race  model 
(Logan  et  al.,  1984).  It  is  unclear,  however,  whether  selective  inhibition  is 
accurately described by this class of model. It has been suggested that more Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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complex  models  such  as  an  interactive  race  model  are  required  when 
assumptions of the independent race model are not met (Boucher et al., 2007; 
Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b; Schall and Godlove, 2012). I show that in this 
task, selective inhibition conforms to all assumptions of the independent race 
model, both for the Prepared as well as the Unprepared conditions (Figure 9.2).  
Three basic conditions must be met for the independent race model to be valid. 
First,  trials  in  which  a  stop  signal  occurs  but  the  participant  fails  to  stop 
(‘stopFail’) should represent the fast half of the RT distribution. Thus, stopFail 
RTs must be faster than Go RTs within the same condition. I observed that this 
was the case for both the Unprepared (p = 8.5 x 10
-6) and Prepared (p = 9.3 x 
10
-6) condition (Figure 9.2A). Furthermore this difference between stopFail and 
Go was not significantly different between Unprepared and Prepared conditions 
(repeated-measures ANOVA interaction: F(1, 17) = 1.1, p = .31). The second 
condition for the independent race model is that stopFail RTs should increase 
as the SSD increases due to the stop process finishing later. I observed such a 
linear increase in stopFail RT with SSD for both the Unprepared (Figure 9.2B; 
linear regression for each participant, mean (SD) over population: intercept = 
368 (74) ms, slope = 0.30 (0.25); 1-sample t-test on slope, t(17) = 5.0, p = 5.5 x 
10
-5) and Prepared (intercept = 347 (86) ms, slope = 0.38 (0.32), t(17) = 5.2, p = 
3.6 x 10
-5) condition. There was no difference between the Unprepared and 
Prepared condition in the intercept (p = .27) or slope (p = .21). Thus, stopFail 
RT significantly increased linearly with SSD, with no evidence for any difference 
between the Unprepared and Prepared condition. The third condition is that the 
p(stopFail) should predictably change with the z-scored relative finishing times 
(ZRFT) of the Stop and Go process (see Methods for calculation). A negative Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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ZRFT indicates that the stop process finished earlier than the Go process and 
the participant should thus have a low p(stopFail); a positive ZRFT indicates the 
Go process finished before the Stop process and the participant should be likely 
to erroneously respond, i.e. have a high p(stopFail). When the ZRFT is zero, the 
model  predicts  that  both  processes  finished  simultaneously  and  p(stopFail) 
should be 0.5.  
I plot p(stopFail) as a function of z-scored relative finishing time (ZRFT) and fit a 
cumulative Gaussian to each participant’s data individually. The bold curves in 
Figure 9.2C represent the average of each participant’s fits. The mean of either 
bold curve was not significantly different from zero (Unprepared: 1-sample t-
test, t(17) = 1.2, p = .25; Prepared: t(17) < 1), nor were the means significantly 
different between conditions (p = .14). The SD of the curve was larger in the 
Prepared than Unprepared condition (p = .02), indicating a significant decrease 
in the accuracy with which the ZRFT of the Stop and Go process predicts the 
outcome  of  the  race  in  the  Prepared  compared  to  Unprepared  condition. 
Nonetheless,  the  analyses  presented  here  confirm  that  selective  inhibition 
conforms  to  all  assumptions  of  the  independent  race  model  regardless  of 
proactive control. I can then use the  race model to calculate parameters for 
further behavioural and fMRI analyses.  
9.4.3  Modulation of speed and selectivity of inhibition by preparation 
The previous analyses show that the Prepared and Unprepared condition are 
matched across a range of characteristics including accuracy, reaction times 
and strategic slowing, and that behaviour in this task can be modelled using the 
independent race model. From this model I derived the SSRT, and found that 
SSRT improved with prior knowledge of the hand that needs to be stopped, i.e. Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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when selective inhibition could be prepared (Figure 9.3A; Unprepared versus 
Prepared  SSRT:  p  =  .02).  Preparation  also  improved  interference,  i.e.  the 
selectivity of inhibition (Figure 9.3B; Unprepared versus prepared interference: 
p  =  .02).  Thus,  at  the  group  level,  both  speed  and  selectivity  of  inhibition 
improved with preparation.  
 
Figure 9.3: Information improves the speed and selectivity of inhibition. (A) Stop 
signal reaction time (SSRT), representing the speed of inhibition, is faster in the 
Prepared compared to Unprepared condition. (B) The interference between the 
inhibition  process  and  the  remaining  action  is  reduced  in  the  Prepared 
compared to Unprepared condition. P-values are from permutation tests, and 
error bars represent SEM.  
This result contrasts with a previous report showing that preparation reduces 
interference  but  paradoxically  lengthens  the  SSRT  (Aron  and  Verbruggen, 
2008). As in the current study, the task used in the latter required participants 
respond to a stop signal by stopping one finger while at the same time pressing 
down with their other finger as fast as possible. Consequently, I asked whether Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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these  two  task  requirements  draw  on  some  shared  resource  and  trade  off 
against each other. Specifically, when participants are provided with information 
they  may  prepare  for  a  fast  stop  (i.e.  improved  SSRT),  a  fast  remaining 
response (i.e. improved interference), or both. I show that at the group level 
preparation  favours  both  speed  and  selectivity  (Figure  9.3).  However,  when 
looking  at  inter-individual  differences,  I  found  preparation  trades  off  speed 
against selectivity: the benefit of information to SSRT is negatively correlated 
with the benefit of information to interference (Figure 9.4A; r = -.70, p = .001). 
For  example,  some  participants  show  SSRT  improvements  in  the  Prepared 
compared to Unprepared condition, but show no improvement in interference 
(Figure 9.4A, lower right). Other participants reduced their interference in the 
Prepared compared to Unprepared condition, but did not improve their stopping 
speed  (Figure  9.4A,  upper  left).  To  quantify  this  trade-off  I  calculated  a 
summary  measure  (SSRTUnprepared  -  SSRTPrepared)  -  (InterferenceUnprepared  - 
InterferencePrepared) for each participant. This trade-off is high when preparation 
is  used  to  improve  speed,  and  low  when  preparation  is  used  to  improve 
selectivity (i.e. to reduce interference).  
A key observation in the study was that this trade-off measure based on the 
entire  dataset  (i.e.  ~80  minutes  of  time  on  task)  is  not  necessarily  fully 
representative of a participant’s trade-off at any time point in the experiment, as 
shown  by  the  lack  of  correlation  between  a  participant’s  trade-off  calculated 
separately for the first compared to the second half of the experiment (Figure 
9.4B; r = -10, p = .68). However, when I examined how participants changed 
their  behaviour  from  the  first  to  the  second  half  of  the  experiment,  I  again 
observed  a  speed-selectivity  trade-off:  those  participants  that  improved  on Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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SSRT from the first to second half deteriorated on interference, and vice versa 
(Figure 9.4C; r = -.75, p = .0003). These results suggest the speed-selectivity 
trade-off  is  dynamic,  and  that  an  estimate  of  the  trade-off  based  on  a 
participant’s entire dataset might not accurately describe the trade-off at any 
given point in the experiment. I therefore calculated a trade-off for each trial 
using a running average over RT data (see Methods for details; Figure 9.4D). 
This  dynamic  measure  of  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off  was  then  used  to 
interrogate  the  entire  neuronal  data  on  how  proactive  selective  control  is 
instantiated in the brain, providing the key test to identify regions that promote 
slow and selective versus fast and global inhibition.  
 
Figure 9.4: Preparation for selective inhibition trades off improvements in speed 
against selectivity. (A) Each black dot represents a participant. I observed a 
negative correlation between the effect of Information on SSRT and the effect of Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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Information  on Interference:  the  more  participants  used  the  Prepared  cue  to 
stop fast, the less they used the Prepared cue to reduce interference, and vice 
versa.  (B)  I  calculated  a  relative  measure  of  speed-selectivity  trade-off  as 
(SSRTUnprepared  -  SSRTPrepared)  -  (InterferenceUnprepared  -  InterferencePrepared). 
However, there was no correlation between a participant’s trade-off in the 1
st 
compared to 2
nd session. This suggests that a single trade-off measure does 
not adequately describe a participant’s trade-off during the entire experiment. 
(C) Despite this instability over time, the way in which a participant’s behaviour 
changed  over  time  was  again  governed  by  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off: 
participants that, from their 1
st to 2
nd session, increased use of the Prepared cue 
to  stop  fast  decreased  use  of  the  Prepared  cue  to  stop  selectively.  (D)  To 
examine BOLD responses that might reflect this trade-off I calculated a trade-off 
measure for each trial based on RT data from a window around that trial. Each 
column  represents  a  participant,  each  row  represents  a  trial.  A  measure  of 
trade-off over the entire experiment (top) ignores variance that is evident in trial-
by-trial estimates of the trade-off (bottom). 
9.4.4  BOLD responses in Unprepared versus Prepared Go trials 
I first compared BOLD responses between Unprepared and Prepared correct 
Go trials. Note any effects in this contrast can be attributed to anticipation and 
preparation for selective inhibition without being confounded by differences in 
the  actual  stopping  process  such  as  SSRT  and  interference.  Moreover, 
behaviour  was  matched  between  these  Go  conditions  in  terms  of  motor 
demands, accuracy and RTs (see e.g. Figure 9.2).  
I observed a number of regions that responded more strongly to a Prepared 
compared to Unprepared cue (Figure 9.5), including the right IFG, left SMA/pre-
SMA,  bilateral  dorsal  premotor  cortex  (PMd),  and  bilateral  parietal  cortex 
(Figure 9.5A; p < .05 cluster-level corrected). To complement this voxel-based 
analysis, and given the strong a priori hypothesis for involvement of the right 
basal  ganglia  in  response  inhibition  (Zandbelt  and  Vink,  2010;  Aron,  2011; Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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Jahfari  et  al.,  2012),  I  also  performed  a  hypothesis-driven  anatomical  ROI 
analysis  (Figure  9.5B;  alpha  =  .013,  Bonferroni-corrected  for  4  ROIs).  This 
showed  that  right  putamen  had  a  greater  BOLD  response  to  the  Prepared 
compared  to  the  Unprepared  cue  (p  =  .005),  with  only  weak  evidence  for 
involvement of the right pallidum (p = .02), and no significant effects observed 
for right STN (p = .08) or right caudate nucleus (p = .17) (Figure 9.5B). Together 
this suggests that proactive selective inhibition engages a set of regions also 
involved  in  global  and  reactive  inhibition  (Aron,  2011),  with  the  notable 
exception of STN and caudate nucleus (cf. Majid et al., 2013) where I observed 
a null effect. I observed no clusters in the brain that responded more strongly 
during Unprepared compared to Prepared Go trials. 
 
Figure 9.5: Prepared > Unprepared Go trials. (A) I observed stronger BOLD 
response  to  Prepared  compared  to  Unprepared  Go  trials  in  bilateral  dorsal 
premotor  cortex  (PMd),  left  SMA/pre-SMA,  right  IFG,  and  bilateral  parietal 
structures. All maps were thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected (shown here for 
illustration  purposes)  and  statistical  significance  was  assessed  at  p  <  .05 Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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cluster-level corrected threshold. Results were projected on coronal slices of the 
MNI 152T1 template (left = left) using xjView (www.alivelearn.net/xjview). (B) I 
extracted  beta  coefficients  for  the  Prepared  and  Unprepared  Go  regressors 
from  four  anatomical  ROIs  and  performed  pair-wise  permutation  tests.  The 
putamen and pallidum showed significantly stronger responses during Prepared 
compared to Unprepared Go trials, whereas the STN and caudate showed no 
such  effect.  The  coefficients  are  mean-centred  for  each  participant  for 
visualization  purposes.  The  axial  slice  was  taken  from  the  ‘ch2’  template  in 
MRIcron (Rorden and Brett, 2000). Error bars represent SEM. 
9.4.5  Speed-selectivity trade-off in frontostriatal regions 
To  understand  how  the  brain  uses  information  to  promote  the  speed  or 
selectivity of stopping I used a metric of the dynamic trade-off (Figure 9.4D) as 
parametric modulator on each of the EVs of interest. Note that the trade-off is a 
relative measure, such that a low trade-off could be due to slower and more 
selective  inhibition  across  Prepared  trials,  or  conversely  speeded  and  more 
non-selective inhibition across Unprepared trials. Thus, any brain region that 
promotes fast but non-selective inhibition would show a negative coefficient for 
Unprepared, or positive coefficient for Prepared stop trials. Vice versa, regions 
that promote selective but slow inhibition would show a positive coefficient for 
Unprepared, or negative coefficient for Prepared stop trials. Crucially, for either 
type  of  region,  the  coefficients  should  be  different  between  Information 
conditions.  Thus,  a  two-tailed  contrast  of  parametric  modulators  Trade-
offUnprepared-stop  versus  Trade-offPrepared-stop  identifies  the  regions  that  putatively 
modulate the speed versus selectivity of inhibition. Post-hoc t-tests can then 
confirm  that  the  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  zero.  I  did  not 
observe  any  such  effect for the  parametric  modulator on  Go  trials (data  not 
shown), and I therefore only report findings on Unprepared versus Prepared Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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Stop trials. I combined stopSuccess and stopFail trials in order to sample the 
entire distribution of responses; they comprise the fast and slow part of the Go 
distribution,  respectively,  such  that  the  subset  of  trials  that  falls  in  either 
category is a function of SSRT, and thus of trade-off. By selecting all stop trials I 
prevent a confounding effect of general RT. Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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Figure 9.6: Expression of the speed-selectivity trade-off during stop trials. (A) 
The  trade-off  reflects  a  dynamic  focus  on  speeded  or  selective  inhibition  in 
Prepared  relative  to  Unprepared  stop  trials.  I  asked  whether  any  regions 
modulated  their  activity  to  reflect  this  trade-off.  Based  on  how  I  defined  the 
trade-off (see Methods) one would predict that regions underlying speeded (but 
non-selective)  inhibition  have  a  negative  coefficient  in  the  Unprepared,  or  a 
positive  coefficient  in  the  Prepared  condition.  In  a  whole-brain  analysis  I Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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observed  a  cluster  in  the  Trade-offPrepared-stop  >  Trade-offUnprepared-stop  contrast 
corresponding to right dlPFC (left). Extraction of the coefficients showed that 
this cluster specifically promoted speeded (but non-selective) inhibition during 
Prepared, but not Unprepared, inhibition (right). Results visualised in MRIcron 
at p < .001 uncorrected. (B) The putamen, SMA/pre-SMA and STN showed the 
same effect as the cluster in Figure 9.6A, linking them to speeded inhibition. Of 
these, the SMA/pre-SMA and putamen mediated fast inhibition only in Prepared 
trials, whereas the STN mediated fast inhibition only in Unprepared trials. Error 
bars indicate SEM. 
I observed only one cluster that survived multiple comparison correction in the 
Trade-offPrepared-stop  >  Trade-offUnprepared-stop  with  a  peak  activation  at  MNI 
coordinates [34, 30, 24] (Figure 9.6A; p < .05 cluster-level corrected), a cluster 
that  incorporates  the  middle  frontal  gyrus,  i.e.  dlPFC.  I  extracted  parameter 
estimates from the significant cluster (defined at p < .001 uncorrected) to test 
whether  the  cluster’s  activity  reflects  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off  during 
Unprepared or Prepared inhibition, or both (Figure 9.6A, right). Whereas the 
trade-off  did  not  modulate  activity  during  Unprepared  trials  (1-sample  t-test, 
t(17) < 1), the cluster was significantly positive in the Prepared condition (t(17) = 
3.63, p = .002) suggesting increased activity in this region leads to speeded but 
non-selective inhibition during Prepared trials.  
To further explore this effect I reasoned that the trade-off could be expressed 
within  voxels  sensitive  to  information  in  brain  regions  implicated  in  the 
implementation  of  stopping  (i.e.  rIFG,  SMA/pre-SMA,  caudate,  putamen, 
pallidum,  STN;  Jahfari  et  al.,  2011;  Zandbelt  et  al.,  2012).  To  test  this 
hypothesis I built functional ROIs by thresholding the Prepared > Unprepared 
Go contrast at p < 0.01 and constraining these to an anatomical mask of each 
region (see Methods for details on ROI construction). As shown in Figure 9.6 I Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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found evidence for an effect of Information on the trade-off in the putamen (p = 
.006)  when  using  Bonferroni  correction  for  6  tests  (alpha  =  .008).  A  similar 
pattern, but only significant at uncorrected threshold of p < .05, was found in the 
right  STN  (p  =  .03)  and  left  SMA/pre-SMA  (p  =  .04).  All  three  showed  the 
signature  of  regions  that  promote  speeded  but  non-selective  inhibition.  To 
understand in what condition each region contributed most strongly I tested the 
individual coefficients against zero (all 1-sample t-tests with 17 DOF) to reveal 
the putamen (Unprepared, t = 1.2, p = .25; Prepared, t = 2.1, p = .05) and 
SMA/pre-SMA (Unprepared, t < 1; Prepared, t = 2.0, p = .06) mediated speeded 
but non-selective inhibition which was most pronounced when information was 
available. In contrast, the STN promoted speeded but non-selective inhibition 
only in the Unprepared condition (Unprepared, t = 2.2, p = .05; Prepared, t < 1). 
I  did  not  identify  any  regions  that  promoted  selective  but  slow  inhibition. 
Together,  this provides  tentative  evidence  that  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off 
was  driven  by  changes  towards  a  focus  on  speed  implemented  by  different 
neural structures depending on the availability of prior information: the dlPFC, 
the putamen, and the SMA/pre-SMA when information was available (proactive 
inhibition) and the STN when no information was provided (reactive inhibition). 
9.5  Discussion 
These data show that participants trade off speed and selectivity in stopping 
when performing proactive selective inhibition, an effect implemented through 
engagement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and striatum. These two regions, 
contrary  to  predictions,  promote  speeded  rather  than  selective  inhibition. 
Provision of information to prepare selective inhibition recruits a set of brain Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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regions implicated in the implementation of inhibition, including the SMA/pre-
SMA, IFG and putamen.  
A recent model of response inhibition describes action inhibition along two axes: 
global-selective (i.e. whether all or only a subset of actions are stopped) and 
reactive-proactive (i.e. the extent of preparation for inhibition; Aron, 2011). My 
task  examined  selective  inhibition  in  a  proactive  versus  reactive  context  by 
providing or withholding from participants specific information about the target of 
inhibition,  respectively.  This  extends  findings  on  global  inhibition  along  a 
reactive-proactive scale (Verbruggen and Logan, 2009a; Jahfari et al., 2012; 
Zandbelt et al., 2012) and selective inhibition in the reactive domain (Coxon et 
al., 2007, 2009; Ko and Miller, 2013). In comparisons to these different types of 
inhibition one unresolved question is whether selective inhibition is sufficiently 
similar  to  global  inhibition,  such  that  it  too  can  be  analysed  using  the 
independent  race  model  or  might  require  a  more  elaborate  interactive  race 
model  (Boucher  et  al.,  2007;  Verbruggen  and  Logan,  2009b;  Schall  and 
Godlove,  2012).  Here  I  confirm  that  both  proactive  and  reactive  selective 
inhibition  satisfy  all  assumptions  of  the  independent  race  model.  Given  the 
current  debate,  however,  it  would  be  best  to  consider  the  validity  of  the 
independent race model on a study-by-study basis. 
Applying the race model to these data, I observed proactive control improved 
speed (i.e. SSRT) and selectivity (i.e. interference) of inhibition compared to 
reactive  control.  This  partly  contrasts  with  results  from  a  recent  series  of 
behavioural and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies that show preparation 
reduces interference, as found here, but either leads to a deterioration (Aron 
and Verbruggen, 2008) or does not affect (Claffey et al., 2010; Majid et al., Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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2012)  the  SSRT.  These  seemingly  contradictory  results  can  potentially  be 
explained  by  my  finding  that  each  participant  is  trading  off  SSRT  with 
interference (i.e. speed and selectivity). To illustrate this point, this participant 
cohort contains subgroups that improve in selectivity but deteriorate in SSRT 
(as in Aron and Verbruggen, 2008; Figure 9.4A, left top quadrant); improve on 
both characteristics (Figure 9.4A, right top quadrant); and improve SSRT but 
deteriorate in selectivity (Figure 9.4A, right lower quadrant). Such a trade-off 
suggests  that  global  inhibition  is  fast  whereas  selective  inhibition  is  slow. 
Furthermore  I  show  that  the  trade-off  can  change  over  time.  It  is  an  open 
question  what  exactly  drives  these  changes  in  trade-off.  Previous  work  has 
shown that participants can flexibly adjust their Go versus Stopping speed to 
optimise  rewards  (Leotti  and  Wager,  2010),  and  one  might  expect  that 
participants can similarly adjust their trade-off when incentivised to do so. In 
addition to such top-down control, experimental factors are likely to influence 
the speed-selectivity trade-off, such as the probability of a stop-signal occurring, 
the dynamics of the SSD staircasing procedure, or the nature of the instructions 
and feedback provided to the participants. The results presented here show that 
this trade-off exists, and new experiments could usefully explore the factors that 
affect it. 
The imaging analysis tested a number of predictions from the action inhibition 
framework suggested by Aron (2011). Briefly, the model suggests that reactive 
selective  inhibition  engages  the  IFG  whereas  proactive  selective  inhibition 
engages the dlPFC in association with the indirect pathway of the basal ganglia 
(but excluding the STN). However, I observed that the IFG, but not dlPFC, is 
more  active  during  proactive  selective  control.  Additionally,  this  form  of Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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anticipation engaged other regions previously implicated in reactive response 
inhibition  itself,  including  SMA/pre-SMA  and  striatum.  This  is  reminiscent  of 
findings  that  stop-signal  probability  (a  manipulator  of  proactive  control) 
positively correlates with activity in this inhibition network (Jahfari et al., 2012). 
A notable difference with my study is that I find activity despite keeping the stop-
signal  probability  equal  between  Unprepared  and  Prepared  conditions,  thus 
preventing  a  confound  where  the  rIFG  responds  to  the  violation  of  an 
expectation  rather  than  the  preparation  for  inhibition  itself  (Zandbelt  et  al., 
2012). As such, the increase in activity is likely to reflect additional processing 
required  for  proactive  selective  inhibition,  which  might  involve  for  example 
attentional processes or the maintenance of inhibitory set, processes that can 
only be uncovered by targeted experimental designs that are not suitable to test 
my  current  hypothesis  (e.g.  Li  et  al.,  2006;  Zandbelt  and  Vink,  2010).  A 
shortcoming  of  the  fast  event-related  design  was  that  the  results  remain 
inconclusive regarding the exact component processes that each of these areas 
subserves (see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Neubert et al., 2013), or how changes 
in  activity  in  these areas  relate to  changes  in  performance.  I  also  could  not 
dissociate  neural activity  from the anticipation epoch from  activity  during  the 
response epoch, such that the reported changes in neural activity might span 
either  or  both  of  these  time  windows.  Despite  these  limitations  my  analysis 
shows that neural processing associated with prior information occurs within the 
known pathways of inhibition, which include IFG, SMA/pre-SMA and striatum, 
rather than in the dlPFC as suggested previously (Aron, 2011). Further research 
is required to ascertain the specific timing and cognitive processes implemented 
within the dlPFC during proactive inhibition. Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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The involvement of this ‘classic’ stopping network in proactive selective control 
contrasts with the absence of evidence for engagement of STN during proactive 
control, in line with a priori predictions (Aron, 2011). The STN has been widely 
implicated in the execution of global inhibition (e.g. Aron and Poldrack, 2006; 
Frank et al., 2007a; Eagle et al., 2008) and more recently, in the preparation for 
global  inhibition  (Jahfari  et  al.,  2012).  My  results  suggest  that,  at  least  with 
regards to preparation, the STN is not involved in selective inhibition. As noted 
earlier, selective inhibition might circumvent this pathway, and its associated 
global  inhibitory  effect,  by  inhibiting  a  specific  motor  command  exclusively 
through the indirect pathway of the striatum (Baker et al., 2010b; Aron, 2011; 
Majid  et  al.,  2013).  I  observed  that  the  putamen  is  engaged  in  proactive 
selective  control,  whereas  I  observed  a  null  effect  for  the  STN  in  the  same 
contrast  (but  note  this  null  effect  does  not  prove  a  lack  of  involvement). 
Regarding the striatum, I present evidence for involvement of the putamen, but 
not  caudate  nucleus,  whereas  I  note  other  recent  work  has  implicated  both 
structures  in  proactive  selective  control  (Majid  et  al.,  2013).  Given  that  the 
putamen, more so than the caudate, is a fundamental component of a  basal 
ganglia motor loop (Alexander et al., 1986), I suggest that the putamen plays a 
pivotal role in implementing selective response inhibition. A closer inspection of 
the electrophysiology of the striatum might provide insights into the differential 
roles of putamen and caudate nucleus (as in Schmidt et al., 2013). 
Activation within right dlPFC and right putamen most strongly reflected a speed-
selectivity  trade-off  during  stop  trials:  activations  in  these  regions  positively 
correlated  with  a  focus  on  speeded  rather  than  selective  inhibition  when 
information about which response to inhibit was available. This finding suggests Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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that  the  dlPFC,  together  with  the  striatum,  process  available  information  to 
prioritise  and  prepare  the  speed  of  inhibition  for  an  action.  This  role  of  the 
dlPFC in setting and prioritizing among future action goals resonates with recent 
findings  suggesting  that  speed-accuracy  trade-off  (SAT)  often  observed  in 
perception and action (Schouten and Bekker, 1967) is resolved within fronto-
basal ganglia pathways (Forstmann et al., 2008; van Veen et al., 2008; Bogacz 
et  al.,  2010).  Specifically,  activity  in  the  dlPFC  and  basal  ganglia  positively 
correlates  with  a  focus  on  speeded  rather  than  accurate  responses.  Note, 
however, these two types of trade-off are not identical: I find that Information 
affects the speed and selectivity of inhibition, but not the RT or accuracy of 
responses. However, similar to the SAT (van Veen et al., 2008) it might be a 
change in baseline firing rate that governs whether participants emphasise one 
or the other. These findings implicate dlPFC and striatum in selective inhibition 
as suggested by the Aron model, but it also suggests a refinement in which the 
putamen and dlPFC are more, rather than less, active when focusing on speed 
over selectivity. On the other hand, the data suggest that the STN is engaged 
when  fast  inhibition  is  prioritised  over  selectivity  when  no  information  is 
provided. In these circumstances selective stopping could not be prepared and 
had to be executed on line. These findings are compatible with the notion that 
the STN is engaged in fast but non-selective inhibition (Coxon et al., 2009).  
The finding that frontostriatal circuits mediate proactive control raises a number 
of questions. Firstly, activity in frontostriatal circuits associated with proactive 
control  might  reflect  either  targeted  inhibition  or  enhancement  of  specific 
actions. For example, low interference in this task could be caused by inhibition 
of the action that needs to be stopped, or enhancement of the actions that still Preparing for selective inhibition within frontostriatal loops 
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need to be executed. These functions might be subserved by indirect and direct 
pathways respectively, but disentangling these different neuronal populations in 
human fMRI is a major challenge due to their likely anatomical overlap (Gerfen 
and  Surmeier,  2011).  In  fact  recent  evidence  indicates  that  the  direct  and 
indirect  pathway  are  simultaneously  active  during  action  initiation  thus 
suggesting their concurrent activation is required for an execution of a complex 
motor plan (Cui et al., 2013). Secondly, fMRI is not well suited to understanding 
the temporal dynamics of proactive control—a more suitable approach might be 
neurostimulation (Mars et al., 2009; Neubert et al., 2010) or electrophysiological 
recording (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008, 2011). 
A  recent  surge  of  interest  in  response  inhibition  that  goes  beyond  all-out, 
reactive stopping motivated us to examine the role of preparation in selective 
inhibition. My data reveal that the opportunity to prepare for inhibition poses a 
trade-off  between  either  faster  or  more  selective  inhibition.  This  trade-off  is 
expressed in frontostriatal structures commonly associated with the preparation 
for, and execution of, response inhibition and allows adjustments of behaviour 
mandated by current context. 
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10.1 Abstract 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  described  the  neural  mechanisms  of  preparatory 
inhibitory  control,  revealing  a  considerable  overlap  between  prefrontal  and 
striatal  regions  mediating  outright  response  inhibition  and  preparation  for 
response inhibition, including right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), premotor areas 
and striatum. In this chapter I take a different approach and ask how reactive 
and  proactive  control  change  across  demographics,  including  age,  gender, 
education and also measures of depression. Specifically, if the neural structures 
underlying  proactive  and  reactive  control  overlap,  and  these  structures 
deteriorate  with  age,  then  this  begs  the  question  do  reactive  and  proactive 
control decline similarly with age? To answer this I used an almost identical 
response  inhibition  task  as  before,  but  delivered  using  a  smartphone-based 
platform that allowed me to test a very large community sample (n = 12,496). As 
in chapter 9 I examine proactive control as the change in stop-signal reaction 
time (SSRT) when participants are provided with advance information about the 
upcoming  trial  compared  to  when  they  are  not,  whereas  reactive  control  is 
defined  as  the  SSRT  when  no  such  advance  information  is  provided.  As 
predicted, reactive control declines with natural aging, and the rate of decline 
was greater in men than women (~10 ms versus ~8 ms per decade of adult life). 
Surprisingly, the benefit of preparation, i.e. proactive control, did not change 
over the lifespan and interestingly women showed greater proactive control at 
all ages compared to men. Together these results suggest that reactive and 
proactive inhibitory control at least partially rely on separate neural substrates 
that are differentially sensitive to age-related change. 
10.2 Introduction Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
Chapter 10 
 
222 
 
Humans frequently need to exert rapid reactive control over their actions, such 
as  stopping  their  car  when  an  animal  unexpectedly  jumps  on  to  the  road. 
However,  humans  can  also  use  informative  cues  and  contexts to  implement 
proactive control (Gollwitzer, 1999; Aron, 2011; Braver, 2012), as when keeping 
one’s foot close to the brake after passing a warning sign for a potential deer on 
the  road.  In  chapter  2  I  argued  that  proactive  control  provides  a  more 
ecologically interesting framework for understanding both everyday behaviour 
and  impulse  control  disorders  (Aron,  2011;  Schall  and  Godlove,  2012). 
However,  the  dominant  paradigm  in  the  inhibition  literature—the  stop-signal 
task—only  measures  reactive  control  (Logan  et  al.,  1984;  Verbruggen  and 
Logan, 2008). This task has provided a detailed understanding of how fronto-
basal  ganglia  loops  subserve  reactive  control  (Aron  and  Poldrack,  2006; 
Schmidt  et  al.,  2013)  and  how  age-related  decline  in  these  pathways  is 
associated with impaired reactive control (Coxon et al., 2012).  
The neural basis of proactive control seems to show extensive overlap with that 
of reactive control as I noted in chapter  9 (and as observed by others, e.g. 
Jahfari et al., 2011; Majid et al., 2013), with perhaps a more prominent role for 
the striatum and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in proactive control  (chapter 9 
and Zandbelt et al., 2012). In this chapter I focus on age-related decline and ask 
whether  the  similarity  in  the  neural  substrates  that  underlie  reactive  and 
proactive control means that both types of inhibition will decline at a similar rate 
over the lifespan. Age-related volume reductions are particularly pronounced in 
frontal regions and occur at a more rapid rate in men than women (Gur et al., 
1991; Cowell et al., 1994; Murphy et al., 1996; Coffey et al., 1998). Men are 
also more likely to develop neurodegenerative disease early in life (Miech et al., Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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2002;  Raber  et  al.,  2004).  I  therefore  hypothesised  that  age-related  decline 
would be more pronounced in men than women for both reactive and proactive 
inhibitory control. 
To  acquire  a  large  and  comprehensive  sample  I  collected  data  through The 
Great Brain Experiment, a smartphone app with experiments presented under 
the cover of games (Brown et al., 2014). The app also recorded educational 
attainment and, for a subset of players, a measure of depressive symptoms. 
Although depression is not thought to be related to reactive inhibitory control 
(Lau  et  al.,  2007;  Lipszyc  and  Schachar,  2010;  Sjoerds  et  al.,  2014),  these 
studies have relatively small numbers of participants and additionally did not 
test  for  a  possible  relationship  between  proactive  control  and  depressive 
symptoms.  Lastly,  this chapter examines  the  reliability  of  response  inhibition 
measures acquired through smartphones and establishes whether assumptions 
of the race model underlying the calculation of stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) 
hold for these data, as performed in chapter 9 (Logan et al., 1984; Verbruggen 
and Logan, 2009b; Congdon et al., 2012). 
10.3 Methods 
10.3.1 Participants 
All  participants  were  recruited  through  The  Great  Brain  Experiment 
(www.thegreatbrainexperiment.com,  Brown  et  al.,  2014),  a  smartphone 
application (app) that is freely available for download in the App Store on iTunes 
for iOS users, and Google Play for Android users. Between March 11
th 2012 
and  April  3
rd  2014  a  total  of  29,740  participants  of  at  least  18  years  old 
submitted  71,981  datasets  (‘plays’)  for  the  game  “Am  I  Impulsive?”.  Upon 
starting  the  app  for  the  first  time  participants  provided  informed  consent. Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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Participants were asked for their age (<18, 18-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-51, 
60-69, 70+ years old), gender (male or female), location, education (GCSE or 
equivalent,  a-level  or  equivalent,  degree,  post-graduate  qualification),  life 
satisfaction (0-10 in steps of 1). As players were only known by an anonymous 
unique identifier (UID) assigned upon consent no identifiable data were stored 
(e.g. no IP addresses, email addresses, initials, dates of birth, and so forth). 
Ethical  approval  for  this  experiment  was  obtained  from  the  UCL  Research 
Ethics  Committee.  Participants  could  uninstall  the  app  at  any  time,  stop 
submitting data, or could request their data to be deleted from the server. These 
requests were made through the app and preserved anonymity. 
10.3.2 Task 
The design of the task was highly similar to the task in chapter 9, and indeed I 
obtained the same SSRT measures from both tasks. A critical difference was 
that  in  the  task  reported  in  this  chapter,  the  participants  were  not  asked  to 
respond as fast as possible to a Go cue; rather, they were asked to respond 
within a certain time window after onset of the trial (cf. Coxon et al., 2007). This 
has  implications  for  the  study  of  the  speed-selectivity  trade-off:  by  using  a 
response window the remaining response after a successful stop is not to be 
executed as quickly as possible, and as such there is no trade-off any more. 
This is one of the reasons for focusing exclusively on SSRT (at the exclusion of 
selectivity) in this chapter.  Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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Figure  10.1:  Task  design  for  each  2-minute  game.  (A)  The  game  required 
participants to smash fruits as they passed over the grey circles. (B) On 37.5% 
of trials one of the fruits turned brown in mid-flight, prompting the participant to 
quickly withhold their response only on that side. On Unprepared trials either 
fruit could turn bad (the example in B shows the right fruit turning bad). On 
Prepared trials one of the fruits glowed, indicating that only that fruit could turn 
bad.  (C)  This  information  could  be  used  to  employ  proactive  control,  and  I 
quantified  proactive  control  as  the  improvement  in  performance  in  Prepared 
over Unprepared trials. 
In this implementation of the task, participants tapped the left and right side of 
their smartphone or tablet screen to smash two falling fruits (Figure 10.1A). A 
single trial consisted of the fruits hanging at the top of the screen for 1-3 s 
(uniformly distributed), followed by the fruits falling down the vertical axis of the 
screen. When these passed over two circles indicating the response window, 
spanning 500 to 800 ms following onset of the fall, participants were required to 
tap both sides of the screen. Out of 32 trials in a single play of the game, a Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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random draw of 12 trials (37.5%) were ‘selective stop trials’ on which one of the 
fruits turned brown, indicating the corresponding side of the screen should not 
be tapped. On 16 out of 32 trials (‘Prepared’ condition) a glowing circle around 
one of the fruits indicated to the participant that this fruit alone might turn brown 
(which  it  would  do  in  6  out  of  16  trials,  i.e.  37.5%).  On  the  other  16  trials 
(‘Unprepared’ condition) neither fruit glowed meaning either fruit might turn bad 
(Figure 10.1B). The stop trials were always ‘selective’, i.e. never did both fruits 
turn bad in the same trial. As in chapter 9, Prepared trials thus contained extra 
information  concerning  the  action  that  might  require  stopping,  allowing  the 
participant to prepare and exert proactive control (Figure 10.1C). The number of 
ms between the start of the fall and the fruit turning brown is the stop signal 
delay  (SSD).  I  used  separate  staircases  for  the  SSD  in  Prepared  and 
Unprepared stop trials. The staircases started at 300 ms, moved by 50 ms up or 
down following correct or incorrect stops, respectively, and were reset at each 
play of 32 trials. Taken together, there were 4 types of trials: Unprepared go, 
Unprepared stop, Prepared go, and Prepared stop (but no ‘No Stop’ trials as in 
the lab version of this task). Reactive control was calculated as the SSRT in the 
Unprepared  condition,  whereas  proactive  control  was  calculated  as  the 
difference  in  SSRT  between  Unprepared  and  Prepared  trials  (i.e.  the 
improvement in SSRT with information; see below). All trials types were fully 
counterbalanced over events on the left and right side of the screen. The order 
of  trials  was  randomised  for  each  play.  Feedback  consisted  of  one  of  the 
following statements: ‘You touched too soon!’; ‘You touched too late!’; ‘Touch 
the fruit inside the circles!’ (in case no buttonpress was detected); ‘Don’t touch Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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the bad fruit!’. A single play of the game took approximately 2 minutes, and was 
preceded by a short instruction screen.  
10.3.3 Participant exclusion 
Only completed plays that were immediately sent to the server over an active 
internet connection were stored. I first discarded data from participants with no 
correct Go or Stop trials, no failed or successful stop trials in either Prepared or 
Unprepared trials, or an SSRT that was smaller than or equal to 0 (see below 
for  SSRT  estimation).  This  left  us  with  22,098  out  of  a  total  of  29,740 
participants (74%). Unless noted otherwise, I then performed all analyses on 
participants that submitted 2 plays or more to allow for reliable estimation of the 
SSRT (12,496 out of 22,098 participants played 2+ games, 57%; Congdon et 
al.,  2012).  Data  collected  over  multiple  plays  by  a  single  participant  were 
concatenated. In all regressions I added the number of submitted games as a 
nuisance regressor. 
10.3.4 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
The  app  contained  a  messaging  system  allowing  researchers  to  contact 
participants through their UID alone. A link to an online version of the BDI-2 
(Beck et al., 1961; Beck et al., 1996) was sent to all participants. In addition to a 
standard set of 21 questions to measure current levels of depression, I asked 5 
optional questions about depression history, number of depressive episodes, 
duration  of  depression  over  lifespan,  history  of  anti-depressant  medications, 
and  occurrence  of  depression  in  immediate  family.  These  data  were  then 
matched to the task data based on their UID. In case of duplicate submissions 
only  the  first  submitted  questionnaire  was  analysed.  In  the  sample  of 
participants (>1 play) the response rate was 4% (509 participants). Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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10.3.5 Estimation of SSRT 
Using the same method as in chapter 9 I calculated SSRT for the Unprepared 
and  Prepared  condition  separately.  In  this  study,  SSRT-Unprepared 
corresponds  to  reactive  control,  and  the  percentage  improvement  between 
Unprepared  and  Prepared,  i.e.  100*(SSRT-Prepared  -  SSRT-
Unprepared)/SSRT-Unprepared, corresponds to proactive control. 
For the purpose of SSRT estimation, Go RTs were defined as the first detected 
button press in the trial (ignoring when the opposite side was pressed). All Go 
RTs, including those outside the correct response window, were arranged in 
descending order. I chose to include such trials to more accurately capture the 
true  RT  distribution.  I  excluded  18  participants  whose  proactive  control  was 
larger than 100% or smaller than -100%.  
10.3.6 Estimation of selectivity 
I estimated the selectivity of inhibition by calculating RTstopSuccess - RTGo. This 
represents  the  slowdown  in  the  remaining  response  when  executing  a  stop 
compared  to  when  no  stop  is  required.  Although  the  race  model  predicts  a 
positive value (because successful stop trials are assumed to represent slow 
response trials), individual variation can capture differences in selectivity of the 
inhibition process (Coxon et al., 2007, 2009). However, the reliability analysis 
(see Results) showed that this measure cannot be estimated accurately from 
the data, so in this chapter I focus on SSRT rather than selectivity. 
10.3.7 Statistical analysis 
To  test  the  hypotheses  I  performed  linear regressions  in  R  (R  Development 
Core  Team,  2008;  R Core  Team,  2011).  I regressed  the  various  dependent 
variables against models that always included nuisance variables including the 
number of submitted games, proportion of correct Go trials (both location and Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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timing  of  press),  and  operating  system  (iOS  or  Android).  As  regressors  of 
interest I used, across multiple models, scalar variables of age and BDI (both 
mean-centred; each participant’s age set to the centre of their age bin), and 
factors gender and education. For analyses that included education I excluded 
participants 18-24 years old as a large proportion might not yet have finished 
their education. I explicitly did not enter all variables and their interactions into a 
single large model, as this leads to many effects for which I had no hypotheses 
or  likely  interpretations.  I  used  the  R-package  ‘doBy’  for  post-hoc  contrasts 
(Højsgaard, 2012). For reliability analysis and plotting I used MatLab R2012a 
(The MathWorks, Inc.). To calculate split-half reliability I always compared even 
to odd plays (as performed in Williams et al., 1999). Note that I report effect 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals in ms rather than p-values, as the large 
sample size makes p-values less informative (Kline and Association, 2004). 
10.4 Results 
10.4.1 Reliability of SSRT and selectivity estimates 
SSRT and selectivity have been used as markers of inhibitory control (e.g. Aron 
and  Verbruggen,  2008;  Smittenaar  et  al.,  2013a).  As  these  are  summary 
measures derived for each participant, their reliability depends on the amount of 
available data. For example, 52% of participants submitted only a single play, 
which is about 2 minutes’ worth of data. Indeed, for participants who played 
more than once, the intra-class correlation between the first and second play is 
below 0.4 for both SSRT and selectivity, which is classified as ‘poor’ (see Figure 
10.2;  Cicchetti,  2001).  Including  twice  the  number of  trials  leads  to  a  ‘good’ 
reliability for SSRT-Unprepared and SSRT-Prepared, whereas the reliability of 
the  selectivity  measures  remains  poor  (Figure  10.2).  Given  these  results  I Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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excluded those participants who only submitted a single game, and focused the 
analyses on SSRT rather than selectivity.  
 
Figure  10.2:  Reliability  of  SSRT  and  selectivity  depends  on  the  number  of 
available  plays  per  participant.  The  SSRT  represents  the  duration  of  the 
inhibitory  process,  i.e.  the  speed  of  inhibition  (see  Methods).  Selectivity 
represents the slowing that occurs on the concurrent response when an action 
is inhibited. Both measures can be estimated for the Prepared and Unprepared 
conditions separately. Here I use the intra-class correlation (ICC) to quantify the 
reliability of these measures as a function of the number of trials that are used 
in the estimation. If SSRT and selectivity are estimated from the first game only 
and compared to the second game (# of plays = 1 in the figure), reliability is 
poor for all measures (following criteria from Cicchetti, 2001). As more games 
are  used  for  estimation  reliability  increases,  although  reliable  estimation  of 
selectivity requires approximately 4 times as much data as reliable estimation of 
SSRT as shown by the rightward shift of the selectivity curves compared to Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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SSRT  curves.  Error  bars  represent  95%  CI  on  the  ICC,  n  =  number  of 
participants for whom sufficient plays were available. 
10.4.2 Applicability of the independent horse race model 
Despite good reliabilities, the relatively small number of trials included in the 
calculation  of  some  of  the  SSRTs  might  make  the  independent  horse  race 
model unsuitable (Logan, 1994; Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b). Participants 
with 2 or more submitted plays had at least 12 stop trials and 20 go trials in the 
Prepared and Unprepared condition each. This is half the number of trials per 
condition that Congdon et al. (2012) showed were needed to yield a reliable 
estimate  of  SSRT.  To  ascertain  the  applicability  of  the  horse  race  model  to 
these data I checked a range of assumptions of the model (Figure 10.3). Firstly, 
on trials where the participant fails to stop, the RT tends to be faster than the 
average Go RT, in line with the prediction that failed stop trials represent the 
fast  part  of  the  Go  RT  distribution  (Figure  10.3A-B;  Prepared:  mean  RTGo  - 
RTstopFail = 22.8 ± 0.6 ms; Unprepared: mean RTGo - RTstopFail = 25.3 ± 0.6 ms). 
Secondly, the later the stop-signal was presented, i.e. the longer the stop-signal 
delay, the lower the probability of stopping (Figure 10.3C) and the higher the 
reaction time on failed stop trials (Figure 10.3D). Together these results suggest 
an  independent  horse  race  model  is  applicable  to  data  from  both  the 
Unprepared and Prepared conditions in participants with 2 or more submitted 
plays. Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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Figure 10.3: The Unprepared and Prepared condition satisfy assumptions of the 
race model used to calculate SSRT. The horse race model (Verbruggen and 
Logan, 2009b) assumes that a stopping process with fixed duration is set off as 
soon as the stop signal is presented. This process then catches up with the Go 
process only if the stop was initiated far enough in advance of the Go response, 
i.e. 1) if the Go process happened to be slow on that trial and/or 2) if the stop-
signal  was  presented  early.  Confirming  the  first  prediction,  in  stopFail  trials 
(where the participant erroneously responds and thus fails to stop) the reaction 
times are on average faster than in Go trials, in both the Unprepared (A) and 
Prepared (B) condition. Confirming the second prediction, the later the stop-
signal was presented (i.e. the later the fruit turned brown) the lower the chance 
of stopping successfully (C). Lastly, if the SSD is large the stop process cannot 
catch up even with slow Go responses; this predicts that the average stopFail 
RT will go up with larger SSDs, which is indeed the case (D). All RTs are shown 
relative to the centre of the response window, which was at 650 ms after the 
start of the fall. SSDs are relative to the start of the fall. Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. White dots in A and B indicate population means. Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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10.4.3 Preparation improves speed of inhibition 
As expected, preparation (proactive control) improved the SSRT (Unprepared - 
Prepared,  31.9  ±  1.1  ms  improvement).  To  examine  how  the  between-
participant factors affected inhibitory control I examined SSRT-Unprepared as a 
measure of reactive control, and the improvement from Unprepared to Prepared 
as a measure of proactive control.  
10.4.4 Demographics of proactive and reactive control 
In a regression of SSRT-Unprepared on age, gender, age-by-gender and three 
nuisance variables (see Methods), I observed 18-24 year old women are 9.97 ± 
1.99 ms slower than men. However, there is also a significant age-by-gender 
interaction on this measure of reactive control (Figure 10.4A, red lines). That is, 
whereas men on average deteriorate by 10.1 ± 1.22 ms per decade, women do 
so only at 8.2 ± 1.05 ms per decade (1.9 ± 1.57 ms per decade slower than 
men). Reactive inhibitory control thus declines more slowly in women than men. 
For proactive control (the difference between Unprepared and Prepared SSRT), 
18-24 year old women showed a larger improvement with preparation (Figure 
10.4B;  1.95  ±  0.57  %  point  difference).  This  effect  of  gender  on  proactive 
control,  if  anything,  became  stronger  with  older  age  (the  gender  difference 
increased by 0.46 ± 0.45 % point per decade). Although Figure 10.4B suggests 
a trend whereby proactive control increases with age, this was not significant (-
0.01 ± 0.03 ms) and therefore presumably captured by the nuisance regressors. 
Together,  these  results  show  that  reactive,  but  not  proactive,  control 
deteriorates  with  age,  but  more  so  in  men  than  women  (Figure  10.4A). 
Furthermore, women experience greater benefits from proactive control across 
all ages (Figure 10.4B).  Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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Figure  10.4:  Demographics  of  proactive  and  reactive  control.  (A)  SSRT-
Unprepared, which measures the speed of reactive control, increases with age. 
However, this age-related decline is more rapid in men than women. Proactive 
control  is  quantified  as  the  difference  between  Unprepared  and  Prepared 
SSRT,  i.e.  the  amount  by  which  inhibition  is  improved  through  preparation 
(difference  between  red  and  blue  line).  (B)  In  proactive  control  strikingly 
different  pattern  is  observed.  Relative  to  performance  in  Unprepared  trials, 
women improve more with preparation across all ages, with a slight increase in 
this improvement with age. Although the lines seem to have a negative slope, 
there was  no  evidence  for an effect  of  age  on  proactive  control.  The  y-axis 
represents the improvement in SSRT between Unprepared and Prepared as % 
of SSRT-Unprepared, such that more negative values indicate greater benefit of 
preparation  on  the  speed  of  inhibition.  (C)  Higher  attained  education  in 
participants aged 25 or over is not only associated with better reactive control 
(reduction in SSRT-Unprepared), but also with a better proactive control (larger 
difference between red and blue bar). (D) The BDI scores were distributed as Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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shown  in  the  grey  histogram.  No  relationship  with  SSRT-Unprepared  or 
proactive  control  was  apparent.  All  error  bars  indicate  95%  CI.  BDI  =  Beck 
Depression Inventory; GCSE = general certificate of secondary education; A-
level = general certificate of education advanced level. 
For education I also examined SSRT-Unprepared and the difference between 
SSRT-Unprepared and SSRT-Prepared to distinguish reactive versus proactive 
control,  respectively  (Figure  10.4C).  Progressively  higher  levels  of  education 
were associated with better SSRT-Unprepared (compared to GCSE, in ms: a-
level, -4.8 ± 4.1; degree, -7.1 ± 3.7; postgrad, -8.4 ± 4.0). Similarly, proactive 
control increased with education (compared to GCSE, in % points: a-level, -1.6 
± 1.2; degree,  -2.6 ± 1.1; postgrad,  -3.3 ± 1.2). Together, this shows that a 
higher level of education is associated with better reactive as well as proactive 
control. 
Lastly I explored possible relationships between depression indices and SSRT 
(Figure 10.4D). In a regression identical to the age-by-gender regression above, 
but with BDI scores added as a predictor, I observed no relationship between 
the BDI score and SSRT-Unprepared (change in SSRT with every point on BDI 
scale, 0.05 ± 0.39 ms) or proactive control (0.04 ± 0.14 % points).  
10.5 Discussion 
This  chapter  describes  a  dataset  acquired  through  smartphones  in  which  I 
examined inhibitory control in a strongly heterogeneous group of participants in 
terms of their age, gender, education and depressive symptoms. I showed that 
these data conform to assumptions of the widely used independent horse race 
model, which was used to estimate the SSRT in the Prepared and Unprepared 
conditions. These measures can be reliably estimated from the data even with Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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only ~4 minutes of data (64 trials). I show that reactive control, operationalised 
as SSRT in the Unprepared condition, deteriorates with age, and this occurs 
faster in men than women. Proactive control, operationalised as the change in 
SSRT  in  the  Prepared  compared  to  the  Unprepared  condition,  did  not 
significantly  change  with  age.  Moreover,  proactive  control  was  stronger  in 
women compared to men at all ages. Additionally, higher levels of education are 
associated with better reactive as well as proactive inhibitory control, whereas 
depression shows no relationship with either measure of inhibitory self-control. 
There are many benefits as well as limitations to the use of smartphones in 
cognitive science (Dufau et al., 2011). As in lab-based (Henrich et al., 2010) 
and  online  (Chandler  et  al.,  2014)  cognitive  research  a  sampling  bias  is 
assumed  which  is  compounded  by  the  cross-sectional  approach  as  in  lab 
studies on aging (e.g. Salthouse, 2009). Broad sampling of the wider population 
is a first step to understanding how our models of cognition apply beyond the 
common context of Western university students. For example, another game 
from  The  Great  Brain  Experiment  showed  that  a  computational  model  of 
subjective well-being developed in the lab could be used to predict well-being in 
the  broader  population  (Rutledge  et  al.,  2014).  Smartphones,  given  their 
ubiquity not only in the West but worldwide (Bicheno, 2012), provide a cost-
efficient and societally engaging way of achieving this goal. 
These results extend previous research on inhibition in multiple ways. I replicate 
the  finding  that  reactive  control  deteriorates  with  age  (Williams  et  al.,  1999; 
Bedard  et  al.,  2002;  Coxon  et  al.,  2012).  Unlike  these  previous  studies  I 
observed an age-by-gender interaction. This adds to an existing controversy on 
differential  cognitive  decline  in  men  and  women,  with  some  reports  finding Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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faster decline in men (on a cognitive battery; Maylor et al., 2007), and others 
finding no differential decline (in spatial ability; Willis and Schaie, 1988; Driscoll 
et al., 2005), and yet others finding women decline faster (on simple and choice 
RT; Der and Deary, 2006). This cognitive heterogeneity is surprising given the 
more rapid age-related neural decline consistently found in men compared to 
women (Gur et al., 1991; Cowell et al., 1994; Murphy et al., 1996; Coffey et al., 
1998;  Good  et  al., 2002),  including  in  prefrontal regions  critical for inhibitory 
control (chapter 9 and Majid et al., 2013). Future work, for example on white-
matter connectivity rather than brain volume (Coxon et al., 2012), might shed 
more light on the neural underpinnings of age- and gender-related decline and 
maintenance  of  cognitive  function.  It  would  be  particularly  relevant  to 
understand  how  proactive  control  performance  is  maintained  in  the  face  of 
neural decline, and how this aligns with theories of proactive control in aging 
(Braver, 2012; Lindenberger and Mayr, 2014). 
In  contrast  to  this gender-by-age  effect on  reactive  control, proactive control 
was greater (i.e. SSRT improved more with preparation) in women compared to 
men at all ages. That is, whereas advance information benefits the speed of 
inhibition as observed previously (Aron and Verbruggen, 2008; Jahfari et al., 
2012; Smittenaar et al., 2013a), women improve more than men at all ages. 
This suggests that preparatory benefits are not simply a function of baseline 
performance whereby worse performers show larger improvements.  
Education is often controlled for (e.g. Monterosso et al., 2005) or measured but 
not reported on (e.g. Bedard et al., 2002; Rucklidge and Tannock, 2002) in the 
response inhibition literature. To the best of my knowledge there have been no 
previous  reports  showing  education  is  associated  with  better  reactive  and Proactive and reactive response inhibition across the lifespan 
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proactive  inhibitory  control.  Attention-deficit/hyperactivity  disorder  (ADHD)  is 
characterised by impaired response inhibition (Casey et al., 1997) as well as 
poor educational attainment (Loe and Feldman, 2007). Even adults who show 
symptoms and/or behavioural indications of ADHD during early childhood, but 
who are never formally diagnosed, show poor education attainment (Lambert, 
1988).  This  suggests  that  impulsivity  traits  contribute  to  educational 
performance, in addition to potential effects whereby poor education leads to 
impaired self-control.  
The approach presented in this chapter shows the power of harnessing large-
scale public participation in psychology and academic research (Bonney et al., 
2014). By transforming often tedious laboratory tasks into engaging games (Kim 
et al., 2014), researchers can now engage the public in research at vast scales 
without compromising their experimental designs. 
   General discussion 
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11 General discussion 
   General discussion 
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This  dissertation  describes  the  use  of  computational  modelling, 
neuromodulation and neuroimaging to investigate the neural and behavioural 
correlates of reward-guided and inhibitory action control.  
In chapter 2 I reviewed evidence that reinforcement learning can be parsed into 
model-free  and  model-based  components.  I  went  on  to  study  how  levodopa 
(chapter 5) and transcranial neurostimulation (chapters 6 and 7) can modulate 
these specific components of reinforcement learning. In chapter 8 I used high-
resolution imaging to investigate the functional neuroanatomy of frontostriatal 
reward learning networks.  
In  the  second  part  of  this  thesis  I  studied  proactive  and  reactive  inhibitory 
control  which,  like  reward  learning,  requires  adjustments  to  action  based  on 
uncertain  information  from  the  environment.  In  chapter  9  I  studied  the 
frontostriatal networks that subserve proactive control over response inhibition.  
In the final study of this thesis I studied proactive and reactive inhibitory control 
in a much larger and more diverse sample than is available for laboratory based 
studies  through  a  smartphone  application,  revealing  how  inhibitory  control 
varies by age and gender (chapter 10).  
Having discussed the conclusions and implications of each individual study in 
their respective chapters, in this final discussion I touch upon two issues that 
are  of  a  more  general  nature;  firstly  whether  model-based  and  model-free 
control can really be considered distinct and secondly; how recent advances in 
human neuroimaging might drive a more anatomically grounded view of striatal 
function. I examine these in light of previous studies in the field as well as my 
own work presented throughout this thesis. General discussion 
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11.1 How distinct are model-based and model-free control? 
Throughout this thesis I deliberately drew a clear-cut distinction between model-
based and model-free influences over behaviour. It is more likely, however, that 
these two forms of control represent opposite poles of a continuous spectrum. 
This  continuous  view  of  control  is  reflected  in  the  many  machine  learning 
algorithms  that  borrow  elements  from  both  classes  of  model  (Sutton,  1990; 
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Furthermore a range of recent findings in cognitive 
neuroscience support the notion of a spectrum of control  (Daw et al., 2011; 
Gershman et al., 2014).  
For example, in chapter 2 I introduced dopaminergic and ventral striatal reward 
prediction  errors  as  a  fundamentally  model-free,  stimulus-response  learning 
mechanism.  Indeed,  a  purely  model-based  controller  would  have  no  use  for 
stimulus-response reward prediction error in most naturalistic environments. It 
came as a surprise, then, when Daw et al. (2011) reported that ventral striatal 
BOLD responses can best be explained by modelling not only a model-free but 
also  a  model-based  component  to  the  reward  prediction  error  (also  see 
Deserno et al., 2015). Equally surprising was the finding that the lesions of the 
ventral striatum abolish model-based reward identity learning (McDannald et al., 
2011).  A  more  formal  departure  from  fully  segregated  systems  is  the  Dyna 
algorithm (Sutton, 1990). Here, a model of the environment replays events and 
action sequences to train an instrumental learning mechanism, e.g. by replaying 
events through models of the environment represented in the hippocampus to 
generate reward learning signals in the striatum (as suggested by Johnson and 
Redish,  2005).  Behavioural  evidence  of  such  model-based  instruction  of  a 
model-free system has now been observed in humans (Gershman et al., 2014). General discussion 
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In their task a model-based and model-free system individually predicted that 
participants would make one choice, whereas a model-based system training a 
model-free actor would predict an alternative choice. The latter choices were 
indeed  observed,  a  result  that  was  replicated  in  follow  up  experiments 
(Gershman et al., 2014). 
Taken  together,  the  above  studies  provide  compelling  evidence  that  model-
based and model-free control exist along a continuum. The question then is not 
if there are multiple forces driving behaviour, but rather at what point during a 
decision and across the timespan of learning do models of the world exert their 
influence. How does this literature on dual processes relate to the findings from 
this thesis?  
As I alluded to in the discussion of chapter  5, it seems that we need to re-
evaluate  some  historical  work  on  instrumental  learning.  In  a  critical  paper 
Collins  and  Frank  (2012)  showed  that  even  simple,  1-step  reinforcement 
learning problems such as the one in chapter 8 are now known to engage both 
model-free and model-based mechanisms. This means than when behaviour on 
such a task is altered by Parkinson’s disease (Frank et al., 2004; Bodi et al., 
2009), dopaminergic drugs (Pessiglione et al., 2006), psychosis (Murray et al., 
2008), schizophrenia (Koch et al., 2010), genetic traits (Frank et al., 2007b), 
ageing (Chowdhury et al., 2013), adolescent development (van den Bos et al., 
2012) or addiction (Redish, 2004) it is difficult to tell whether this is due to a 
change in a model-free or model-based component of choice, or indeed in their 
interaction.  Chapter  5  showed  the  surprising  result  that  levodopa  in  healthy 
participants  had  no  effect  whatsoever  on  model-free  learning,  but  boosted 
model-based control. In a 1-step learning task such a dopamine-induced boost General discussion 
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in model-based control might well be expressed through faster learning rates in 
a  (model-free)  temporal  difference  reinforcement  learning  model,  leading  to 
potentially erroneous conclusions, for example that dopamine is impacting on 
model-free prediction errors.  
In conclusion, more work is needed to understand the intricate organization of 
decision-making, probably through the development of tasks that finely place 
behavioural control on a spectrum rather than categorise it into discrete forms. 
Until we have such an understanding, tasks that can provide more insightful and 
nuanced accounts of behaviour should be favoured over more basic tasks that 
until now have provided the foundation for our study of reinforcement learning. 
11.2 The specificity of ‘frontostriatal’ systems 
Corticostriatal systems are important for reward learning and decision-making, 
but also for virtually every other domain of cognitive neuroscience. Indeed, the 
study of frontostriatal systems has strong momentum at present —about 20% of 
all papers on the topic have been published in the last 2 years. But despite 
three  decades  of  work  on  functionally  segregated  loops  through  the  basal 
ganglia (Alexander et al., 1986; Averbeck et al., 2014), many functional studies 
in humans still refer to the striatum as a unitary structure. Indeed, given that the 
striatum  to  some  extent  represents  a  microcosm  of  the  cortex,  a  study 
concluding that a task ‘activated the striatum’ is akin to stating a task ‘activated 
the cortex’ if further anatomical specificity is omitted.  
The  remarkable  topography  of  the  striatum  provides  an  opportunity  to 
understand  what  specific  corticostriatal  loops  are  involved  in  cognitive  and 
motor  functions.  As  such,  the  anatomical  rigour  applied  to,  for  example, General discussion 
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prefrontal  cortex  (Rushworth  et  al.,  2011;  Haber  and  Behrens,  2014)  or  the 
visual system (Lund, 1988; Zeki et al., 1991) could also be leveraged in the 
striatum. Studies that do divide the striatum into parts often limit these efforts to 
three  areas:  the  ventral  striatum,  putamen  and  caudate  (e.g.  chapter  9  and 
O'Doherty et al., 2004). In reality, the functional and anatomical division is much 
more subtle (Graybiel and Ragsdale, 1978; Averbeck et al., 2014; van den Bos 
et al., 2014).  
In  chapter  8  I  took  a  data-driven  approach  to  understanding  how  local 
differences in corticostriatal connectivity relate to local differences in functional 
responses.  The  underlying  idea  is  that  function  in  the  striatum  is  not  easily 
defined along anatomical landmarks, as might be the case in motor or visual 
cortex. Indeed, the border between nucleus accumbens, caudate and putamen 
is  at  best  highly  ambiguous.  Using  the  connectivity  fingerprint  of  individual 
voxels  is  a  promising  method  to  define  functional  zones  within  the  striatum 
(Draganski et al., 2008; Saygin et al., 2012; Averbeck et al., 2014). As methods 
for  diffusion  imaging  and  probabilistic  tractography  improve  (Glasser  et  al., 
2013; Sotiropoulos et al., 2013; Van Essen et al., 2013) we can expect to see 
more studies beginning to explain computations and representations across the 
brain  in  terms  of  anatomical  connectivity.  This  promises  to  complement  the 
large  number  of  studies  of  functional  connectivity  (Fox  and  Raichle,  2007; 
Bullmore  and  Sporns,  2009;  Fries,  2009;  Friston  and  Dolan, 2010),  such as 
resting state fMRI which has already been used to segment the striatum (Di 
Martino et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2009; Barnes et al., 2010; Helmich et al., 
2010;  Choi  et  al.,  2012).  Indeed,  whereas  functional  connectivity  has  been 
convincingly used to study frontostriatal interactions in the competition between General discussion 
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model-based  and  model-free  control  (Wunderlich  et  al.,  2012b;  Lee  et  al., 
2014), a similarly rigorous approach using structural connectivity has to the best 
of my knowledge not been applied.  
In  summary,  the  argument  put  forward  is  that  not  all  striatal  activations  are 
created equal. By using a combination of functional and anatomical connectivity 
methods  we  will  hopefully  develop  a  finer  scalpel  to  study  the  origin  of 
corticostriatal activations and their role in cognition.  
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